ETHIOPIAN WAR
AN UNDIVIDED ITALY TERRITORY OF NATIONAL NEED THE OLD IMPERIALISM. On the wall of the Basilica of Maxcntius in via dell’lmpcro—the very heart of the Rome Mussoliniana—four significant maps have been placed by order of the Duce, writes Michael Florinsky in the JS’ew York Times. The first represents Rome in the eighth century 8.C., when it was merely a city; the subsequent expansion of the area under Roman rule is depicted at three historical moments: in 146 8.U., alter the Punic War; in J 4 A.D. ? after the death of Augustus; and finally, in 1)6-114 A.D., under Trajan. At that time Roman territory not only encircled the Mediterranean but extended to the Black and the Caspian Seas and the Arabian Gulf, and also comprised large portions of further Europe, including all of Spain and part of Britain. The comparison between the first and the last map is striking indeed. The philosophy written in stone on the walls of the Basillica of Maxenthius is now finding its practical application on th-e arid soil of Ethiopia. It is often said by critics of lini that the East African venture is a personal enterprise of lhe Italian dictator. That is no longer true. In the course of a recent visit to Italy I had many talks with people in every station in life, from peasant and taxidrivers to members c-f the Cabinet, and they left me with the distinct impression that the country is solidly behind the Duce in his Ethiopian policy. Except for the younger generation, there is little real enthusiasm for the war, which may prove difficult and costly. What one hears over and over again, however, both from Fascists and from the opponents of the regime, is that this is a war of necessity. In support of this contention several arguments are advanced. Needs Expansion. Italy, it is held, needs territorial expansion. Against the forces of an enchanting but hostile nature the Italian peasant courageously carries on a losing struggle. The farmer in the Central Apennines obtains a meagre living by cultivating patches of land only a few square metres in area, often five or six hundred metres below his village and accessible only by narrow mountain paths. The soil consists largely of rocks, and the return for the effort made is small indeed. The standards of living are what might be expected. 1 was told by the peasants themselves that they aie meat perhaps once a year. The Fascist Government has taken energetic measures to provide new land for the farmers. This policy found its expression in land reclamation, which has been carried on at considerable cost to the State. But laud areas which lend themselves to improvement are practically exhausted. Until recently the surplus population of Italy found an outlet in emigration to the United States and to- South America, and in seasonal work in France, Germany, Switzerland, and Belgium. Since 1929 these possibilities of employment have practically disappeared. Italy also needs raw materials. Iler industries use cotton, coal, oil, wool, ore—all imported from abroad. Much has been done in the last year to reduce the demand for imported raw materials and fuel by using various substitutes and -electric power. But t-hc possibilities of such substitution are necessarily limited.
The position of Italy has been aggravated by the depression. To buy raw materials she must export manufactured goods. The moribund condition of foreign trade to-day is a matter of general knowledge. The depreciation of the pound and of the dollar dealt a terrible blow to Italian exports.
Not Her Making This is the situation which any Italian Government, Fascist, or other, has to face. None of the difficulties with which the country is confronted, it is pointed out, are of her own making. It is often said that the Fascist policy of encouraging large families is certainly a doubtful method of relieving overpopulation. But Italy is a strongly Roman Catholic country; and what “ Government or_ political
party has ever openly advocated birth control as a solution of its natioual problems? The birth rate, moreover, has been steadily declining under the Fascist rule.
The conquest of Ethiopia appears to many in Rome to be a relatively simple solution of some of Italy’s most pressing difficulties. The bulk of Africa has long been divided among the great Powers. Ethiopia, true, is a member of the League, but was it not Great Britain who opposed her admission in 1923? A barbaric country cannot be transformed into a civilised State by merely joining the Geneva organisation.
In Rome the argument that the methods of national expansion used in the nineteenth century are no longer applicable in the post-war world did not sound convincing. If the whole colonial policy of the great Powers was nothing but wickedness and un-Christian immorality (as a series of remarkable letters published recently in the London Times would seem to imply) would it not be logical to apply to their colonies the same principle which was applied by the Treaty of Versailles to Alsace-Lor-raine—to undo a “historical wrong” —and set such colonies free This, however, is the programme not of the League but of the Third International. The League itself, it may also be argued, is not entirely blameless in the matter, since at least the ”B” and “C” mandates under its supervision are reminiscent in more than one way of the old colonial system. There is, moreover, the precedent of the Japanese occupation of Manchuria which the League proved unable to prevent. A Surprise That is why the strong opposition to Italian action in East Africa came as something of a surprise to Rome. Perhaps the fact that the strengthening of the Italion position in Africa has potential repercussions on the safety of British Imperial communications and British influence in the “IDark Continent” has been somewhat underestimated by Mussolini and his advisers. Few in Rome imagine that a successful annexation of Ethiopia would afford a remedy for all the evils from which Italy is sugering. In many respects Ethiopia is an unknown. It is believed that she will produce cotton and coffee—things that are now imported from abroad. ’There are Humours —but only rumours-*of large deposits of gold, ore and oil. but no I one seems really to know whether they actually exist.
The more cautious opinion expressed in Fascist circles is that East Africa must be looked upon primarily as a territory where the surplus population of the peninsula will find a fertile land for the application of its labour. Climatic conditions are reported io be suitable for European settlement. The future settlers are visualised as small farmers who could produce enough for their own needs and for those of their families but would not try to compete with other agricultural countries in the world market. Like the Roman legionaries they will settle on the land they conquer and there, under the protection of the Italian flag, they will be able to find a decent living without betaking themselves o any country. This somewhat romantic idea is in harmony with the Fascist doctrine of strengthening the link between man and the soil. Heroic Doctrine. There is still another element in Mussolini’s Ethiopian policy which must not be overlooked. Fascism is a heroic doctrine. For 13 years the young generation of Italians has been taught the beauty of sacrifice for a great national cause. The longing for the ‘‘great adventure” which lives in the hearts of so many young people cannot fail to respond to their leader’s passionate appeal, and it is among the new generation that he has found his most enthusiastic supporters. The immediate sacrifices both in lives and money are likely to be heavy. The London Times remarked somewhat cynically that if Ethiopia has so far escaped the fate of other African territories it is because the operation was considered too costly. But fascism thinks in terms of decades, not months. It is, however, confidently expected in Governmental circles that the purely military part will be over within a few months, probably before the end of the year. And I was assured from the highest source that the country is perfectly capable of standing the financial and economic strain until a definite military result shall have been obtained. Whatever action may be taken in Geneva, it seems most unlikely tnat it can bring to an abrupt end the armed conflict in East Africa. But even if the miracle can be performed, the grave problem behind Mussolini’s action will continue to demand a solution.
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Bibliographic details
Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 79, Issue 283, 3 December 1935, Page 5
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1,421ETHIOPIAN WAR Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 79, Issue 283, 3 December 1935, Page 5
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