The Wanganui Chronicle. “Tuesday, September 19, 1944. PARATROOP LANDINGS IN HOLLAND

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 88, Issue 224, 19 September 1944, Page 4

The Wanganui Chronicle. “Tuesday, September 19, 1944. PARATROOP LANDINGS IN HOLLAND

entirely new war front has been opened in Europe, but the probability is that the paratroop landings in. Holland would occasion the enemy High Command no surprise. The anticipation before the landings were made in Normandy was that this would bo a point of Allied activities. That they should come now fits in with the German preconceived appreciation of the campaign. The campaign in France could have developed in several wa ; ys and it was not until actual achievements had been registered that the secondary stages of the campaign could be decided on. In such a lightning action as has been witnessed in the hundred days since D Day alternative follow-up plans had to be worked out before the start was made, for in this sort of warfare the essential science is that of logistics, the art of moving troops. The Allied High Command had to be prepared to make several moves, any one of which might again be subject to modification. Despite the mechanisation of warfare there is less use for mechanical or rigid thinking than has been the case at any time in the history of warfare. is flexibility of thought that is the essential element in the High Command. Had the enemy proved himself to be strong in Brittany and had the Allies been successful only in driving northward from Caen it would have been necessary to secure more landing places and pour in troops where possible in order to extend the front and so bring into operation their manpower superiority. But when the rightwing succeeded it was appropriate to throw out encircling arms. This broke the German organisation into small sections and led to the liberation of Paris and the general disintegration of the enemy’s armies. Had the enemy been able to get back to the old Hindenburg Line then it would have been appropriate to attempt a landing in the region north of Antwerp with the object of closing the corridor of retreat. But so swift and so successful was the Allied drive into Belgium that it was not until the German and Dutch borders were reached that the drive exhausted itself and the enemy was enabled to make something of a stand. While the frontier defences were being manned and opposition to the Allies was stiffening, the commanders of the Allied armies were compelled to think in terms of a turning movement. To land troops by parachuting them down at the mouth of .the Rhine was an obvious move before the campaign opened, for on the ‘islands at'the delta there were opportunities for paratroops to operate under favourable conditions. From this point a spreadingout process would have been disconcerting to the Germans and, appreciating this danger. Rommel at first established his headquarters at Breda. When the attack came in Brittany it was necessary for him to move his headquarters staff to the south. After the defeat headquarters had other things to occupy their attention, including that of improvising a line of defence much nearer home than was previously contemplated. Their efforts made it necessary for them to think, as did the Allied commanders, of a possible turning movement. The Rhine delta remained the obvious weak spot. Seeing that the nature of the campaign as it did develop made it dear that the Breda was the vital area, how comes it that the enemy did not make better preparations for the reception of the Allied invading troops? In such circumstances the simplest answer is the most probable. The answer which is prompted by this probability is that the enemy did his best with the material and men available for this particular task. The regular parking of gliders bespeaks controlled order on the ground which the paratroops have occupied, and while this may be subjected to attack in the near future, the most critical period for the Allied air-borne troops is directly following their landing. Each hour will add to their strength. The critical period may last for some days and even for a fortnight, but with the passing of each hour the risk of their force being wiped out will decline. Assuming that, the new movement is developed with success, the whole of Holland and Denmark will come under immediate pressure not only from without but also from within. Up to now the resistance forces in. these two countries have been deterred by the enemy’s dominance of the air, but from now on—with success attending the present effort—this dominance will soon be extiiiguished. This will give to the patriot forces in Holland and Den-

inaik better opportunities for matching themselves against the. German garrisons in their respective countries.