ARMISTICE PARLEY

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume LXXVI, Issue 18062, 28 December 1920, Page 5

ARMISTICE PARLEY

THE GERMAN SIDE OF IT. ERZBERGER’S “EXPERIENCES.” Matthias Erzberger has accomplished a great deal for a man who is only forty-five years old, who was boTn at Buttenhausen, which is not on the map, and who was educated at Biberach, which lias no school ot importance, writes Allan W. Porterfield in the New York Post. In uis young days he spent his time unearthing scandals and working lor the Centrist Party (Catholics) of Germany, to which he has always belonged. When Prinz Max von Baden took charge in the fall of 1918 Erzberger was made Secretary of State, Privy Councillor, Excellence, Chief of the Propaganda Department, and then head of the Armistice Commission. And when, in June, 1919, the Democrats i efused to sign the Peace Treaty, Erzberger stepped in, availed himself of the five minutes that were left to save the day, and saw to it that the Treaty was signed. This over, he became Minister of Finance and Vice-Presi-dent o the Cabinet. Then came his lawsuit with Dr Helfferich, as a result of which he retired from publie life. But has he retired? His book, “Experiences in the World War,” a volume of 396 pages, and selling like hot cakes tor 38 marks, does not leave that impression. He says in so many words that this is merely the foreword to what he is going to write, and that these are not his experiences, but the experiences or Jie men about him. If he has much more to say than he has already said in the present volume we may look for confessions that will make St. Augustine seem like a reservist. He does ,not talk like a man who has retired. What could he add, for example, to his experiences as head of the Armistice Commission He has toldit all, it would seem; and in so doing has cleared up two points, one of vnlch reflects credit on journalism, while the other acquits the Allied command of the charge of having wilfully continued fighting until 11 o’clock on November 11, thus causing- the deaths of hundreds of men to no purpose other than to prove once more that an order is an order. According to Erzberger’s “Experiences,” Germany made it known on November 6 that an armistice , must be signed, so that, the shouting in America on tne 9th was not entirely premature. On the other hand, the armistice was not signed until less than six hours before 11 o’clock on November 11th, and it takes time to notify even the largest units, such as armies, corps, and divisions. Nothing could be further from the truth than that all Germany and the Allies had to do was to have representatives come together and sign a brief statement that the fighting was to stop. The armistice Germany signed was in truth a preliminary treaty made up- of many articles, each one of which required careful study. That it was signed on time will be forever to the credit of the Allied officers who effected the settlement. The sole reason why the fighting might have been stopped a tew hours or possibly even a day, earlier is that when Erzberger and his three associates laid their cards on the table they revealed what had never been got at by the Allied Intelligence Sections, that for Germany to continue the war on a large scale, to say nothing of a successful basis, was utterly out of the question. What toox place then in the forest of Compeigne concerned not the possibility of but the plan for a cessation of hostilities. Erzberger received the notice to effect an armistice “quite suddenly” at 12 o’clock noon on November 6. That evening at 8 he left for Spa, where he had a conference with the German High Command, attended by “more than two dozen German officers, every one of whom wanted to go to'French headquarters to take part in the ceremony.” Erzberger, however, saw that “such a large group of officers would create an illogical impression in France,” so he arranged for three associates, Count Obernoff, General von Winterfeldt, and Captain Vanselow. Hindenburg said: "It is the first time in the history of the world that politicians and not soldiers have signed a truce, but go. in God’s name, and do the best you can for the Fatherland.” The party left in five German automobiles, “and made very slow progress, owing to the fact that the roads were blocked by retreating German soldiers.” At 6 p.m. on November 7th the party reached Chimay, about six miles for the French border. The German general in command would not allow them to proceed, “owing to the danger of doing so.” Erzberger telephoned on ahead to the next German general lat Treion, about three miles beyond the Belgian border, who said, among other things: “The morale of the troops is wonderful. They have been fighting now for six weeks without relief. One division has only 349, another 437 men left.” This general made it possible for the party to proceed. They passed the German front at 9.20* p.m. Erzberger then picked up a second bugler. The automobiles went as slowly as possible, the buglers taking turns in giving signals. The Germans met tne first French troops 150 metres from the German front. Two Frer.eh officers accompanied them into La Capelle, where some civilians came up to Erzberger’s automobile and asked for cigarettes, which he did not have. At La Capelle, about fifteen miles from the Belgian border, they exchanged their German automobiles for French ones, each delegate receiving a card and a guide. Erzberger’s guide was a Prince of Bourbon, who “could not tell me where we were going, though he did inform me that we had about fifty kilometres to go.” They went from there by way of Guise to St. Quentin, arriving there at 1 o’clock a.m. on November 8. The French had dinner ready for them. Erzberger says: “There were two French generals present, one of them being General Depaney, who informed me that we would have for dinner precisely what every French general and private had: soup, salted meat, and peas.” At 2 a.m. they left St. Quentin and proceeded by way of Chauuy to the station at Tergnler,

where „ they were placed on a special train. “We were given some cognac,” says Erzberger, “and though we were not told where we were going, we were ordered to keep the blinds down. At 7 a.m. our train stopped in the woods, and since I noticed another special train standing about a hundred metres away, my suspicion was confirmed. The meeting place was to be the Compiegne Forest.” The opening session was held in Marshal Foch’s private car, beginning at 10 a.m. on Friday, November 8, and lasting about three-quarters of an hour. It was agreed that the deliberations should last no longer than 72 hours; that is, until 11 o’clock, Monday, November 11. The terms of the armistice having been made known, Erzberger asked permission to send them to the German High Command by radio. Foch said this was out of the question and that in all matters he was bound by the Allied command and the. Allied Governments. He informed Ergberger that he could transmit the terms either by cipher or by courier. Feeling .that a courier could not reach the German Headquarters and return in time, Erzberger asked for 96 hours instead of 72 in which to deliberate. His petition was not granted. He says nothing about what took place on Saturday. On Sunday morning the German counter proposals were presented to Marshal Foch and at 7 p.m. the Armistice Commission was informed by radio that the Kaiser had abdicated and the Crown Prince had renounced his rights to the throne. Erzberger did not know whether Germany had become a republic or was still an empire. The English delegates present, Lord Wemyss and Admiral Hope—there were no Belgian, Italian, or American representatives—then raised the question as to whether the new Government would be in a position to carry out the terms of the armistice Erzberger replied: “If whatever Government exists in Germany has the authority to delegate us to sign the armistice it will have the authority to execute the terms of the armistice.” The English representatives replied that they would agree to the armistice with the reservation that if Germany did not execute it military force would be used and the English would at once occupy Heligoland. Sunday morning was taken up with discussion. Sunday afternoon the German delegates took a, walk in the woods. Tn the evening they were notified by Marshal Foch tint their counter proposals had been rejected, while General IVeygand, French Chief of Staff, informed the Germans that there could he no deliberations after 11 o’clock on "Monday. At 8 o’clock on Sunday evening Erzberger received a telegram from Hindenburg asking 'him to beg for certain changes in the terms, and a little later he received the command: “But if you cannot get these, sign anyhow.” At. 10.30 ho received the notice from Germany to go ahead and sign as the duly appointed representative of the new Government. This telegram was signed “Reichskanzler Schluss.” The. interpreter. Erzberger, does not say whether it was the French M. Laperche or the English Mr Bagod, asked who was this Chancellor “Schluss.” He was informed that “Schluss” is the German word for “stop” and means the end of the telegram. The final session began at 1.15 a.m., November 11. Each article was taken up with great care. Foch informed Erzberger that he was going to send fifty divisions to the Rhine to constitute the army of occupation. Erzberger begged lor a reduction in this number. Article 26, dealing with the blockade, was discussed the longest of any. When the terms were finally agreed upon it was 5.12 a.m., only five hours and fortyeight minutes until firing should cease. Foch, according to Erzberger, agreed to call it 5 o’clock, so that full six hours would elapse between the signing of the cessation of hostilities. The actual signing began at 5.20. Two copies were made. When Erzberger signed ho told Foch that some of the terms could not possibly be carried out, but he added, referring to the German people : “ A nation of 70,000,000 people may suffer, but it does not die.” To which Marshal Foch replied, “ Tres bien.” At 5.30 the delegates took leave of each other by rising from their chairs. There was no hand-shaking.