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NOT ALARMED

AMERICA AND THE AIR THE BOMBING FETISH AN ARMY REPORT Several cherished fetishes of those who deem the United States open to disastrous attack from the air are assailed by the finding of the War Department. Special Committee on Army Air Corps (states the New York Times). The committee, comprising distinguished civilians as well as army officers, is quite specific on the subject. “The ideas that aviation, acting alone,” it says, “can control sea lanes or defend the coast, or produce decisive results in any other general mission contemplated under our policy, are all visionary, as is the idea that a very large and independent air force is necessary to defend our country against air attack.” The work of contemporary writers is then cited who describe aircraft crossing the seas and bombarding American cities with high explosive and gas, with resulting destruction to the whole population. The Dropping of Gas Bombs. “The committee has had computed,” the report says, “the quantity of gases of various kinds necessary 4 for effective concentration on areas of given sizes; these ‘computations show the fallacy of the idea presented. To carry sufficient bombs for such a destructive effect would require aircraft in numbers beyond the ability of any nation to maintain, even if a type of aeroplane capable of crossing the ocean with a military load, attacking and retaining to its base, can be developed.” The air invasion of the United States and the air defence of the United States are conceptions th z committee deems, of those who fail adequately to consider the effect of ocean barriers and other limitations. Aircraft in sufficient numbers to threaten serious damage could be brought against America, it asserts, only in conjunction with sea foiVes or with land forces which must be met by forces identical an nature and equally capable of prolonged effort. Bases Held Essential. In this connection the conclusions of ; the latest War Department, study made by general officers of the line, general officers of the General Staff, and the Chief of the Air Corps, are cited. This study scouts the idea that invasions by air from overseas are practical matters. It analyses the whole plan. of such. at -' tack, and lays stress on the indispensable services on the ground which are vital to any successful mass operation from the air. It says in part: ‘‘ln any study of the employment of air forces it should be realised that the said forces cannot operate without bases, and or floating. Furthermore, the facilities associated with su»ch bases must include all those instrumentalities and utilities necessary for operation and maintenance of the air forces. The importance, of these bases may be appreciated by realising that between 80 and 90 per cent, of the personnel of an air force is associated with these bases and their supply facilities. While the facilities at such bases may be somewhat, limited in temporary emergencies, they will have to be extensive to care for and to permit the operation of any large air force, in fact of any : force that, is in excess of twenty-five .j to fifty aeroplayes. i To secure land bases, an enemv would i have either to seize a suitable harbour i on the American coast land his forces, i and occupy considerable terrain, then i set up the facilities necessary for his i air force, or establish similar land i bases, including air installations, near ; the American borders. Ocean Still Safeguard. “In the former <casc the enemy would i have to overcome the harbour defences ; and the mobile army and occupy suf- ; ficient terrain to establish, and to pro- : tcct against counter-attack, his landI based aviation, before such aviation i could be used. During such operations ; the only aircraft available to the • enemy would he his fleet-borne aviation, and ous own Air Force could coni centratc superior forces to interrupt i the development. “Proposals are sometimes advanced ; to the effect that land-based bombing i aeroplanes of foreign nations can cross i the Atlantic or Pacific, rendezvous at i some selected point, deliver a concert- ; trated attack on some vital objective, ; and then return to home bases. “Or with land or floating bases estabi lished en route and in territory coni tiguous to our nation, an air force ; superior to our own could munch a i decisive attack against some vital area ? in the United States. | “These proposals cannot be accepted as a possibility under the present stag< of air development. Preparation ol adequate bases in peace would be eon vincing evidence of an intent to attack and would disclose an enemy’s proposed plan of operations. Appended hereto is an analysis of General Balbo’s flight of twenty-four Italian aeroplanes. For this flight eight air bases in foreign countries were established, with eleven surface vessels as agents thereof. The weather services of four nations were utilised. Advance pre parations were Started in May; the flight was ready in early June, but could not start until July 1. Thirty three days were consumed between the time of readiness for departure and arrival at destination, 6063 miles distant, covered in forty-six hours of flying in fifteen days from start to arrival. ’ ’ Declaring tLat there are a confidential number of important strategic areas in the United States, the study says that while the strategical importance of all these areas demands such peace-time development of ground installations in eavh area as will make possible their defence, plans contemplating a distribution of forces, both land and air, in all these areas, irrespective of ywsible enemies and consequent relative importance of those areas, would be unsound from a military as well as an economical viewpoint. “The development of aviation.” the study continues, “has greatly increased the difficulties of overseas invasion. Both for long-range reconnaissance offshore to detect the approach of enemy expeditions and for the attack of such expeditions before they reach the shores a properly constituted Army General Headquarters Air Force provides a unit hitherto lacking in war.”

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https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/WC19340914.2.120

Bibliographic details

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 77, Issue 218, 14 September 1934, Page 10

Word Count
997

NOT ALARMED Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 77, Issue 218, 14 September 1934, Page 10

NOT ALARMED Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 77, Issue 218, 14 September 1934, Page 10

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