WALL BETWEEN BRITAIN AND SOVIET RUSSIA

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 83, Issue 118, 22 May 1939, Page 7

WALL BETWEEN BRITAIN AND SOVIET RUSSIA

THE RECENT NEGOTIATIONS EXPLANATION BY MR. NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN DESIRE FOR CO-OPERATION TO KEEP EUROPEAN PEACE

f British Official Wireless ] Received Mav 20. 5.5 p.m. RUGBY, May 19. Speaking in the House of Commons debate to-day. the Premier (Mr. Chamberlain) dealt fully with the negotiations between London and Moscow and expressed the hope, in conclusion, that he would he able, in due course, to report to the House that a final agreement has been reached between the two Governments. He looked to the opportunity which Lord Halifax (Foreign Secretary) would have to-morrow for a discussion with M. Daladier (French Premier) and M. Bonnet (French Foreign Minister) to help toward that end, but he indicated the regret which Britain felt that Lord Halifax would not, after all, be meeting either M. Molotov (Soviet Foreign Minister) or M. Potemkin (Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs) at Geneva. “I cannot say how much I regret I the Soviet’s decision not to allow M. Potemkin to go to Geneva.” said the 1 Premier. “The League Council meeting was postponed for a week in order to allow him to go, and after it had been postponed it was found he could not go, and so Lord Halifax was de-1 prived of the opportunity of a per- ’ sonal discussion with him on 1 hese matters which, I think, might have! been valuable to both of us. No 1 doubt the Soviet has good reasons foi I her attitude, but 1 regret it is noti possible for the meeting to take placed This is one of the cases in which I cannot help feeling there is a sort of veil or wall between the two Governments which it is extremely difficult to penetrate, and if the opportunity had been afforded us we might have shaken hands across the gap.” “We Want Co-Operation.’’ The Premier disposed again of the charge that Britain was impeded by some kind of ideological prejudice in her approach to the Soviet, and proceeded to deal faithfully with the suggestion that Britain sought to evade reciprocity of obligation in the proposals put forward in Moscow. He insisted that Britain was not concerned at all with Russian internal or political doctrine. She was solely concerned with the best method of building up a peace front and enlisting the co-operation and assistance of the Soviet. "We want the Soviet’s co-

operation. We attach value to it,” he declared. Mr. Chamberlain proceeded to ridicule the suggestion that Britain’s attitude was one of disdain for Soviet assistance. Whatever its precise value, and he disclaimed the intention to make any unauthorised evaluation —whatever the value of the Russian military forces or of the way in which | they might be applied, no one would , be so foolish as to suppose that that > huge country, with her vast population and enormous resources, could be a negligible factor in the consideration of a situation such as confronted the peace-loving Governments of Europe. He cited M. Stalin’s statement that the Soviet’s policy was to sup,ort States that were victims of aggres-1 sion, if they were prepared to defend their independence, and said that since that was also Britain's point, of view Britain felt it was an indication I that the Soviet might be disposed to i collaborate in carrying that common | aim into effect. But in approaching the question of such collaboration Britain was also aware—and this was the point for which Mr. Chamberlain complained his critics had made insufficient allowance—that the direct participation of the Soviet in security guarantees might .not altogether be in accordance with the wishes of some of the countries for whose benefit or on whose behalf the arrangements contemplated were being made. Declaration Sought. Since Britain desired and sought the collaboration of all the countries ' concerned, she was anxious to avoid any division among them, said Mr. Chamberlain. That consideration was j what had [romoted the character of’ the British suggestion to the Soviet Government that Russia should make a declaration regarding Poland and Rumania similar to the one made by Britain and France, but in the form that if Britain and France should be involved in conflict in consequence of the undertaking which they had given to those countries, the Soviet Union for its part would be ready to render assistance also to Poland or Rumania as the case might be, always provided, of course, that assistance was desired. The Premier expressed himself as mystified how it could be contended that the offer was not reciprocal or how the misunderstanding in Moscow of that matter could have arisen. It had always been the British intention that an arrangement with Russia should be reciprocal. If it was argued that the British suggestion did not provide for a case of direct attack upon the Soviet Union, he re/Jied neither did it provide for a case of direct attack upon the United Kingdom. Again, it might be argued, it did nqt cover the cae of certain States other than Poland and Rumania, which were neighbours of Russia, and through which, perhaps, she might be attacked. That was quite true, but on the other hand it did not apply equally to certain Western States which, if an attack were made upon them, might ultimately cause Britain to be involved in war. The suggestion did not contemplate that the Soviet should intervene irrespective of whether Britain and France did so though, as a matter of fact, those countries’ commitments by the assurances they had given were irrespective of whether the Soviet came in.

Therefore, if there were inequality between the two Governments the inequality was in favour of the Soviet and not of Britain. Somehow there had been a misunderstanding and, in any case, the proposal was not acceptable to the Soviet, so Britain had tried again. In the meantime the Premier reminded those who were impatient for results that what they were seeking was not an alliance between a group of States, but a means of resisting aggression. They could not succeed in that policy if by ensuring the cooperation of one country they rendered another country uneasy and unwilling to collaborate. “I think that what profoundly disturbed the public mind everywhere, even more than the annexation, was the patent contradiction between those proceedings and the assurances which Germany frequently and solemnly gave the world,” declared the Premier. “The contradiction completely ux’ermined the sense of security throughout Europe and created a widespread feeling that the independence of no small Ration was safe if it stood in the way of German ambition. “It was in these circumstances that Britain thought it her duty, in conjunction with France, to intervene and try to supply a new stabilising factor,” Mr. Chamberlain continued. “It was necessary to act quickly because apprehension of an attack was acute in certain quarters. We took a course which was generally approved and acted ourselves and promptly gave the steadying support of assurances where they were most needed. “It will, therefore, be seen that the assurances we first gave Poland, Rumania and Greece were not the end of the measures in mind.” said the Premier. “It (.till remains to Strengthen them by more permanent arrangements and to try and obtain

additional support from other quarters willing and ahle to help. “This is not a oplicy of lining up opposing blocs of European Powers animated by hostile intentions against one another and accepting the view that war is inevitable. I never regard war as inevitable until it. has begun.” he declared. “The policy of opposing blocs seems to us essentially unstable and therefore, fundamentally dangerous. “There is no clement of aggression in our policy, which is one of precaution operative under conditions under which others have the power to make it unnecessary, but this policy seems necessary at present because without it we do not see the prospect of establishing a sense of security and stability in Europe,” he Premier stated. “Staring a Gift Horse 3 he Soviet Ambassador (M. Maisxy) was present when Mr. David Lloyd 'George opened the foreign affairs debate. He said that all the business about Russian proved that Britain did not know what she wanted. There was a great desire, if possible, to do without Russia, which had offered to come in months ago. but we were staring a gift horse in the mouth and were frightened of its teeth, yet. we

were not frightened of the teeth of the beasts of prey who were tearing one independent country after an- ' ot her. j "This very moment we are officially joining the celebration of their carnivorous triumphs in Madrid." Mr. Lloyd George declared. “The situation reminds me of the spring of 1918. Everyone feels a great att.acK is coming, but none knows where the blow will fall. The dictatorships are speeding up 1 heir .armaments at an unprecedented rate and in an atmosphere of secrecy which was intensified when diplomatic rights were withdrawn from eight embassies on May 25. “The way to keep out war is to assemble suck a force with France, Turkey and Russia as to make the dictators realise they cannot risk war without disaster. The members of the Axis have restlessly sought a vital strategic position and practically command the Mediterranean, but we can recapture it. Albania enables the possessor to command the Balkans.” hp added. Quick Decision. “Germany’s idea now as always is that, a speedy decision would have been achieved in 1914 but for Russia. The moment it failed to achieve a .;pccdy victory the game was up. The German military heads arc now working out a scheme for a quick decision on land and air, and she is enormously increasing her power and the number of submarines," he continued. “She has 20,000 tanks armed with big guns and capable of travelling over any country at an amazing speed, and she’ possesses more bombers than Britain. Germany will undoubtedly choose a point to attack Poland’s 1500-mile frontier. How can we send reinforcements since it is impossible to redeem our pledge to Poland without Russia?” Mr. Lloyd George concluded.