WANTS OF HITLER

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 80, Issue 169, 20 July 1938, Page 3

WANTS OF HITLER

A WAY TO ADRIATIC JUS PROGRAMME FOR ROME ZONES OF INFLUENCE When one head of a government meets another on an officially festive occasion, their diplomatic advisers have been busy long beforehand preparing the programme of formal conversations, wrote "Augur” from London to the New York Times on April 30. It often happens that decisions on important points are agreed on before the visit begins and it is not unusual for the official pronouncement on the results of the conversation to be drafted before the distinguished visitor leaves his capital. The visit of Chancellor Hitler ta Premier Mussolini is no exception to that rule and here in London it is taken for granted that Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop and Foreign Minister Gaieazzo Ciano and their permanent staffs have done therr duty, so that the meeting in Rome will proceed without a hitch towards its appointed end. However, it is useful to add that it is customery that the most important decisions do not appear in the official statement. They often become known later, surprising not only public opinion but even other governments, despite the fact that all of them maintain efficient intelligent services. London has a shrewd idea about the talks between Hitler and Mussolini. While Mussolini is chiefly concerned with returning with interest the honours shown him during his visit to Germany, the Fuhrer goes to Rome with the fixed intention to strike while the iron is hot. He fears that the Anglo-Italian Agreement just concluded is only a beginning of the process of the liberation of Italy from exclusive dependence upon the German partner in the Rome-Berlin axis. However much the Germans may claim that Mussolini’s consent was obtained to Austrian Anschluss, the undisputable fact remains that the capture of Vienna by the Nazis came as a surprise and deeply shocked Mussolini and the whole Italian nation. The Germans are certainly not unaware that their presence on the Brenner Pass is similar in its effect to a hard tumour constantly pressing upon an exasperated human body. After all, Mussolini would have never tolerated Anschluss had it not been for the quarrel with Britain over Ethiopia and the resulting formation of the Rome-Berlin axis. Hitler’s Anxiety Hitler is anxious to reap the harvest sown by co-operation with Italy before the Italians move awny. That i anxiety is reflected on the points of the agenda that German diplomacy set up in view of the coming visit as far as is known in London. These points on excellent authority are presumed to be the following:— First, free access for Germany to the Mediterranean through Adriatic ports, especially Trieste. Herr Hitler acts as the heir to Austria, to which Italy long ago conceded favourable treatment in that respect. But the tide of German power now rising from beyond the Alps presses for the solution of the problem of an approach to the open sea that would be more radical than the mere free port privileges :Vanted to the little Austrian Republic. If possible, Hitler wants Trieste placed under a regime that irrevocably would make that port carry on activities openly under the swastika banner. Evidently? Il Duce, even against Hitler’s promise not to raise any demands with regard to the Germans in Southern Tyrol, cannot agree to the alienation of an inch of the territory that the Italian nation won by so great an effort in the World War. The conflicting views will somehow have to be brought to a common standard, perhaps with the aid of a temporary solution. The second point will be delimitation of the respective German and Italian zones of influence in the valley of the Danube. The easy capture of Austria has whetted the appetite of Hitler, who now sees within his grasp the expansion of German influence down the great European river to the Black Sea, meeting there the Russian border. Before the Fuhrer’s eyes already a vision is said to exist of a mighty battle against the hordes of Moscow with a victory that would throw under his feet the riches of the Ukraine. A Vassal State To reach that goal it would be necessary to pass over the smaller States that lie across the path of German expansion. Hitler wants Czechoslovakia as a vassal. Not only the German districts, but the whole republic, because that would open to him access to Rumania. He also thinks he needs Hungary on the other side of Danube, because of its agricultural products and equally because control of Hungarian economic policy would permit practically complete encirclement of Czechoslovakia. But Hungary is a client of Italy, even older than was Austria. The Italian port of Flume exists through Hungarian maritime trade. The vassalage of Budapest to Berlin will not be absolute as long as Mussolini’s consent is not obtained. Therefore, Hitler needs a formal agreement with regard to zones of influence. It really would exclude Italy from the Danube Valley altogether. In any case, Hitler refuses to recognise anything outside Yugoslavia as belonging to Italy’s share. Third, the attitude of the Powers m • the Berlin-Rome axis must be decided ’ towards an expected move by the British Government, followed by the French, in favour of the creation of a combination of the great Powers of - Europe on the lines of the unsuccessful Four-Power Pact concluded at i Mussolini’s initiative some years ago. J Hitler opposed the idea altogether. - He cannot avoid the true reason, which is his unwillingness to release l Italy from direct dependence on him I in the Rome-Berlin axis. Instead, he v puts forward the following arg.j- -” ments:— A four-Power agreement exposes Germany and Italy to the danger of having to discuss later the inclusion of (Russia, which would be contraiy to

the principles of the anti-Communist pact between Berlin, Rome and Tokio. Also, Hitler holds the view that t France is now reduced to the position of a second-class Power, not deserving 1 a place in the front rank next to Ger - ' many, Britain, and Italy. No Compromise Tolerated The Nazi mentality is violently opposed to any combination that obliges , Germany to compromise on her demands. Hitler sees in Britain, with : her wealth and colonial possessions, a destined victim of the virile Germans when their 80,000,000 are united In Europe. He does not want to injure the prospects of a resplendent future by a compromise with decadent peoples. Mussolini, as is well known, thinks different. His ambition is to return swiftly to close collaboration with London and Paris, which he never would have deserted had it not been for the unfortunate quarrel over Ethiopia. Also, Mussolini possesses more imagination than Hitler and visualises easier the immense power of Britain, with her immense resources, which are only just beginning to be tapped. Fourth, German diplomacy would be delighted if it succeeds in separating permanently Italy and France. It believes the Anglo-Italian Agreement will become paralysed if the French cannot come to terms with Mussolini. Hitler still hopes to persuade his Italian ally that the French regime is hopelessly rotten and that the Stale is destined to end in disruption under the guidance of Marxist elements. Hitler would like Italian expansion to be directed towards Frencn territories. He points out that the ancient possessions of the royal Italian house, namely, Savoy, and the Nice district, naturally are destined to fall to Italy’s share when France is wrecked by social unrest. Also the Island of Corsica is needed to complete the dom - nation of the Tyrrhenian Sea so th.it the latter can become an Italian lake. Tunis, on the shore of Africa, nearly visible from Sicily, is a land predestined for occupation by the Italian race. The Italian Approach Thus the siren's voice from Berlin already sings the praises of Italian irredenta at the expense of France. Mussolini is too clever to accept this attractive dream as a reality. He prefers certain real advantages, political and economic collaboration with the Western Powers to the doubtful prospect of mythical aggrandisement. Germany’s strategic position in Central Europe is so strong now that Hitler really does not have to revert to force to obtain all his desires. It is quite unnecessary for him to go to war against Czechoslovakia when oy constant economic pressure he can reach better results in a cheaper The fifth point that Hitler is eager to discuss with II Duce is the tightening of military co-operation between their countries. Until now Rome has been linked to Berlin by a general promise that one partner in the axis should come to the assistance of the other in case ot aggression by more than one great Power. As a result, for example, during the quarrel over Ethiopia-the position of Italy in the Mediterranean n«came stronger when France openly sided with Britain because under the terms of the agreement mentioned, Germany automatically would have been obliged to consider co-operatio.i. But Hitler now wants more than

that. He wants a permanent military alliance committing Italy irrevocably o follow German policy in Europe. Until now, Il Duce has resisted pressure from Berlin in that sense, but I the course, publicly proclaimed, of co-operation between the British and 'French general staffs now furnishes I Hitler with a pretext for a return to i the attack demanding an equivalent I gesture. The view of London in such a case ■would be that the co-operation of the i military circles in Rome and Berlin is '■ sufficiently intimate now and the publicity would not change the real situation.