RATANA RAILWAY DISASTER

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 80, Issue 88, 14 April 1938, Page 8

RATANA RAILWAY DISASTER

COMMISSION OF INQUIRY

DEPARTMENTAL OFFICERS’ EVIDENCE

“LINE NOT CAUSE OF DERAILMENT

Evidence from officers of the Railways Department relating to the condition of the permanent way, and the crossexamination of these expert witnesses regarding the location of the speed restriction sign of 20 miles-an-hour on the six-chain curve where the disaster occurred, were features of the evidence at the opening day of the inquiry l;y the commission appointed under section 63 of the New Zealand Government Railways Act to ascertain the cause of the recent tragic accident near Ratana which resulted in seven people losing their lives. The commission comprises Sir Francis Frazer (chairman), and Mr. F. W. Furkert and Mr. H. L. Cole. They were appointed by the Minister of Railways to carry out a thorough investigation and to present their report to him not later than April 30. Expert evidence from nine witnesses was to have been heard yesterday, but after the depositions of five officers had been taken the enquiry was adjourned to Wellington until 11 a.m. on Tuesday, April 26, when the question of taking evidence from the remaining four witnesses will be discussed. The chief feature of yesterday’s evidence were statements by the chief engineer of the maintenance branch of the Railways Department. Mr. G. J. Bertinshaw, and engineering officers at Wanganui that the condition of the line was in no way attributable to the derailment of the train.

Mr H. M. O’Leary. K.C., assisted by Mr F. W. Aickin (railway law officer) appeared on behalf of the Railways Department. Mr C. G. Watson appeared for the New Zealand Engineers’, Firemen s and Cleaners’ Association and the driver of the derailed train, Mr E. Percival.

Mr C. M. Armstrong, of Wanganui, A-as present on behalf of the relatives sf the late Mr L. W. Stroud.

The General Manager of Railways, Mr G. H. Mackley, was present during the hearing of the evidence.

Order of Reference

The order of reference for the enquiry gives the commission power to carry out a thorough investigation into the cause or causes of the Ratana derailment and what steps can be taken to prevent a similar occurrence.

The order of reference is:— (D What was the cause of the derailment? (2) Was any employee in the service of the Government Railways Department guilty of any dereliction of duty which directly or indirectly contributed to the derailment? (3) Generally, are there any circumstances in connection with the derailment which call for comment, particularly in respect of the rollstock and the permanent way w the locality of the derailment? (4) What steps, if any, should be taken to prevent a similar derailment? In addressing the commission, Mr. O’Leary said that his instructions were to give the commission every assistance in determining the cause oi the accident. It was not proposed to call any evidence at this stage, which would require an answer from the driver of the train, who was still in hospital. He had been instructed by the Minister of Railways that if there were any persons who had any complaints to make regarding the accident at Ratana, they were to come forward with these complaints so that they could be investigated thoroughly. He had also been asked to express the sympathy of the Minister of Railways, the Hon. D. G. Sullivan, and the general manager and staff of the Railways Department to those v.ho had been bereaved and to express to those who had been injured their hones for a speedy and complete recovery.

Mr. C. G. Watson expressed sympathy with the bereaved relatives from the rank and tile and the executive officers of the organisation which he was representing, and expressed the hope that the injured passengers would have a complete and speedy recovery. He made application that the commission should call evidence from the driver of the train which had passed over the line shortly before the derailed train, and crossed the special at Turakina, the .ablet porter at Turakina, and the nationmaster at Turakina if he had been on duty until an hour or two before or after the accident. He should also like any evidence regai ring repairs to and the condition ot the mgine, say, during the past two years /nd, in particular, the repair book in which the driver would book in this engine at the repair shops in Wellington.

Mr. O’Leary said that lhe repair book would be included in the evidence of Mr. P. R. Angus. The tablet porter at Turakina was to be called as a witness later on. He had lot thought of calling the Turakina itationmaster or the driver of the >ther train, but this could be done ater on in the enquiry.

Albert Leslie Smith, assistant traffic manager at Wanganui, produced train advices from Wellington and Wanganui, which showed the running of the train W4 special. He also produced the guard's running sheet showing the arrival and departure times at the various stations and other details including the driver of the engine, the number of passengers and he class of engine. The last stopping place to the derailment of W4 was Marton. He produced a schedule snowing the times of arrival and departure of W4 at the various staions according to the train advice, the guard’s record and tne station record. He also produced the running schedules of trains 571 and 573 whicn had passed over the line before W4. Train 573 had passed over the scene of the derailment approximately 35

minutes before the special train which it crossed at Turakina.

Oliver Langman Kidson, train control operator at Wanganui, said that his duties were to supervise the running of trains and to control the work they performed. The actual running of every train was plotted on a train control diagram, the dia-

gram for March 26 being produced. This chart showed that W4 left Marton at 1.44 or 145 a.m., the time given oy Marton being 1.45 a.m. According to the chart, the train had arrived and departed from Turakina at 2.03 a.m., where it had crossed 573. The time at Turakina would be given by the tablet porter, who would record the time in his book. He should have heard from W4 at Fordell at approximately 2.30 a.m.

The witness said that just as he was leaving the control desk to have his supper he heard a click on the micropnone and a voice say ’ That you? that you?” to which he replied “to you.” It appeared to be a sensa tional voice and when he heard it he presumed that something unusual had happened. The conversation took place at 2.25 a.m. The voice said, “This is,’’ and then after one or two words had been missed, said “a passenger on the train.” The voice said that the train had been piled up in the cutting. Witness then asked what train it was and the voice replied that it was a passenger train. Witness said: “Not the Wellington-New Plymouth passenger train.'” the voice answering “Yes.” The man at the other end of the line said that the scene of the accident was near Ratana, and that he believed there were two passengers dead and many injured. It was then estimated that there were between 30 and 50 passengers injured. The voice at the telephone had given his name as Hare, and had agreed to remain al the telephone. Witness then detailed how he had arranged for medical and ambulance attention for lhe injured passengers. Chief Engineer’s Evidence George James Bertinshaw, chief engineer of the maintenance branch of the railways, said that he w r as responsible for the safe maintenance of tne track, bridges and other structures of the New Zealand Government Railways. After giving a general description of the condition of the track and the scene of the accident, the witness said that he had looked around for any sign of an obstruction having been placed on the rail, but he could not find any evidence of this. It would be very difficult to detect an obstruction owing to the debris lying about and the disturbance in the ballast and formation caused by numerous people walking over it irom the time of the derailment.

The point at which the engine first left the track was well on the six chain radius curve about 110 feet beyond the end of the transition curve. The accident occurred in a cutting. The track up to the point of derailment had not been disturbed by the time he arrived there. Beyond the point of the derailment the track had been damaged by the derailed vehicles. Wnen he arrived, the raii ahead of the point of derailment had been cut by the track men and a portion removed. Later when the work train arrived this portion of rail was replaced in its proper position to enable car A 1413 to be re-railed.

Ganger Henderson informed him that when he examined tne track on his arrival at the scene the southern portion of this rail was lying in the middle of the track, also that it was still coupled up at the north end, but that at lhe south end of the rail the fish plates at the point had been knocked oft, probably owing to the fish bolts being broken. To his mind, this clearly indicated that this rail could not have been displaced by lhe engine, which was lying on the left side of the line. The rail must have been displaced by one or more ot lhe cars which came to rest on the right hand side of the cutting. This rail must have received a blow from the left side of sufficient severity to break the fish bolts and force it towards lhe right into lhe middle of the track.

Nothing Wrong With Track

“From the measurements taken and my examination of the track, which was very closely made, 1 consider that its condition had no beating upon the derailment. In my opinion, nothing connected with tne permanent way could have caused tne derailment. This is borne out by the fact that train No. 573, consisting ol an “X’’ engine, 14 four-wheeled wag-

gons, one bogie wagon, one car and two vans, passed over lhe point ot derailment about 40 minutes before ’the accident occurred. Train No. 573 is a goods train between Wanganui .and ra’merston North. According to ' the guard's sheet, it arrived at lurai kina at 1.52 a.m. The “X” class of • engine which was on this goods train, I weighs about. 94 tons, and the “AB" ! class of engine which was on the derailed train weighs 85 tons. "If there had been anything seri-

ously wrong with the track, it is reasonable to suppose that it would have been more likely to have interfered with the passage of the goods train, which was largely composed of four-wheeled vehicles, which are much more liable to derailment than bogie carriages or engines. "A curve radius board is placed on the right-hand side of the formation on the straight at a distance of about 25 feet from the end of the transition curve. This curve board is in good condition and can be plainly seen for a considerable distance along the track. The figure on the curve board is *6,’ in bold black figuring on a white background. The figure is eight inches in depth and the black paint is li inches wide.

“There is a speed board standing at the beginning of the cutting on lhe right-hand side, showing in large black letters against a white background the word ’slow’,' with the ngure '2o’ under it. This board is 4i feet north of the beginning of the point where the transition curve ends and the true curve begins. The white paint of the speed board is somewhat weathered, but the black letters ‘slow’ and the figure ‘2o’ are clear and distinct.

There was a telegraph post on the side of the line at a distance 70 feet south of the speed board. This telegraph post was 10 to 12 inches in diameter. In daylight for a distance of about 135 feet southward of the speed board, the telegraph post did not obscure in any way the view of the speed board, out from 135 feet southward to about 230 feet southward, the telegraph post somewhat obscured the figures on the speed board. Beyond 230 feet from the speed board there was a very clear view of the speed board and the figures on it. He personally saw the speed board itself from the track at a point 70 chains south of the board in daylight on the day of the accident, although, of course, the figures could not be seen at this distance. He saw, in daylignt, the figure ‘2o’ clearly from the track at a distance of 76u feet south of the speed board and at a distance of 560 feet back he also saw the word ‘slow'’ clearly. He understood tests at night time have been carried out with an engine by Mr. P. R. Angus, locomotive superintendent, who w'ould give evidence as to the results.

Speed on Curves

The maximum permissible speed on curves less than nine chains radius for passenger trains was 25 miles an hour. Ordinarily, therefore, the speed on the six chain radius curve on which the accident happened would be 25 miles an hour, it was considered, however, that there was more possibility of engine drivers exceeding the speed on a heavy down grade, and for this reason the speed restriction of 20 miles an hour was inserted in the timetable to cover that portion of the line between 130 miles 70 chains and 131 miles 30 chains (Ratana grade). This was shown on page 15.5 of the working timetable. ihe maximum permissible speed of trains was shown on page 112 of the working timetable. These were fixed by the chief engineer. The critical speed on a curve would be the speed at which the wheels of the engine w'ould be likely to mount the rails. For a curve of 6.4 radius this critical speed would be about 35 m.p.h., according to the formula given by Mr. J. W. Spiller in a paper on high speed on railway curves published in the “Minutes of Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers 19081909.” This formula may have to be modified somew'hat for different characteristics of engines but is generally accepted by the authorities. The permissible speed was kept w ell below this critical speed, not only for safety’s sake, but also in consideration of the comfort of those travelling, and also to keep the rate of wear ol the rails down without unduly increasing the guage. The permissible speed of 25 miles an hour for a six chain radius curve had not been altered during the whole of his service, which extended over 34 years. The restriction of 20 m.p.h. on the Ratana grade had been in existence since 1914. When the Turakina-Okoia deviation now under construction by the Public Works Department was completed, the existing track between Turakina and Okoia would be lifted. As a result of this, all the sharp curves on the present track would be eliminated. The new main line, when the deviation between Turakina and Okoia was completed, should have no curves of less radius than 16 chains. Previous Derailments A search of the records indicated that there had been four previous instances of derailments on the five chain radius curve on which this accident happened. The first occurred on October 30, 1917, at 131 miles seven chains 34 links at the northern end of the curve just before it joined the straight. This point was 7i chains north of the point of derailment of engine “AB” 829 on March 26, 1938. The vehicle involved w'as a fourw'heel cattle wagon, “H” 271, on train 584 proceeding toward Wanganui. The cause w’as a slight subsidence of the track at a joint in the track, owing to the formation being soft. The track at this point was on a filling and not in a cutting and the curve was not transitioned at that date. The second instance was the derailment of a four-w'heel “L” wagon No. 5881 on train No. 584, at 131 miles three chains 95 links on December 14, 1920. The cause of the derailment was an axle of the derailed wagon breaking at a flaw. The third case occurred on September 7, 1928, when a four-wheel box wagon “K” 503 on train No. 584 w'as derailed at 131 miles seven chains 42 Jinks, at the northern end of the six chain radius curve on a filling. The main cause of this derailment was a displaced brass in an axle box, and a slight irregularity in the cam of the track, was considered to be a contributing factor. The fourth instance occurred on June 1, 1936, when engine “AB” 661, on train 571, was derailed at 131 miles seven chains while ascending the grade. The derailment was due to a fangbolt nut having been placed on the high leg ot the curve. Police investigations diu not result in the apprehension of the person responsible.

“I should also add in connection with obstructions on the line that on November 11, 1936, a fish plate was found on a rail at 130 miles five chains, and a dog spike found placed across the rail at 130 miles seven chains. The police prosecuted a suspected person, but he was acquitted.

“An examination of the files of the Railway Department shows that since January 1, 1933, there have been 64 cases of obstructions placed on the track throughout New Zealand, apparently maliciously.” Cross-examined, witness said that

the curve of 6.4 chains was of a radius to be avoided if practicable and were more common in Wanganui than in any district in the North Island. This was one of the reasons for the deviation, the other being to improve the grade. He had no knowledge of any abnormalities in the maintenance of this curve.

Your evidence cannot rule out the possibility of there having been an obstruction on the lines?—By no means.

Isn’t it correct that some forms of obstruction would almost be impossible to locate?—l don’t think so. Even a minute obstruction could be* located. Even when the whole line was covered with debris?—Yes.

Would a spike be sufficient to cause a derailment? —Yes. And from your evidence these spikes have been found on the rails in this locality?—Yes. Then it is quite possible that thu accident may have been caused by a similar obstruction?—lt cannot be entirely ruled out.. The fourth instance of an attempted derailment had been made at the northern end of this same curve. On this occasion the engine had been partially derailed.

Location of Speed Sign

For some distance the telegraph pole obscured lhe figures on the spceo restriction board, said witness.

You w'ill agree that this is not a desirable state of affairs? —Yes, that is so.

At night, the shadow' of the pole made by the engine headlight may obscure even more of the board? — I could not say.

It is only a matter of deduction?— It may. Witness said (hat the white paintwork of the restriction had faded, and to a degree had lost some of its effective contrast.

This permanent speed sign is at the beginning of the curve? —Yes.

Is there any practical railway reason why it has not been erected some distance from the curve? —There is no practical reason why it could not be but it is not necessary. Witness added that the speed sign was erected in relation to the radius of the curve. The speed limit of 20 miles an hour operated from seven chains south of the speed limit sign.

So that the driver has gone seven chains before he arrives at the sign board?—Yes. There was no practical reason why the sign could not be further south, but there was no need for it to be there. The speed limit of 2b miles an hour was operative between 130 miles 70 chains and 131 miles 30 chains because of the Ratana grade and the six-chain curve. The speed sign was erected as an additional precaution.

What speed would you say it was safe for him to pass the speed board'.' —Twenty-five miles an hour. When the Public Works Department wants a motorist to reduce ius speed it erects a warning sign some distance back. Why does not the Railways Department do the same?—Wt do not place sign boards on curves unless they are on a grade. Why shouldn’t you adopt, the same principle?—l contend that the speed board was erected considerably in advance of the danger.

Is there any reason why it should not be erected further back from the danger?—No. Desirable in fact?—Yes.

In the light of recent events do you think that it is desirable to have this sign further back?—Yes, it would. Witness said that the only occasions when temporary warnings were illuminated was in the case of six-miie an hour signs. He was not aware that the locality was subject to fogs. In districts where there were frequent fogs, he considered that it was imperative that warning signs should be very conspicuous.

Is there any indication on the permanent way where the driver is informed that he has to reduce from 35 to 20 miles an hour? —No. Witness said that it could be secured from the mileage pegs which were on the fireman’s side of the track.

Reason for Sign. If the speed sign did not nave any relation to his speed on the curve, what w’as its purpose?—An additional precaution. What for?—To remind him of the 20 miles an hour restriction in the time-table which he may have overlooked. Mr Watson said that his cross-ex-amination on technical matters would be made later during the enquiry.

Re-examined, he said there was no other indication of the size of the curve other than the figure on the radius board and it was assumed that a driver would see the notice before he reached it.

If a driver approaches a curve where a six-chain curve is indicated, at what speed should he enter it?— Twenty-five miles an hour. He considered that a speed of 25 miles an hour was safe for the curve where the accident happened. He would expect the driver to pick up the speed sign as soon as the radius sign. From his experience he would expect the speed sign to be seen from 10 chains back at night. Ignoring the speed sign and the restriction in the working time-table, the driver should have entered the curve at not more than 25 miles an hour. If the slowing down signs were placed further back it might seriously affect the running of trains on many sections.

To Sir Francis Frazer, witness c-aid he could see no objection to the speea sign being placed at the point where it became operative. District Engineer’s Evidence. John Dow, district engineer in charge of the Wanganui district, said that he had personally inspected the portion of the track on which the derailment occurred on March 3, 1938, and last rode over it on a train on March 18, 1938. On March 3 he tested the curve with the track gauge and found the run-off, cant and slack to be very regular and the alignment of the curve was good. On March 18 he particularly noted lhe riding qualities of the train, which was a mixed train, on this curve, and found that the train negotiated it very smoothly. After the accident he had inspected the track for about five chains southward, to ascertain if any obstruction had been on the rails. 1 could find nothing that might have been used as an obstruction, nor could L find any marks on the top of the rails indicating that any obstructions had been on them. It would be very diflicult to fine any object that might have been used as an obstruction at that time, on account of the disturbance caused to the formation and track, both by the derailed vehicles and by the number of people who had walked about there prior to my arrival. Again on March 28. with the

whole of the gang present, I made ar further thorough and minute search but found nothing indicating a wilful obstruction. The whole cutting was cleared out. All the dirt and ballast had been removed and any lumps had been broken up. It had all been collected and examined and nothing had been found that could be used as an obstruction. He had made a very thorough search of the locality. Track in Good Order. “From my examination of the track, 1 am sastified that its condition had nothing whatever to do with this derailment, and that the track was in good order was borne out by the fact that several trains had passed over it shortly prior to this derailment,” said witness.

Cross-examined, witness said it was feasible that anything that could have been used as an obstruction could have been removed by souvenir hunters. It also would have been feasible for a person to have placed an obstruction on the line and retrieved it afterward.

If the speed sign is to be an effective warning to the driver of the approach to the curve it should be some distance back? —That is so.

I take it that you agree that it is undesirable that it should be partly obscured by the telephone pole?— Yes.

And that it is unfortunate that the white paint has been allowed to gei into its dingy condition? —That is so.

William Theodore Langbein, assist-ant-district engineer of the Wanganui district, said he left Wanganui somewhere about 4 a.m. and was the first executive railway officer to arrive on the scene. When he reached the telephone box a Mr Hare was talking to Train Control, Wanganui. He then walked along the track to the accident. He walked around the train to the engine and it appeared that everybody was out of the train except one passenger who appeared to be receiving attention. He thought that it would be about 4.30 a.m. when he arrived at the wrecked train. He did not consider the condition of the track had any bearing on the derailment. Several times during the day he had searched for possible obstructions, the first of these being made before daylight. He could not find any eidence of obstructions having been on the rails. Painting; of Sign. Painters had been engaged for some months in repainting curve and speed boards on the Main Trunk line, and after they finish the Main Trunk, it was intended that they should attend to curve and speed boards on the main line. In the ordinary course of events, they would have repainted this speed board within the next six months. The telegraph post which was some distance in front of the speed board would partially obscure the view of the figures on the speed board between points approximately 2 chains and 3-i chains south of lhe speed board. Southward of this, there is a very clear view of the speed board for a long distance. Cross-examined witness said the speed sign was not erected for the curve but for the curve in relation to the grade. He would not agree with Mr Dow’s statement that in view ol the erection of a similar sign north of the curve the sign must refer to the curve. No report had been made to him regarding the condition of the speed board. Although he knew it was getting time when it

needed attention he did not think its condition was bad enough to send a man out specially to paint it. At this stage the hearing was adjourned to Wellington and will be * — on April 26.