THE EMPIRE CONFERENCE

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume LXXVI, Issue 18259, 18 August 1921, Page 2

THE EMPIRE CONFERENCE

BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY. NAVAL DEFENCE PROBLEMS. DOMINIONS AND DOWNING ST. MR. MASSEY’S MASTERLY SPEECH. (Special to “Chronicle.”) LONDON, June 22. Following the formal opening of the Empire Conference on Monday, the visiting Premiers yesterday delivered addresses of great importance. The topics touched on included the relations of the Dominions to the Mother Country, the Anglo-Jap-anese alliance, naval defence, the peace of the world, and the disarmament problem. The Prime Minister of New Zealand, Mr. W. F. Massey, did honour to the Dominions by a speech marked by every evidence of high statesmanship, wide vision, and true imperialistic spirit and sentiment. Mr. Massey said:— “In the first place, Prime Minister, I .want briefly ta take advantage of what you referred to as our “unenviable privilege”—speaking for mvseif, the privilege of having the longest record as Prime Minister of any of those who sit around the Council Board to-day. ond on that account I want to add a few words to what you have said with regard to an old friend, General Botha. During the very tew months that I was acquainted with General Botha I came to regard him as one of the best men I ever met, a great man undoubtedly, and in addition, a great British statesman. If he had been with us to-day it goes without saying he would have been invaluable in assisting to solve some of the difficult problems with which we are face to face. I think I ought to say a word of welcome to those who are met in this room for the first time, and I feel confident that they will do credit to those behind them who have honoured them with their confidence, and that their coming here will be an acquisition to the Conference, which I hope and believe will make for better things so far as the Empire is concerned. And now, Prime Minister, in addition to what I said yesterday, I want to refer again briefly to the very fine speech which we, the members of this organisation, had the opportunity of listening to yesterday. I want to say that I look upon it as the most important speech delivered since the war, and a speech which, to the British citizens of the Dominions, will give great satisfaction, and not only to them, but to the citizens at the heart of the Empire, the United Kingdom itself. The speech, in my opinion, struck the right note, and it will give, I am quite sure, more confidence to people overseas and to citizens generally than the Prime Minister himself imagines could possibly be the case. Ever since the signatures of the representatives of the Dominions wore attached to tho Peace Treaty at Versailles on June 28, 1919, there has been a feeling on the part of many intelligent ' men and women that the future of the Empire may possibly have been endangered thereby. What I mean is this, that I have seen it stated repeatedly,. as a result of the signing of the Peace Treaty, which, of course included the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Dominions of the. Empire had acquired complete independence, and in case of the Empire being involved in war—which I say heaven forbid, and I say It with all my heart and soul—any one of the Dominions might refrain from taking part or assisting the Empire in anyway. POWER OF THE DOMINIONS. I do not quite agree with that view -and I go upon the principle that when the King, tho Head of the State, declares war the whole of his are at war, and that must be the case if some of the best constitutional authorities are right. That is one of the causes of anxiety at the present time. There is the other as a logics,! sequence of the grst that any Dominion—l won’t say Dependencies—Dependencies are in a different position —but any Dominion may on account of what has taken place enter into a Treaty with any foreign country, irrespective of what the Empire as a whole may do. lam not now referring to a Treaty entered into for commercial purposes—that is quite another matter. ’ I understand the position any Dominion may make a commercial arrangement with any foreign country, but the Treaties of which I am thinking and of which many other people are thinking are Treaties involving war or peace or foreign policy, as the case may be. These latter are the Treaties which I understand in existing circumstances a Dominion has not the right to enter into. I bring this up now. I had thought of waiting for another year, but one never knows what may happen during twelve months. Personally, I doubt if it will be possible to hold the Conference which was intended for next year for reasons which may not perhaps have occurred to many here present. I think I am right in saying there will be an election in Australia next year. I am not authorised to say this, but I have heard it said that possibly Canada will have an election next year. That I do not know, but I do know this that New Zealand must face an election next year. Mr. Lloyd George: How many years have you Mr. Massey: Three years. Mr. Lloyd George: How many years have you? Mr. Meighen: Five years. Mr. Lloyd George: How many years does your Pariitment last? Mr. Hughes: Three years. Mr. Massey: We are in the same year, so when Australia has an election New Zealand has an election. I am suggesting that we shall probably have a number of elections next year, and therefore it may not be possible to hold an Imperial Conference for any purpose whatever. Mr. Hughes: I am glad you mentioned that. That is one of the practical difficulties. I think I told you, sir, it would be impossible for me to come next year.

“A DANGEROUS POSITION.” Mr. Massey: I was referring to constitutional questions which are causing difficulties at present, and I should like to see them cleared up. I think we are in a dangerous position—a position which may bring friction in a year or two’s time or in the years to come. I think it should be faced now, and we should arrive at an understanding as to exactly where we are. There is another point. The Imperial War Cabinet has been referred to on a number of occasions to-day and yesterday, and 1 read with a great deal of interest an article by Lord Milner in one of the papers yesterday morning—l think the Times. I may say I agree thoroughly with the opinion expressed by Lord Milner in regard to an Imperial War Cabinet. I believe it did magnificent work, and I hoped that it would become a permanent institution, modified, of course, as required by a period of peace. The Imperial War Cabinet was suitable for a period of war. I do not mean to say we should go on the same lines. We are here to-day, and I think I am right in saying we do not even know what to call ourselves, and there is a great deal in a name. A Conference means consultation, and consultation only, but a Cabinet also carries with it the right to recommend some definite course to the Sovereign. Of course, behind it all there is the responsibility on the part of each representative of the Dominions particularly, or even of the United Kingdom, to the Parliaments behind us. We must take the responsibility of our actions, but I think most of us, all of us, here to-day are experienced politicians, and I am quite sure that we are not likely to go too far. There is another difficulty. The representatives of the Dominions and India meet the representatives of the United Kingdom in conference, but we have no right to join in any recommendation that may be made to the Sovereign in regard to any course which requires his assent and which may be thought desirable. Now I am anxious about this. I have absolute confidence in the good sense of British people and British statesmen, but, still .there is the anomaly. There is something there that wants to be put right. Using a term which is often used, it is not democratic. I do not know whether these matters can be discussed and dealt with during the present Conference, and I am calling it a Conference for want of a better name. What I object to is what the name Conference implies. 1 do not know whether we are able to deal with it during the term of the present Conference or whether we are not, but I do think the matter should be settled and not left over indefinitely. We sometimes talk about what we have gained, and we have gained a great deal. There is no question about that. We have gained in status and in other ways. We stand in quite a different position from that in which the Dominions and Dependencies of the Empire including India, stood ten years ago, but we have gone back as compared with what was the case two years ago when the Imperial War Cabinet was in existence. Mr. Hughes: I do not quite follow where wo have gone back. Mr. Massey: We have lost the right which we had then on war matters, and even other matters, to assist in making a recommendation to the Sovereign, the head of the State, in regard to any course of action which we thought desirable and which required his assent. I may be wrong in the view I take, but I feel so strongly about it, and I have discussed it with my colleagues in New Zealand, though I have not mentioned it it in Parliament, except by way of a brief hint. I went no further with my own Parliament, but I would not be justified in allowing this Conference to pass without bringing it up. I may say that I believe thoroughly and strongly in the partnership of nations. It does not matter what you call it—a family of nations, a commonwealth of nations, or anything else, so long as the partnership is applied, I believe thoroughly and firmly in that. But even a partnership of nations any more than a na- | lion cannot stand still. We must either progress or delay. There is no question about that, and I hope those who are entrusted with the management of the public affairs of the Empire itself and of the countries of the Empire will see that no decay takes place. There is one point I must acknowledge in this connection, and it is this. While I have called attention to the anomaly I admit and am thoroughly of opinion that there is a far stronger power in the British Empire to-day than any words that may be placed upon paper, either printed or written. That is the sentiments of the British people the patriotic sentiments of the British people. I am not merely speaking of Anglo-Saxons or Europeans, or any one race. I am speaking of the British people rigfft through the Empire, including the native races. You cannot go beyond sentiment. And X am quite sure that as soon as they understand what is taking place or the possibility, if only the possibility—they will see that these matters, which may apear small at the time, are rectified without waiting oo long. NAVAL PROBLEMS. I want to say something about naval defence. It has been referred to by Mr. Hughes, and I may say that there is no difference of opinion between Mr vlughes and myself :n regard to the necessity for naval defence. The stoim centre has clanged undoubrs.y during toe last few years so far as it is possible to judge by appearanees, and many of us fear that the next war-—-and I wish I were o itinrstic enough to believe we had seen the last of wars, but I am not we fear that the next naval war will be fouaht in ths Piejfie. Human nature has not changed very much in the last 5,000 years, and aP though we nave profited by Q. e lessons of the war, and I would like to think ina the lessons of H-e war would prevent war, the suffering that the people of Europe c-n-'i ru ed, the tremendous loss of life Xlie misery they endured, I would like to think that these, taken together, or any one of them, would prevent war in the future. I am not looking forward

to war in the immediate future. There are clouds on the horizon, it is true; some of them perhaps no bigger than the proverbial man’s hand, but they are there, and they may bring war | sooner than we expect. The wish, however, is not father to the thought. NEED OF STRONG NAVY. I hope the indications may come to nothing, and no one will be better pleased than myself if they come to naught, but so far as naval defence is concerned —I am speaking of the Empire now —a chain of countries right round the globe. Dominions, Dependencies, and the Empire within an Empire—lndia, as well as the United Kingdom—whatever may happen in the future I do hope that I there will be sufficient naval force | kept in order to maintain the connections Between the differen parts of the Empire, and that was where there was danger of our losing the last war. in connection with submarine warfare in its worst days, about 1917, before the hydrophone and depth charge had been perfected, when the ships were being sunk faster than we were able to turn them out, there was a danger of the connections being cut between the different countries of the Empire outside the United Kingdom, and if the connections had been cut we should certainly have lost the war-—nothing could have saved us. Fortunately things turned out as some of us were optimistic enough to expect, but again we have to think of the future, and we have to remember the lessons of the last war. I know of course, there are great changes, great improvements, if you can call them improvements, in the instruments of war. Probably different methods, but we can only go as far as our knowledge allows us, and I hope this point will not be lost sight of. If it were possible —for my feeling about war is so strong and I have no doubt it is shared by everyone present —it it were possible for me by one stroke of the pen to strike out tne possibility ot war, I would d<? it without hesitation; but it is not. We know everyone of us that there are countries in the world today, densely inhabited countries that are only kept within their own boundaries and kept from inflicting injustice on their weaker neighbours by the fact that if they did it would probably bring down on them a stronger power than themselves. Mr. Hughes referred to the financial side of the question and the up-keep of the British Navy of the future. 1 do not suppose that New Zealand is in any better financial position than any other country. We have not been exactly crippled, but we feel the result of the war expenditure, and we are likely to feel it for some time to come. But for all that—l speak on behalf of New Zealand—l take the responsibility ol saying that New Zealand will find its fair share of the money necessary to provide a navy strong enough in comparison with other navies to defend the Pacific in case of attack. I hope it will not be necessary, but it is only right that I should express what I feel, and I feel very strongly after seeing what took place on the last occasion in the Southern Pacific upon the outbreak of war. We have an idea of the possibilities that the future may bling forth, and while I have a great deal of respect for the opinion of General Smuts, I do think it would be unwise to leave the countries of the Empire—-which means the Empire itself —absolutely unprotected. So far as America is concerned, I hope that we shall be able to join with America in that friendly co-operation which you, Sir, referred to in your address yesterday. I would go the length of saying that so far as I am concerned I am prepared to join in any well-thought-out alliance with America. Personally, I do not think that is possible, but, whatever happens I hope the time will come wnen America and Britain will join together, if for no other purpose and with no other object than that of keeping the peace of the world and preventing war. General Smuts expressed the opinion that we should do without alliances. I am sorry, but I am not able to join in that opinion. So far as our Treaties are concerned we must stand by them even if for the time being they do not seem to be to oui- advantage. With regard to the Treaty which was signed two years ago at Versailles, and which provided that we —I am speaking or the Empire now—should come to the assistance of France in case of necessity—l do not know whether legally that Treaty stands. I doubt it, because America has withdrawn from the position which she then took up. But so far as we are concerned I have no doubt about our moral abiigation. Our reputation for fair and nonest dealing is one of our best assets and must be maintained at all costs. Then we must ask ourselves this question. We have got through the worst war tthe world has ever witnessed —I hope the world will never see another like it—but if Britain had been compelled to stand alone in that war, the question that must occur to each and everyone of us would be, “Could Britain have been successful?” 1 doubt it. With all the confidence that I have in the might and power of Britain and the patriotism of her people—and the patriotism was proved by the fact that 1,000,000 British citizens'—the flower of the Empire—gave their lives to save the Empire —I idoubt if by ourselves we could have stood up against the Powers of Central Europe and have come out successfully during that war. With regard to the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, this is probably one of the most important things we have to deal with. 1 declined, even to my own Parliament, to discuss details of many matters which I felt confident would be brought up before this conference comes to an end. I took my Parliament into my fullest confidence so far as the proposed Japanese Treaty was concerned, and I told them that, in my opinion, with whatever modifications may be necessary, I was quite prepared to support its renewal. It is only right to admit that, in saying that, I am guided to a certain extent by what took place during the war period. There was one period of the war, very soon af-

ter the war broke out, when New Zealand had 10,000 men ready to send to the front, and the ships and equipment ready to send them, and l information reached us from an official source that the Pacific was not safe. I had an instinct that it Was not safe, but that information decided me, so far as It was possible for a Prime Minister to decide, and I appealed, perhaps in strong terms and by strong methods, which I thought justified at the time, to the British Government to send us protection for those 10,000 men before they were sent out into the Pacific knowing that there was a strong German squadron in those waters. The strength of that squadron was proved by wlfat happened afterwards 1 when they met two quite good British ships—l will not say battleships or even big battle-cruisers but they met two quite good British ships—and sank them with a loss of 1,600 men. The ships were the Good Hope and, I think, the Monmouth. Mr. Churchill: Yes, that is right. Mr. Massey: They were there, and it was quite impossible to find out, when our transport was ready to sail where the German squadron was located. I felt that I could not take the responsibility of sending those men out without protection. However the British Government—l think Churchill was the head of the Admiralty at that time —acceded to our request, and arrangements were made with Japan to send out a strong battle-cruiser, not a battleship, with 12in guns and a powerful British cruiser, the name of which I have forgotten, but which had been the flagship of the China squadron. Mr. Churchill: It was the Minotaur. Mr. Massey: When those two ships came we were perfectly safe. I think our anxiety was justified by the fact —and there are very few men to-day who will not recollect it —that that was the trip upon which the Sydney sank the Emden, By that time, by the way, the Australian ships had joined ours and in the Indian Ocean there were about twenty-eight ships or more carrying troops totalling probably 28,000 men. 1 will say that we were justified in New Zealand in our anxiety for the Safety of those men. My support of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty does not in the very slightest affect the fact that in New Zealand we stand by our right to choose our future fellow-citizens and it is only fair to say that our legislation on the subject has never been found fault with by either the Japanese or any other race. Personally I do not think there will be another war during this generation. It is only right to say §o, but wars have come up very unexpectedly, and it is not well to leave the necessary preparation until the last moment. I trust that so far as naval defence Is concerned, and it is on naval defence that the safety of the Empire of the future rests, we shall not be found unprepared. There is just another point arising out of the proposed renewal of the Japanese Treaty, and it is this. Supposing Japan had been on the other side? I do not mean to' say that is possible, because there was the treaty, but the treaty as it is to-day did not compel Japan to come into the war in the circumstances in connection with which the war was fought. But supposing Japan had been on the enemy side, one result would have been quite certain, that neither Australia nor New Zealand would have been to send troops to the front, neither could we have sent food or equipment—equipment for tile soldiers and sailors or food tor the civil population of Britain. It would not have been possible. These things have all to be remembered in connection with the renewal of the treaty. lam prepared to take the American view into consideration. I do not want to leave any wrong impression on that point. I am quite prepared, as I said, to join with America to prevent war, but I must put the position as it occurs to me and as my experience dictates, and I do not think any apology is necessary for my doing so. There are several points referred to in the address by the Prime Minister which must come up again before the Conference comes to an end and I was veiy g.’ad to hear what was said about reparation. Apparently I missed the report of the negotiations; in all probability the negotiations took place between the time I left New Zealand and before I arrived here. Mr. Lloyd George: That is so, I think. My. Massey: I should be very glad indeed to hear a statement made —not merely on my account, for I know it will be of interest to everyone present—of what the exact position is so far as reparation is concerned. Lord Curzon: If we circulate the short statement upon that question it might save trouble. Mr. Massey: Thank you, that will be good enough for me. Lord Curzon: I will certainly let you have it. I want briefly to refer to some matters which I think should be dealt with. The League of Nations has already been referred to I do not know what the future of the League of Nations is going to be or what effect it will have in preventing war. I should like to th’nk it would do all that it was intended to do by its promoters; but we know, most of us, in past history that attempts to prevent war have failed. The Holy Alliance, arising out of the Congress of Vienna, was just one and a similar intention to the League of Nations. I do not want to say the League of Nations is beyond hope, because I know better, but the Holy Alliance did fail. I do not want to find fault with the League of Nations (Continued on page 3.)