WERE GOING TO WARN JAPAN

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 90, Issue 84, 11 April 1946, Page 5

WERE GOING TO WARN JAPAN

PRE-PEARL HARBOUR DAYS DOCUMENTS BEFORE U.S. INQUIRY. Recd. 7.45 p.m. New York. April 9. The “New York Times” says that in addition to Mr. Churchill’s messages to Mr. Roosevelt, the Pearl Harbour Committee was shown a document asserting that some time before the Pearl Harbour attack, at a date unfixed precisely, the Australian Minister for External Affairs reported, in detail, to the British Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, what Mr. Roosevelt intended to do as a warning to Japan. Mr. Fergusson (Republican, Michigan) claimed that the document indicated that the Australians had information, which, according to earlier evidence before the Pearl Hatbour inquiry, was not in the possession of the State Department, and was not known by the American public until to-day. Representative Murphy (Democrat, Pennsylvania), protested that neither Mr. Cordell Hull (then Secretary of State), nor the Assistant Secretary of State (Mr. Sumner Welles) had ever been asked whether they had such information. He termed Mr. Fergusson’s reference as unfair.

The “New York Times” says the Australian document was appended to a proposed British declaration that a force, or a threat in Thailand by Japan would be at her own peril, and that the British Commonwealth Governments would immediately take all appropriate measures. This projected warning was sent by Mr. Churchill to Mr. Roosevelt, for “any comments which the President may have,” and was presented to the Dominion Governments for their concurrence, or rejection. Available evidence indicated it reached Mr. Roosevelt not earlier than December 7, 1941, was shown to the Dominion representatives earlier.

The document showed that the Australian Minister, apparently referring to the declaration, sent the following despatch of the British Secretary for Dominion Affairs, London “Subject tf the conditions that the President gives approval to the text of the warning as drafted, and also gives the signal for actual delivery of the warning, we concur in the draft as a joint communication from all His Majesty’s Governments. I point out that a message just received from the Australian Minister at Washington notes, firstly, that the President has decided To send a Note to the Emporor; secondly, the President’s subsequent procedure is that if no answer is received by him from the Emperor by Monday evening, he will issue a warning on Tuesday afternoon, or at night, and the warning, or its equivalent by the British, or others, won’t follow until Wednesday morning; that is, until after his own warning has .been delivered repeatedly to Tokio.”