The Wanganui Chronicle. WEDNESDAY, MARCH 17, 1943. KHARKOV AND SMOLENSK

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 87, Issue 63, 17 March 1943, Page 4

The Wanganui Chronicle. WEDNESDAY, MARCH 17, 1943. KHARKOV AND SMOLENSK

’’fllE Russians have maintained on the central sector the weight of their offensive against file Germans, being content to hold the latter in the region of Kharkov. This decision bespeaks the prosecution of a large-scale scheme of attack. Tlie Russians possibly—it is impossible to dogmatise at the moment—could have held on to Kharkov, but had they decided to do so it would have made impossible the prosecution of the attack on the central sector. Why did the Russians seemingly leave half done their task in the south? Why did they start a new' offensive against the most formidably-defended front s It is probable that the Russians achieved more .success on the southern sector than they expected to do, and in developing this success they passed over a larger area of terrain than they could conveniently do and sustain the offensive. Then came the early thaw which reduced the over-snow transportation, which threw all supplies on to the railways, which cannot yet be established over considerable lengths of the track at the rear of the Russian front. The Russians maintained the defence of Kharkov as long as their resources would allow them, but there has evidently been no rout of their forces on this sector. German reserves freshly arrived from the Reich have been thrown into the Kharkov battle which has enabled the Germans to recapture the city. The Germans now have attained a psychological victory as well as a military one, and that is of great advantage to an army that lias been retreating under necessity. It re-establishes the belief in the possibility of victory being attained which lifts up the army’s morale to a. desirable level. The Russians are fully alive to the desirability of preventing the happening of any event which will stimulate the enemy’s fighting spirit, and the former would not have lightly conceded Kharkov to the enemy. It is well known that the attacker against a prepared position loses more than the defender, and if a high price has been exacted from the Germans the Kharkov action may still be regarded as a Russian success. But the Kharkov engagement docs not stand as an isolated operation when viewed from the Russian side. The Russian High Command must attempt to appreciate German intentions during this year. Having failed to hold the Caucasus and secure oil in sufficient quantities, the Germans must make their future strategy conform to the supply situation as it exists to-day. By the rigid conservation of oil fuel and lubricants Germany may be able to stage a violent but short-lived offensive during the current year. But where shall this be staged? If Russia could be knocked out of the war, then the Axis Powers would be able to turn their faces to the west and concentrate their efforts in smashing any transoceanic invasion of Europe. There will be problems enough in this, but they will be easier of accomplishment if Russia’s armies can be disposed of first of all. Driving at the Caucasus again will not achieve this, and the Germans are hardly likely to entertain such a project. Their present drive at Kharkov is designed to make easier the withdrawal of their troops in the Donetz Basin; a very difficult task to-day. Marshal Timoshenko’s task is to drive at Smolensk, which is the central headquarters of the German eastern front. It is believed that Hitler’s headquarters arc also established at this base. The drives at Rjev and Viazma were preliminary to the advance against Smolensk, which must be expected to be a task of great magnitude, for the Germans may be expected to endeavour to retain the central front intact in order to be in a position to stage their sledgehammer attack along Napoleon’s road to Moscow. If Moscow can be retained as the possible goal of the German offensive the dislocation of the whole Russian military effort continues to exist as a reasonable possibility. Timoshenko is aiming to spoil that essential short, sharp drive at Moscow before it can be launched, and he regards this as of such supreme importance that he is prepared to run risks of allowing large numbers of German troops to escape from the Donetz Basin area. The Germans, having committed their reserves to the prosecution of the rescue operations in the southern sector, are under a handicap in reinforcing the vital central sector. Timoshenko can consequently be expected to prosecute with vigour his campaign against Smolensk in order to achieve as much as possible before the enemy’s reserves are re-committed. Timoshenko’s task, in short, is to defeat the German eastward drive by attacking its base line before the movement is launched. Smolensk constitutes the base line.