The Wanagnui chronicle. MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 2, 1935. FRANCE AND THE LEAGUE

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 79, Issue 205, 2 September 1935, Page 6

The Wanagnui chronicle. MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 2, 1935. FRANCE AND THE LEAGUE

Q.X the eve of the League Council meeting the French "wait and see” policy appears to have given way to one of unity with Britain in support of the Covenant. Such a decision may well be regarded as momentous, for it not only changes the whole outlook with regard to the Abyssinian dispute, but marks a turning point in the course of European history. If a majority of the French Cabinet “favour League action if the need arises,” strong hopes may be entertained of unanimity at Geneva. Three great issues thereby are affected: Firstly, Britain, whose declared policy has been not to act alone in the dispute, must continue her activities within the framework of the League; secondly, the League, the fate of which would have been sealed had France deserted it at this crucial stage, is given a new lease of life; thirdly, Signor Mussolini may conceivably find strong Powers arrayed against him in unbroken opposition, while others remain neutral. During the last few days Britain has been at the parting of the ways in European affairs. She has stood firmly by the League, but at the same time has made it clear that she has no intention of actifig as the solitary policeman of Europe. In the present dispute France has had to decide between Britain ami Italy. Failure to uphold the British initiative in support of the League would have caused a revulsion of British public' opinion and an equally certain determination to have the fewest possible future dealings with Europe, while more important still, France could not expect British support in future if Heir Hitler, following Signor Mussolini’s precedent, decided to occupy Austria. French support must, therefore, mean a continuance of British commitments in Europe. For the League, the present dispute is in the nature of a major test. Betrayal by France after her much-vaunted attachment to the principal of collective security, would have sounded the death-knell in Geneva. As it is, the League continues its struggle for existence, though it does so with the possibility of a further defection in the ranks if Signor Mussolini carries out his threat to withdraw from the League if so much as a vote of censure is passed against Italy. With the British hand strengthened at Geneva by a favourable French decision, the question is immediately asked: to what length is the League likely to go in its efforts to block Signor campaign in Abyssinia" Xo one can say what unforeseen developments are likely to occur in the near future, but factors influencing the general trend of events may he considered. Furthermore, it must be remembered that the League has not yet sat in final judgment on the Italo-Abyssinian dispute, and at the moment everything depends on the manner in which the delicate situation is handled by the Council, and probably the League Assembly itself. The plain fact of the matter is that the economic sanctions provided in Article 16 of the Covenant arc inoperative without war. The relevant paragraph reads:—

Should any member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Article 12, 13 or 15, it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of al! intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenantbreaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a member of the League or not. When that article was drawn it was anticipated that the League would soon become universal, at least that it would soon include all the Great Powers, and that consequently a blockade of the offending State would be a simple matter. With the League as it is to-day, the threat of a punitive war is held in some quarters to have become almost valueless. Instead of Britain and France shouldering such a responsibility, it is far more likely that the League will be further used for the rallying of goodwill and expression of common sense. It is in this direction that the League’s efforts must continue to be employed, and by reason of the fact that they will carry greater weight than of late, the chances of success may be deemed to be improved.