THE NECESSITY OF SINGAPORE

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume LXXXIII, Issue 19918, 13 August 1927, Page 7

THE NECESSITY OF SINGAPORE

MR. WILFORD GIVES VIEWS AFTER INQUIRY ON THE SPOT SHOWS RELATION OF BASE TO PACIFIC NAVAL POLICY Empire Defence Above Party

(Per Press Association.) WELLINGTON, Aug. 12. Strong advocacy of the Singapore base was made by Mr T. M. Wilford, member for Hutt, in the course of the Budget debate this afternoon, practically the whole of his speech referring to this subject. Mr Wilford said that he had had the fortune, in 1923, of visiting the East and the only people he found ©opposed to Britain’s proposals there were the rubber barons and the tin kings of Malaya. The opposition of these people was duo to a cause which would be news to most, because the British Gov eminent had decided that the base was to be constructed at Trade Union rates of pay. This had causoH alarm amongst, those people, who were rich by means of cheap Chinese labour. Those States near the base wanted it, and had co* tributed liberally towards it. There* was but one opinion in the East and that was that Singapore must be controlled by Britain. The Singapore base was an insurance. It might be asked: “An insurance against whom?” It was an insurance, not against any particular person or thing, but against anything that migtit happen. The opposition to the Singapore base was first started by Colonel Repington, in 1921, who said it wo.ild cost ten million to dredge the western entrance. The answer to that was that there was no western entrance, which was blocked by a causway built for that purpose. It had been said that the base was being laid down solely for the benefit of the rubber barons and the tin kings, but the fact was that they were the only people,who had passed a resolution against it. It was not true that Singapore was a pestilential area, and it was necessary to have a base there because we would shortly have to vacate Hongkong. Position of Japan. It was not breaking faith with Japan, because geographically it had no immediate relation to Japan. Further, the head of the Japanese delegation at the Washington Conference and at the Peace Conference at Geneva had said it was Britain’s business, because she had great interests in the Pacific, and it was no breach of the Washington agreement. Japan had an equal right *o build her own navel bases, and was doing so. It had been said that the base at Singapore was not necessary. It was necessary to keep command of India. If India went out of the Empire, good-bye to the Empire. The Singapore base was necessary to the mobility of our ships, which must have some place on which they can retire in the event of disaster. In 1931, Japan would have four million trained military forces and was moving steadily ahead in all quarters. She was

already in Singapore, owning nrueh land and many important points, and Holland had agreed that, in tho event of Japan becoming aggressive towards her colonies, Holland would, in consideration of the Singapore naval base, hand over to Britain the island at Sumatra, so that she would control both sides of the strait. Importance to New Zealand and Australia. Proceeding, Mr Wilford emphasised the importance of the base to Australia and New Zealand. Our existence depended upon naval defence, and the price we were asked to pay for it wis not great for the security offered. He quoted many high opinions to show that Singapore was strategically the chosen spot. A fleet stationed there might not, prevent Japanese raiders descending upon Australia, but those raiders would never get back to Japan. It was impossible to say what secret negotiations were going on between Russia and Japan. If Japan ever captured Singapore, it would be many weeks before we could receive any assistance from any British force. It had been said that Japan had placed her cards on tho tabic. She did nothing of the kind, as witness her presentation of her twenty-one points to China, six of which were secret and were never published. America found out these secret clauses and exposed them. China was prevailed upon not to agree to them, hence all the trouble between Japan and America. Japan was steadily moving her way down the Pacific, and her strength was in the complete union of her army and people. Lessons of the War. Our cruiser strength was below that of Japan, especially in the rate of speed, and if we were going to have a base at Singapore we must do it thoroughly. It must be armed with the largest guns. It was the story of the battles of Coronel and the Falkland Islands over again, in both of which cases the ships with the heaviest guns triumphed. In conclusion, Mr Wilford wished to say that we should never make Empire matters or Empire defence party matters. Although times were bad we must not starve naval defence. The men who studied these big problems were the better able to advise, and we should take their advice rather than that of pacificists wjjo would have us unprepared for war. If Britain, in 1914, had been able to put a force of 500,000 in the field, there would have been no retreat from Mons and the Great War would have ended there and then. We should be prepared to pay our share gladly, as apart from the question of insurance, it was a duty which none of us should shirk.