JUNGLE WARFARE

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 86, Issue 227, 26 September 1942, Page 3

JUNGLE WARFARE

WHERE JAPANESE EXCEL ADVICE TO COMMANDOS (Special Australian Correspondent—N.Z.P.A.) Sydney, Sept. 25. Japanese success in New Guinea jungle fighting is the result of careful planning and intensive training. In 1940 Japan established on the islands of Formosa and Hainan two great “schools for conquest.” On each of these islands a secret armv of 200,000 men was conditioned to the rigours of jungle fighting and trained in the tactics of infiltration. War correspondents urge the need for Australia (in common with every United Nation charged with opposition to Japanese in the Pacific) to develop its own Commando Army trained in ruthless guerrilla battle technique, in shock tactics, and imbued with persistent initiative mors than matching that of the stubborn, resoiutp Japanese enemy. A military correspondent claims that we have not got the ships for a “massive and conventional offensive. Therefore, oi.'r Pacific war—if it is to be effective—must be a commando war; that is to say, a war in which relatively small bodies of troops, by means of surprise, concentration and initiative, achieve results quite out of proportion to their numbers.”

Each theatre of war makes its own peculiar demands on troops invested in it. The Japanese early recognised tlie force of this. Japan’s troops-were not merely toughened for their tasks They were taught the topography and customs of the countries in which they were to operate. They exercised over terrain of the same character as that in which they were destined to fight. In China, Japanese troops camouflaged themselves by wearing uniforms of mud-yellow. Anticipating the lush green jungles of Malaya, New Guinea and the Solomons, their commando-type troops were taught how to be green from head to toot. Their light field equipment was the result of experience and experiment. Their snipers were issued with smokeless ammunition. In place of heavy army boots, they proved the value of rubber "sneakers." They were equipped with thick cotton pads for hands and knees to enable them to crawl through the jungle without a sound. So that each soldier could be self-suf-ficient for a fortnight, they gave special attention to the contents of his pack. These contents have no-w been found to comprise: Pound bag of rice; bag of hard tack; half-pound hard candy; can of field rations; package of concentrated foods; vitamin pills; anti-dysentery pills; quinine; antidote for mustard gas; bandages; can of chlorine to purify water; flashlight; gas mask; green mosquito net. also used to camouflage head and shoulders; heavier net, to camouflage rest of body; rope for tree-climbing. In their training for this specialised type of warfare, the Japanese are known to have had heavy casualties. They embraced the realistic policy that it is "better to kill 10 men in training than to lose 100 untrained men in action.” Instruction in the Japanese language is suggested as a little-rea-lised essential. Observers, admitting- that to learn Japanese is a long job, counter by saying that this is likely to be a long war. They point to the fact that the average Japanese officer speaks English—often excellent English. This ability has too frequently caused considerable confusion and casualties among our own troops. A second need is to assemble and organise all possible local Pacific knowledge by drawing on people who have lived in the various islands and who speak the language of the natives and know their customs. More than being made expert in landing operations, commandos in the Pacific war should be instructed in elementary seamanship and navigation. (The numbers saved from Greece and Singapore because they had a yachtsman among them is an argument for this). Sabotage, concealment, camouflage and disguise are all accepted parts of commando training, and these reuuire merely Io be adapted for Pacific needs, lesist'm ■ to disease is highly important. Tile Japanese soldier is always given time to acclimatise himself before going into battle. In the New Guinea jungle, the newcomer usually contracts a bout of malaria within six weeks, rendering him unfit for active service for a further two or three weeks. Australian fighting strength has been heavily depleted from this cause. A military correspondent writes that "it is an open secret that our disease losses in Rabaul were tragic.’ Thorough instruction in tropical hygiene is, then, of paramount importance. Food for commando units should be compressed, nourishing without being bulky. Clothing must be light, and camouflage. For the rest, it U mostly up to the commando troops themselves. Commandos are not made to a standard pattern. And it is argued that the Anzacs have the initiative, as well as the courage ami the stamina, to make them the best commando troops in the world.