TARANAKI DEFENCES.

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 10, Issue 621, 23 June 1866, Page 3

TARANAKI DEFENCES.

It is generally allowed that the urannex in which the war has been conducted has not only been very expensive, but, at the same time, of very little advantage to the colony at large. It has been carried on as if we were in an enemy’s country which we had no intention of possessing ; for the few n ilitary settlements formed ai’e so weak and distant from each other that they scarcely worthy the name ; and the general opinion is, that , as soon as the troops are withdrawn the settlers will be driven pell-mell into Hew Plymouth. We do not hold this opinion ourselves —weak as must be allowed these posts are—if they are well generailed ; but still it would be a stretch of language to say that they are strongly held, and that they could, by themselves, bid defiance to any force which the Maoris could bring against them. Indeed, it is painful to listen to the unanimous expression of opinion upon this subject, when it is the subject of conversation (which, it must be admitted, is very seldom, the people, not imagining they have had anything to do with the mismanagement, being perfectly indifferent), every one, exception, declaring it a 3 his belief that nothing has been done in the way of settlement, except a tempting of disaster. There is much in a name, however, and it may please the fancy, at least, of the most of us to know that, since the war commenced, we have extended our possessions at least 30 miles to the northward ; that we have gained the Waitara ; that we have military settlements-at Clifton,Tikorang l s Mataitawa, and Manutahi. But, we imagine, this knowledge can do little more than please the fancy, and it would be well, perhaps, that we were -not-so well satisfied, with the mere jingle of the name. Even, one of these settlements is as weak as water, and scarcely one of them could support another. Clifton might, be taken and eaten up, and the place remain unknown to be a desolation until the friendly Maoris did us the favour to inform us of it. The others are rather better off. Tikorangi (which had it not been for an unfortunate neglec , would have been stronger) might, by a great effort, be supported by Manutahi and Mataitawa ; that is to say, if the Maoris did not place a corps of observation to prevent them from stirring. And even then, what a prodigious support they could yield each other! At Clifton, the outermost, there are 46 men ; at the other three, somewhat under 60 each. . These would scarcely be a breakfast for 400 or 500 Maoris, considering that these gentlemen do not, alter the old Scotch fashion, begin at the heel and advance gradually to the head, nor use them as salt provisions. In short, instead of overawing the rebels, they would be overawed. Instead of being a defence to those within their boxmdaries, they would rather be a weakness, inviting attack, irom the fewness of their numbers, and keeping the whole settlement in a state of continual anxiety. It is simply ridiculous to regard our northern borders as defended ; ana this is the result of six years’ expendi .mre. So much for the country north oi IN ew Plymouth. Of the South we have nui shell accurate information ; but, taking Patea as an example, might it not be possi e <> proceed somewliat differently with it, anc , from experience of the past, to form a strong and reliable protection there to tne surrounding district? In the other sett e ments we have mentioned little or no care has been taken to secure tlie settler. Jno ditch or earthwork surrounds the settlement. The men are allowed to work singly on tlieir farms, and the bush or fern beyond them is left uncleared. From these hiding places the rebels might pick them .on, one by one, with impunity. Instead of 200 or 300 acres of the land beyond their boundary being cleared, they arose situated that they will have no warning till the enemy is upon them. Or, instead of the men being compelled by the terms of the settlement to work in companies, with their arms always at hand, and outlying pickets placed at some distance in front of them, to give them warning of danger, every mail is simply placed, unprotected, in the best position possible for a mark to the rebel, and the rebel’s escape made thoroughly secure. Of course they have a block-house to retreat to, but they will reach it with diminished numbers if they can be so easily taken by surprise. At Patea the same state of things exists. The nature of the country is the same ; and the men, it is said, are to be placed close to tbe bush which forms the boundary of their land. Everything there is peaceable at present, but it will not do to rely upon the Maoris remaining so, and quietly rest satisfied that, with so safe a position for attack, they will not take advantage of it. hi or would it be sufficient to sc :ur the country inland for 20 miles, and thereby think we were safe because, for tbe time being, the rebels were driven off. Tlie Maoris being a migratory race, their commissariat being o the I simplest description, a day or two would complete their return. This system has been tried for a number of years and surely found at last to be useless. It has cost a great deal,’ and all that it was intended to accomplish has- still to be done. It has been an unnecessary expenditure of money, and would be so still, if continued. As well as might we imagine w r e had taken possession of the country of the wandering Arab, by continually keeping in pursuit oi ' him. He would tire out the foe by the simplicity of his habits ; and, it being impossible to render nature unproductive, his loss would, in a year, he almost repaired. It is the same with t >e Maori. He can flit from place to place, easily finding a living, and return with the same ease to seek revenge for his trouble. Without force, which was beyond our means and almost impossible to have employed, it was necessarily to he expected that a war of pursuit would be protracted ■ foryears, and, after it bad been so continued, leave us almost where we were. Indeed the first, and as we now find it, ruinous blunder we made was in employing the military at all. They have cost a great deal and done little or nothing. Three millions of money have, somehow, been spent, and where are the returns ? A few feeble settlements, unworthy of the name, and subject to the same danger as our settlement was at tbe outbreak of the rebellion. Indeed, all that could easily liave been done then, without a farthing of this enormous expenditure, must be done now, without the means of doing it. ' What has been spent in conquering the Maori might have, without conquering him at all, but simply forming strong settlements all around and at a com i lerable distance from our defenceless towns, made the Northern Island strong in population, rich and prosperous, instead of diminished in numbers and labouring under the greatest ■depression. With proper inducements, military settlers would have flocked in from the surrounding colonies. As they came

they could have been formed into companies of 100 or 200, and land snuiicient allotted to this number. Their first duty should then have been to make an entrenched camp of this allotment, to surround it with a ramparf, to build inner forts, and, for a year or two, work in companies. Any number of these could have been formeu at little expense. With the promise of 50 acres or 100 acres at the end of three years, little more than provisions would liave been necessary to induce them to work heartily and vigorously. A brush, with the Maoris would have been a mere pastime to vary the tediousness of ■ labour, and the land would now have been securely held, and the small villages these settlements were placed to protect, been as safe as the most inland towns in England. Tlie benefitstoo, to the colony at large, would have been incalculable. Any debt we had acquired in the process of settlement would have boon easily met by increased Customs, and the burden, speedily, altogether removed. Ten thousand additional men in the province would have given us, at the low rate of £3 per head, £30,000 per annum, and we might _ from this, already have had much which it will be long ere we possess but, above all, we should liave been secure from danger, which we may yet feel. jEven the scheme of Mr. Vogel (given in this day’s-issue) might have some such conditions advantageously attached to it. The Patea might be made perfectly safe only by the exercise of a very little arrangement. —‘ Taranaki News.’