A GERMAN STORY

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume LXXXIII, Issue 20126, 20 April 1928, Page 3

A GERMAN STORY

OF BATTLE OF JUTLAND I THE BRITISH BADLY LET INI' A former wireless officer who belonged to the German station at Neumunster throws new light on a hitherIto obscure, though very important, ! feature of the Battle of Jutland. lie explains that it was not until the first. I stage of the conflict was in progress i that the British Command realised that the main German battle fleet, as well as the battle-cruiser squadrons, formed part of the opposing forces. Captain Kraschutzki, the officer in question, whose statements gain additional value in that they are intend cd as a criticism of the German Ad miralty’s neglect during the first two ■and a half years of the war to change the signalling codes, declares that immediately before the departure of the fleet on the adventure that led to the Battle of Jutland the call signal of rhe flagship was changed. Up to this moment the signal had ' consisted of the letters D.K. The change was a very simple but, as it proved, a very effective one. All that I was done was to substitute for D.K. the letters U.W., which, to then had been the call signal of Wilhem- • shaven, and to give D.K. that station. An Effective Ghange. ; ‘ ‘ Consequently, ’ ’ says the Captain, '“the English station, which not only intercepted the messages but was able to locale the point from which the lucsages emanated, definitely located ; DK-—that is to say, the German fl ig- : chip— in Wilhelmshaven. “During the first stage of the battle the English Command believed it had only to deal with German cruisers. 1 When, therefore, the Southampton reported having sighted the whole German fleet this appeared incredible to the British Command.” Captain Kraschutzi declares that right up to 1916 the call signals io the ■ German ships remained the same as ■ those that had been in use before the war. • ‘ ‘ These were certainly known to the English, who, in the meantime, had i established wireless stations which i were able to detect the position of 1 every vessel from which a signal was sent. Therefore whenever a ship in the North Sea or a submarine off the ' English coast sent out a signal the British knew not only the name of the : sender and the contents of its signal but also its exact location.” I He adds that it was not until the exchange already mentioned between • the signals of the Wilhelmshaven and j the German flagship that any change was made. German Zeppelin Operations. I An article by Captain E. A. Lehmann and Howard Alingws in the new number of “The World To-day” deals with the German Zeppelin operations in the first half of 1916, anti claims that the Zeppelins “saved the German , fleet at Jutland.” The basis of that claim is “a secret British report dated 20th September, 1927.” But in September, IUI7, the full facts of Jutland, as they have re cently been revealed in the fifth volume of the German Official Naval History of North Sea Operations, had not been disclosed. Fog and mist prevented the Zeppelins from carrying out extensive reconnaissance on the eve of Jutland. On the morning of May 31, 1916, a few hours before the battle, five Zeppelins (L 9 Ll 4, Ll 6, L2l, and L 23) went up, but saw nothing of the British. Three :of them were near the scene of the ' battle, but heard and saw nothing. The M°ming After. ; On the morning after the battle, when the British fleet was steaming ‘ north, away from the German coast, i Lil sighted twelve British Dread noughts and was violently shelled by ! them with their big guns. i The fire was ineffective and tnere ’ was no damage. Some shrapnel burst i uncomfortably close. The airship i was jolted incessantly by the eoncusi sion un all sides. Her framework was ' being badly shaken. Her captain consequently decided to increase the dis1 lance from the warships, and lost the British in the mist. L 24 also sighted British destroyers that morning and v.as fired at by them; she afterwards ■ made out twelve British battleships, i presumably the vessels seen, by Lil. Anti-Aircraft Forces In the High Sea Fleet’s sortie of 'August, 1916, the British Grand Fleet : was sighted by Ll 3, and it seemed as ; though a great naval battle was imi minent, when Ll 3 lost sight of her I quarry. A line of thunderstorms compelled the Zeppelin to make a detour, and when she managed to regain her ' course, the British could not be found. ! No doubt they had become alarmed oy ' the presence of the Zeppelin. There are also those who hold that . the German Fleet had become alarmed ' at the news of the propinquity of the ' powerful Grand Fleet. The “remarkable .heroism” of the British anti-craft forces in these early days of Zeppelin fighting is mentioned; ' and interesting accounts are given of \ arious raids.

At that date the British Zeppelin fighters had no effective weapons, owing to the fatuous policy of “darkness and composure” which the Government adopted. Not till September, 1916, were incendiary lullets supplied to British airmen, and with these bullets the huge unweildy airships were very speedily overcome and sent down in flames.