The Wanganui Chronicle TUESDAY, JANUARY 5, 1943. RUSSIAN STRATEGY
THE Russians are now reaping the fruits of their masterly strategy. This, however, tends to become obscured by the harvest of successes that have been reaped in recent ■weeks. It is desirable to keep the main picture well in mind so that the' operations can be appreciated for what they arc. The Russians have two main advantages—a large area within which to retire and a tremendous reserve of manpower. The fundamental of the strategy employed in this war is to make full use of these main advantages. By retreating where necessary the Russians lengthen the line of the enemy’s front, thereby thinning it out. The Germans endeavoured to counter this by attacking upon narrow fronts and by employing mobile units in sweeping movements behind the defenders’ lines. The Russians have always managed to extricate their armies from these encircling arms. The German High Command appreciated that the Russians, if they were able to maintain their front during last summer and autumn, would be able to return to the attack in Jhe winter. Hitler, doubtless with a view to the internal condition of the Reich, favoured a less adventurous course than his generals advocated. While they wanted to go forward to the attack and so compel the enemy to accept battle on a decisive scale, Hitler wanted to consolidate his position and so compose the public mind that there was nothing to fear from the Slav menace. In order to provide the resting place for this defensive campaign it was necessary to have a position from which the offensive of next spring could be launched. Stalingrad was the obvious advanced restingplace for the winter. From there the Volga River could be cut and used for moves both north and south. A southern drive yvould place upon the Kalmuk area in the Caucasus the tremendous strain of having to fight in isolation, and would pave the way to the complete contiol by Germany of the oilfields of that region. With oil available from this area the Germans would be in a much more favourable position and the Russians would have been very unfavourably placed for the future prosecution of the war. Instead of falling in accordance with the Hitlerian expectations, Stalingrad proved unconquerable. Then came the winter and, instead of the war slowing down, the Russians moved to the offensive on either side of Stalingrad. The Germans were compelled to accept a position in which the initiative rested with the defenders. It is now clear that the Germans endeavoured to break through to the relief of the attackers of Stalingrad, who by now had become defenders of their own position. The reversal of roles was as disconcerting as it was unexpected. It compelled the Germans to place their reserves where the Russians could calculate their strength. Immediately this was done the Russians knew where they could place their next blows at the German front. The central front immediately became active and Rjev became the scene of an enveloping and bypassing movement. The line from Viazma to Smolensk was subjected to pressure, and the line from Viazma to Rjev was cut, thereby isolating that strongpoint. When anticipations were raised that this would be the scene of further deliberate fighting, the attack was shifted to the south of Stalingrad down the Volga River, resulting in the German armies in the Caucasian isthmus being required to regroup and retreat with considerable losses. While this was being carried out the Russians developed a further movement in the direction of Rostov; Millerovo was bypassed and the movement south and west was continued. Meanwhile the Germans have had to concede Elista to the Russians in the Eastern Caucasus, and Mozdok, near the Grozny oilfields, which indicates that the invaders feel the necessity to prepare against the closing of the door to the Caucasus. Just when the gravity point of the war seemed to have been definitely fixed in the south the Russians launched another attack, this time right in the northern-end of the front. By coming down south of Lake Ilmen and passing through the region of the Valdai Hills the Russians have captured the important railway junction of Velikiye Luki. This place is important as a feeder for the Rjev area, although the Russians had some weeks ago cut the line between these two towns.
The plan now being followed is clear. It is to attack the enemy’s flanks with the object either of compelling retreats on the extremities or of running the risk of having them cut off. The Russians have inflicted very heavy casualties upon the Germans and their allies in the course of these operations, but on the assumption that 60 divisions have been destroyed there are now some 190 Axis divisions yet to be dealt with on the eastern front. Even as they are at present distributed they constitute a dangerous force, but were they occupying a shorter defensive front they would be even more difficult to subdue. The present situation is very fluid, and it would be difficult to forecast immediate future developments. As opportunities present themselves the Russians develop them, but taking the main strategy as it is indicated by the moves that have already been made, the thesis that the immediate long-range objectives are Riga and Rostov still stands. The present plan of attack is likely to cause two withdrawals, from Leningrad and from the Caucasus; and in each of these regions the Russians apparently are sufficiently strong and close to their adversaries to deal some very serious blows when once the enforced retreats are imposed upon the Germans. The heartening feature of the present developments lies in the time factor: the months of January and February fight for Russia, giving her mobility and imposing upon the Germans hardships in respect to food, clothing and transport. The current month and next month will, therefore, be powerful allies of Russia, doing incalculable harm to the Germans despite their much-advertised preparations to withstand the winter.
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Bibliographic details
Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 87, Issue 3, 5 January 1943, Page 4
Word Count
1,002The Wanganui Chronicle TUESDAY, JANUARY 5, 1943. RUSSIAN STRATEGY Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 87, Issue 3, 5 January 1943, Page 4
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