A DISPUTED RULE

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 77, Issue 207, 1 September 1934, Page 10

A DISPUTED RULE

POWER OF AN EXECUTIVE UNION’S APPEAL ALLOWED WORK ON WATERFRONT. WELLINGTON, Aug. 31. In accordance with a majority decision—the Chief Justice (Sis Michael Myers) and Mr. Justice Johnston concurring and Mr. Justice Ostler dissenting—the Court of Appeal to-day allowed the appeal of the Wellington Waterside Workers’ Union from a decision of Air. Justice Reed concerning the admission of William Henry Hargreaves. of Wellington, as a member of the union. The case raised important questions of law and was of special interest to waterside workers’ unions. In terms of a membership rule vesting the right of admission to membership to the executive in its discretion, Hargreaves was not admitted to membership of the Wellington Union. He took action against the union in the Supreme Court, and Mr. Justice Reed held that the union could not- in law refuse to admit him as a member. The effect of the judgment of the Court of Appeal is that no right of membership in a union is conferred by the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1925, and that there is nothing in the rules of the union which can be said to enable Hargreaves to succeed in his application for mandamus to compel the union and its executive to enrol him as a-member. The Chief Justice drew attention to the difference in the Australian and New Zealand law on the point as follows: "It seems to me that in the Commonwealth of Australia and in the States of New South Wales and Queensland, a position such as‘obtains in this case has been carefully guarded against, while in New Zealand it has not. AVhether or not the position in New Zealand should be altered is a political matter upon which I have no right to express an opinion. All I can say is’that in my judgment, interpreting as best I can the law as it now exists, the relief granted by the Court below to respondent cannot be supported and the appeal should be allowed. ’ ’ Mr. Justice Johnston also supported the appellant union. Mr. Justice Ostler delivered a dissenting judgment. He. agreed that it vyas not unlawful for a trade union to limit its membership by its rules, but held that the rulers of the appellant union in this case were ultra, vires on lhe ground of uncertainty. His Honour also strongly commented on the position of the existing law. "I hold a strong opinion that whether a trade union is working under an awprd which gives preference to unionists or whether it has no award but has obtained preference to its members by agreement with their employers, it should not be allowed by law to limit its members and thus create a monopoly in the right to do such work. If every trade union could thus act, the result would soon be that no person could obtain employment in any industry except by favour of the union of workers registered in respect of that industry. As the law stands at present, however, in my opinion it is not illegal for trade unions to limit their membership and then by agreement to obtain preference for their members from their employers, thus creating a monopoly of the right •to, work for those employers. It is a matter for the Legislature to say whether it will forbid such conduct." Dealing with appellant’s argument that no legal damage had been done to respondent. His Honour stated: "The appellant union by their wrongful refusal to admit respondent caused him damage by not being able to obtain work which he would otherwise have obtained. They knew that the effect of refusing to admit him to the union would be that he could not compete for work on the wharf with other members. In my opinion it does not matter whether preference to unionists was preference in fact or law. Ry the wrongful refusal 1o admit him the union caused him damage, and in my opinion that damage is recoverable at law."