The Wanganui Chronicle. THURSDAY, MARCH 6, 1947. FAMINE IN RUSSIA

Wanganui Chronicle, 6 March 1947, Page 4

The Wanganui Chronicle. THURSDAY, MARCH 6, 1947. FAMINE IN RUSSIA

E’AMIN’E in Russia to-day means a change in that country's attiture towards other countries. Instead of being consistently non-eo-operative there is a more accommodating attitude displayed by Russian delegations to international conferences and by the Soviet authorities in their dealings with neighbouring countries. Famine, however, is an ever present enemy waiting to strike at the Russian people. It has struck many times in the past. The Soviet policy is to place Ihe country in a position to resist future attacks upon her food supply.

The causes of famines in Russia are not as simple as they appear to be to the casual observer. Superficially the cause of a famine in the grain-growing areas is due to a lack of rainfall. This, however, is not the whole of the story. Other factors have played their part, and will do so again. Before the first World War Russia was suffering from largescale soil exhaustion. It was only in the Ukraine and in White Russia that sufficient corn was being produced to provide for exportation elsewhere within the Union. The first scientific step taken by the Soviet authorities on coming into power was to undertake a large-scale soil survey. This was in the nature of a stocktaking. It is probable that the scientific point of view gained 100 strong an influence and that this was the cause of the speedy turnover to co-operative farms and the elimitation of the Kulaks. This robbed the countryside of the real experts in soil management. The term Kulak is loosely used in Russia, but generally means a successful peasant. The Communists regarded the successful peasant as irretractable human material irrevocably wedded to individualism. This no doubt was in large measure true for these were the people who had made a success of individual management. There was little personal inducement for the individual worker on the collective farms and the average efficiency of these units was low, while the success of a Kulak set the seal on his subsequent liquidation. The great famine in the Volga region which came in 1921 and reached its peak in 1922 was due in great measure to the liquidation of the Kulaks. But there were other factors which operated. Deaths among the Russian forces during the first world war arc estimated at about 2,000,000, while 2,300.000 were returned from the fronts because of wounds or illness, while another 700,000 were returned from enemy prison camps because of illness and whose usefulness was no doubt impaired and whose lives were shortened. Russia was, therefore, suffering from this human loss when the big changeover to collective farming was essayed. Another factor which disturbed production was the levies in kind which were engaged in by the Soviet authorities in the early years of 'he regime. Realising that they would lose their cattle without adequate payment, the Kulaks took the only sensible course and killed their animals for food for themselves. The decimation of animal population was enormous through economic policy, while the run down of agriculture generally through the weakness of the human factor resulted in the lack of fodder and the spread of infectious diseases. Stalin, reporting to the Communist Congress in 1934, gave the following particulars for the years 1916, 1929 and 1933 respectively Horses (in millions) : 35.1; 3-1; 16.6. Large Horned Cattle: 58.9; 68.1 ; and 38.6. Sheep and Goats: 115.2: 147.2; and 50.6. Pigs: 20.3; 20.9; and 12.2. In some districts in the South East the human loss attributable to famine conditions were put down at 10 per cent, of the total population. It was experiences such as these that led the Soviet. Union to contemplate living more within itself. It abandoned the policy of forcing exports in order that larger quantities of imports could be secured from abroad. But Soviet policy had to pursue two lines of action; to prepare for the second world war which the Soviet rulers were convinced would break out and to expand the country’s food economy. The policy was sound enough and in the pursuance of this twin stemmed policy the Communist, doctrines were in practice modified and that modification has been going on increasingly ever since. To-day Russia, once the'granary of Europe, is facing a food famine in the South Eastern areas of its own territory. This famine extends to Rumania where thousands are reported to be dying. The dislocating effects of war upon the economy of the region must be given due weight in assessing the causes of the present famine, the loss of human effort through the war must also be taken into account and the debilitating effect of semi-starvation during the war years may not be left out of account. Russia has endeavoured to bring up not only the total animal population but also to improve the breeds thereof. A successful effort has also been made to increase the production of fertilisers. The German invasions, however, struck right at the heart of the best grain growing districts, of the hydro-clectrieally developed areas, thereby impairing the production of wheat and the generating of electric power and the manufacture of fertilisers. These war losses must have aggravated the adverse climatic conditions that have prevailed over the districts affected. It is not to be assumed that it is the Soviet economy that has brought about the current famine in South Eastern Europe but it would possibly have been less of a shock to the economy of the country and involved the population in less severe want had the economy of Russia been less insular and more linked up with that of other countries in the world. The change of note in her foreign relations may presage an alteration in policy in respect to Russia’s foreign trade relations.