FRANK APPEAL

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 87, Issue 22, 28 January 1943, Page 4

FRANK APPEAL

CURTIN ASKS FOR HELP FROM AMERICA PACIFIC WAR COUNCIL ‘‘MERELY A SOP” (Special Australian Correspondent—N.Z.P.A.) Recd. 6.15 p.m.) Sydney, Jan. 27. “Mr. Curtin did not plead for special favours but for a broader conception of the danger which threatens all the democracies. It was the Prime Minister’s frankest appeal for more American help in the war against the Japanese.” The Sydney Daily Telegraph this morning offers the above editorial comment on Mr. Curtin’s world-wide Australia Day broadcast. The paper agrees with the clear Untted Nations strategy that Australia is not the best base for a direct attack against Japan, but says there J is no doubt that if Australia goes the “ whole Pacific would be “wide open” to the Japanese, and that. America would then have to defend her western shores. “This is the point Mr. Curtin tried to drive home in the bluntest words he has so far talked to our ally,’’ adds the Telegraph. “Greater American resistance in ships, men and machines is therefore essential, not only for Australia’s sake but for the* sake of the American people as well.” The views expressed by Mr. Curtin on the conduct of the Pacific* war fairly well reflect the opinion of the great bulk of Auslralians. Their hopes that a greater proportion of the United Nations’ strength may be allocated to this theatre had been raised by persistent Washington reports that important announcements to be made on the direction of global strategy will mean that more attention will be given to the war in the „ Pacific. A great champion for closer Amencan attention to the struggle against ft Japan and for increased Allied striking power in the South Pacific has been the Christian Science Monitor military writer, Joseph Harsch, author of “Pattern of Conquest," who has had wide experience of both the war in Europe and the war in the Pacific. Harsch has recently pointed out to Americans the inadequacies of the Pacific War Council, which, he contends, was “instituted by President Roosevelt as a superficial concession to Australia under extreme pressure. “It was never regarded as more than a sop in official American eyes—and a grudging sop at that,’’ adds Harsch, “and it has suffered the inevitable fate of mechanism formed in such circumstances —meetings become less frequent and the President informs members of the broad outlines of decisions reached elsewhere.” Emphasising the desirability of China and the South Pacific democracies (Australia and New Zealand > having a greater voice in decisions of global strategy, Hersch points out for the benefit of his American readers that the Pacific War Council is not the deliberating or deciding body but gathers to learn the decisions reached bv American and British Chiefs of Staff.