OPERATION FELIX

Wanganui Chronicle, 29 September 1947, Page 2

OPERATION FELIX

NAZI WAR SECRET PLAN TO SEAL WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN (N.Z.P.A.—Special—Copyright.) London, Sept. The second instalment of the German secret naval archives, now published by the Admiralty, recording conferences between Hitler and Grand Admiral Raeder and other German service chiefs during the latter month s of 1940, reveals that Hitler was determined at this stage of the war to seize Gibraltar and the Canary Islands and seal the western Mediterranean. This operation, which was given the code name of Felix, was to have the full support of Franco Spain. After a conference with Hitler on November 4, 1940, Raeder noted: “The Fuhrer is determined to occupy Gibraltar as soon as possible. Franco is obviously prepared to enter the war on Germany's side within a short time, and the Army General Staff has already made preparations to send the necessary troops.” Franco’s price for his co-operation was apparently the cession to Spain of French Morocco. At this conference Hitler ordered that a “special reconnaissance unit - ’ of 50 German officers should be sent into Spain at once, that German troops should be moved up to the Franco-Spanish border, ready ,to march through Spain, and that immediate naval and air force preparations should be made to attack Gibraltar and seize the Canary Islands and also possibly the Cape Verde Islands. RAEDER SEES DANGER Raeder himself opposed the proposal to seize the Cape Verde Islands, as he considered this would cause dangerous political repercussions in the United States and give Britain a pretext for landing troops in Portugal. In order to protect the Germans against this, Hitler said he would give orders that three German divisions should move to the Portuguese border as soon as Spain entered the war. The records reveal that Hitler was also considering the use of the Azores as a base from which to launch longdistance bombing attacks against the United States, using a special new type of Messerschmitt bomber While these plans were being di<cussed, Mussolini attacked Greece. Raeder reveals that the Duce took this decision without reference to Hitler, who, together with the German High Command, regarded It as a major blunder. The Italian forces were considered quite inadequate, and the possibility, later realised, of being compelled to reinforce them with Germans, was unwelcome in view of Germany’s commitments and plans. Raeder’s misgivings, the records reveal, were confirmed when the Battle of Taranto gave the British Fleet the mastery of the Western Mediterranean and General Wavell’s offensive drove the Italians out of Libya. The Grand Admiral laconically described the Italian leadership as wretched, and noted that Hitler believed the Italian Royal family must be '‘eliminated” as it wa§ pro-British. For some time prior to this Hitler had been hinting about the possibility of attacking Russia, with which , Germany was then in a state of highly suspicious neutrality. FUHRER ACTS AGAINST RUSSIA. Raeder, who constantly reiterated his belief that Britain was the major enemy and that, all other considers- I lions should be subordinated to her , defeat, records that, he again urged i the Fuhrer to drop the idea of attack- 1 ing the Soviet and to concentrate by i every possible means of forcing Bri- | tain to sue for peace. Raeder argued | that, the Mediterranean must be regarded as the crucial theatre of war, and that if, by seizing Gibraltar and establishing bases in North Africa, Germany could destroy or immobilise the British Mediterranean Fleet the British supply position would become impossible. He urged that this should be accompanied by major intensification of submarine warfare around the British coasts. In spite of opposition, however, on December 18, 1940, Hitler suddenly issued a directive ordering his commanders to prepare to attack Russia. Raeder thereupon made another strenuous effort to convert Hitler to his point of view, and, among other things, discussed with the Fuhrer the possibility of invading Ireland. This j project, ‘however, was dropped be- ) cause Raeder believed the British I Fleet would prove too strong. ) At a final conference held in 1940, I Raeder records that lie Again stressed the urgency of attack upon Gibraltar, and that Hitler agreed, but admitted that Franco was still not ready. This Hitler attributed to British offers ot food and supplies to Spain.