“INSIDE JAPAN”

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 86, Issue 58, 10 March 1942, Page 4

“INSIDE JAPAN”

j BEHIND THE HEADLINES AMERICAN JOURNALIST’S IMPRESSIONS This is the second of a series of articles by James R. Young, famous American foreign correspondent and former Tokio representative of International News Service. Young lived for 13 years in Japan, and was gaoled in 1940 by the Japanese Gestapo. Last year he returned to America and wrote “Behind the Rising Sun," on which these articles are based. Another in the series will be published to-morrow. ,Ql TST.\.\l >l ,\(i developiiK'iils in Japan's race for world arms supremacy, whirl) I tabulated in 1937. the year that marked the rise of Japan as a military threat, included : 1. A five-year naval programme • requiring nearly £123,000,00') above I regular annual naval expenditures I to provide for construction of addi- | lional warships, coastal defences, naval aircraft, torpedo boats, destroyers, and aircraft carriers. 2. A six-year Army plan calling for the expenditure of £77,000,000 a year and expected to reach £154,000,000 a year by 1941, with a 40 per cent, increase in general armaments . production and 100 per cent, jump in aircraft production. This, however, has failed, since Japan has been deficient in eight raw material essentials. 3. Expansion of munitions factories, arsenals, and private industries engaged in manufacture of war materials. Employment of distressed farm labourers in factories to reduce anti-military feeling created by rising costs of living attributed lo arms expansion. 4. Combined Army and Navy orders sky-rocketed, the production of finished steel products in Japan to an unprecedented total of 5.000,000 tons annually. The Japan Iron Co., now defunct, was a monopoly unit handling War Office orders. It contracted for 150,000 tons of American pig-iron following heavy similar purchases in India and France. 5. A secret fund of £750,000 a year was provided for propagandising Japan's position in Eastern Asia and to conduct an intensive domestic campaign to win over the populace lo the Army's demands for more funds. In effect, Japan’s military machine was on a virtual wartime basis for nearly five years while her diplomatic doves negotiated for peace! ' Unlike the soldiers of many world | Powers, the Japanese troops had op- ; port unities to function under warlike i conditions and to test lheir strength I and discipline on a miniature scale. '] High naval officers maintained a • pi maple oi secrecy in naval policy, but this did not apply in the Army, whore la limited group of militarists has led (Japan in an armament race that has i cost her more than she can afford. ■ There was never any guarantee or [assurance that statements of policy | might not. be turned overnight by ih'e Army or Navy into an expansion policy into China, Thailand, the South Seas, and even the Philippines. Under such circumstances the Navy was always liable to be called upon to support, the Army in an aggressive policy. Japan’s naval equipment, I was told, would he of a special nature, locally adapted and not of longrange or for extended cruising raxiius. Her armaments on the sea, they told me, and now 1 believe them, would be counted on as "surprisingly effective and accurate, speeay, and easy to handle in any encounter" or to assist an Army invasion of China or the South Sea area. In anticipation of a naval race, the Japanese fleet in J 937 was reorganised . and reinforced. The training fleet was , put on a permanent basis in 1938. A new 12th Squadron destroyer ffolilla was attached to Japan's second fleet. The third fleet was immediately ' vastly improved in equipment and personnel. 1 Development of American naval ' bases in the Pacific - Hawaii, the ’ Philippines, and Alaska spurred ( Japan to follow suit in strengtnening her South Sea Island bases. Then War Minister Hajime Sugi- ’ yama publicly announced: "In view of recent circumstances. ( our armaments must be expanded. The Soviet Union has built a huge lighting machine. Its development of armaments in the Far East is amazing. "Aircraft and anti-aircraft eqiupi ment are our most urgent necessities. - Next is an increase garrison in Man- - chukuo. Our fourth demand is adi justment and co-ordination of strategic i materials.” He accomplished all but. the last. ? Such frahk admissions of the n- - ese War and Navy Office's expa... on I programme left no doubt that the Jap- ■ anese military machine was headed - - with the Nazis for what happened on December 7. 1941.