THE AUSTRALASIAN BASE

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume LXXXI, Issue 19050, 1 July 1924, Page 10

THE AUSTRALASIAN BASE

ALTERNATIVES TO SINGAPORE. POSSIBILITIES OF DARWIN. (From Auckland Star’s Naval Correspondent.) LONDON, May 8. While no place on the entire coastline of Australia or New Zealand presents such a magnificent point d’apdul as Singapore, there are at least three places which offer fairly good substitutes for local naval defence. These are Sydney, which is already ohe fortified naval base of the Royal Australian Fleet, Port Darwin, whien is a coaling station, and Port Stephens. At first view, one would think that Sydney has no real competitor. It has a spacious land-locked deepwater hirbour with approaches that could lx made impregnable to any seaward attack, and behind the defences of which a fleet could lie in absoluute safety. Its docks are numerous and others are projected. But, unfortunately, Sydney harbour is on the wrong side of Australia. It is too far south and east to take the place of Singapore. Besides there are other reasons of a strategical character into which it is unnecessary to go, and more thin one non-strategical reason. . Port Stephens is possessed of a very fine land-locked inside harbour. Che entrance between the rocky headlands is narrow and. easily defensible, though not to the same extent as Sydney Harbour, while it is open to the same objection, that is, it is too far southeast, though a hundred of miles further north than Sydney. In addition Jin channel is narrow, tortuous and stud ded with shoal water. Of the three, it is certainly the worst. PORT DARWIN HAS ADVANTAGES. The third place, Port Darwin, Northern Territory, has not some of the defensible features of Sydney and Port Stephens but it is superior to both in •strategical position. It commands in a great measure the approaches to t*. e east, north and west. Its harbour and the adjacent waters are fairly well laid out by the hand of nature. The -topographer of 70 years ago hardly did it justice, however, when ne wrote: 1 ‘Port Darwin has an entrance between white cliff projections, three miles distant from each other; although' of considerable size, it has much soal water, especially on the west side. The shore is low and sandy and has singd’ur looking detached peaks in the background. ” Despite the “much shoal wato-.” there is plenty of room in the harbour and its entrance lends itself to defence of a high order, while the low background is a decided advantage. Within a few hours’ steam is the great expanse of Van Dieman’s Gulf, in which the combined fleets of the world might ride in safety; guarded on the east by the Cobujg Peninsula and on the north and west by Bathurst Island and Melville Island, Dundas Strait and Clarence Strait, giving acccess to the open sea on the north-west respectively. Port Darwin is within easy reach of Singapore, which lies to the nortnwest, and its selection would have an important be: ring on the American potential naval base on the Island of Guam. Port Darwin has one great drawback which takes time to remedy—its isolation. Its railway facilities are very much in the future, and inland supplies under the present day circumstances present a problem in war time. Primarily, a naval base exists as a place from which a naval force can strike with all its might, and continue striking, at an enemy, and not merely as shelter for harried or defeated warships. True, it must have docking, accommodation for injured ships or ships requiring overhaul and refit in peace or war-time, and all tae necessary personnel and plant to deal with very kind of contingency. it must be well enough armed to take care of itself at any time. The naval power that loses the command of the seas has nol noger a raison d’etre for maintaining naval bases, and that is why the Singapore scheme was urged so vehemently by the practical men who know its value. Without a base to prepare at, and strike from, a fleet is worse than useless. The one is necessary to the other; alone, each in worthless. OTHER POSSIBILITIES.

Many years ago Port Essington was favourably spoken of as a potent’al naval base. The “port,” which is a deep indentation in the northern shore of Coburg Peninsula, but rather open to Arafura Sea, has an eighteen miles inland depth, an entrance width of seven miles, between Vashon Head on the west to Point Smith on the east, and soundings most of its length of frtin twelve to fifteen fathoms of oud and sand, giving good anchorage. The southern end of the inlet is taken up by three spacious bays, with soundings from two to five fathoms. The heat, however, is very great, the noonday thermometer rising to over 100. At one time a detachment of Royal Marncs was stationed at Victoria, which was founded about 70 years ago. The men suffered from the effects of the rainy season, and eventually the garrison bad to be withdrawn after a four years’ trial. The approaches to Port Essington are a bit difficult, there being

much low land and shoal water on the east side of the harbour; but, of course, that is by no means a disadvantage under certain circumstances. None of the above topographical problems present themselves in the case of Sydney Harbour, the waters of which are notoriously deep, and sheltered from serious storms. Latterly, however, naval strategy has a tendency to get away from thickly populated areas and big ' property values, to localities where t 1 b civil population has little or no risx—such as Seapa Flow, which had a single defence when the Grand jrviet based itself there in August, 1914 not so much as a single land gun. It was open to attack any the Huns cared to assail it from tljs sea. That, they did not know that das the savi# grace of the situatipA. 1 To return to Sinagpcre and its abandoned” scheme. The Singapore scheme alternative has not been abandoned, as some think or infer. Th'e ex-German floating dock is available, and may be in Singapore when it is needed for the great war that is bound to rage some day in the Pacific. The floating dock scheme is better than -i> thing. In any case, we have the assurance of the Conservative Party that if they return to office within reasonable time they will proceed with the original scheme. The pity of ic is that there is a possibility of Ramsay MacDonald’s odds and ends hanging cn long enough, by the aid of the “Little glanders,” under Asquith and Lloyd Georgy to spoil both schemes. Ten or fifteen years at the outside will determine who shall rule the Pacific and Indian Oceana*