LETTERS TO THE EDITOR.

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 4, Issue 199, 12 July 1860, Page 3

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR.

July 7, 1860.

Sir, —Allow: me to call to call the attention of the magistrates to the necessity of making a road to the Cemetery from Victoria Avenue, between the'’lndustrial School ground and the town boundary, with the labour of the prisoners, which might be done with but little trouble by cutting down those small hills, and in the swamp by cutting the sides and throwing the earth into* the middle, which would make it passable for the present?; and a culvert laid in the new .creek, which I think might Le done by subscription, as the one at the mouth of the river failed for the want of funds ; I I think:so small' a sum as this,would require might easily be obtained. Hoping the magistrates will take it into favourable-considera-tion, I am,

An Elector.

July 9, 1860.

Sir,— Since everybody’s business is nobody’s business, and I am a nobody, it follows that what is everybody’s business is peculiarly mine. In this position, then, I acquaint you, that some six years ago Mr. Dillon Bell, the then Land Commissioner, gave the inhabitants of Wanganui the privilege to choose whether ihe hills opposite, ou the other side of the river, should be reserved for the use of the town, or sold ; the meeting unanimously resolved they should be reserved ; and they have been so' until now. May I ask you by what authority this act of the then Land Commissioner has been now overruled ?—and also, if any of our representatives (who all declare their intention to watch over, protect, and promote the welfare of Wanganui) have interested themselves in any way oil the subject ? —and if not', why not ? It is true, the Provincial exchequer is nearly exhausted; but that is no reason why the- privileges accorded to Wanganui should be wrested trom her. Next, we hear, that one section of this land has been sold by compact or agreement, the purchaser to pay. the same amount for it as the next best section may realise at public-auction. But this section is said to be worth from £SO to £IOO more than any other of the block! Why was it not put up to public competition, as is the custom, and not sold by private agreement ? This looks like undue partiality.

! A licence for a public house has also been granted, it is unimportant whether to Tones,

Brown, ,or Robinson; but have the magistrates acted in this matter in accordance with the provisions of; the Licensing Act ?—-and if not, why not ? Or has it been a private job ?—■ which also would look like partiality. It is rumoured, also,, that the Ferryman has not paid the rent for the whole time be has had the ferry. Whose duty is it to collect it ? —and why has it not beep done, especially as the Provincial exchequer.; is nearly bankrupt, and cannot afford to lose it. This also looks like partiality. It is also believed that the late Ferryman has had considerable amounts given to him (about .£6O) for the repairs of the punt, &c. —was it a stipulation in. his lease that the Provincial government should be liable for these- repairs ? If not, this is also a great partiality. It is these hole and corner doings which bring the Provincial Government into disrepute, and throw a doubt over the impartiality of the acts of the magistrates and if in this case, in every case. I hope you will give satisfactory, answers to these queries, so-as toset the grumblers at rest. I am, sir, yours, Szc.

A Nobody:

July. 9 th, 1860.

Sie, —Having read, in a late issue of your paper, a letter signed “ A Military Settler and? a Volunteer. Rifleman,” I wish through the same medium- to say a few words in reply thereto, being myself a volunteer from the formation of the corps. I have no wish to fall into the ranks of'the 65 th regt.,.as, by so - doing, I should display a great want of confidence in Major Cooper, and the gentlemenelected as officers by the volunteers from their own ranks, by placing myself under otherofficers, and virtually assisting to break up the corps to which I belong. If the writer of the letter alluded to wishes - to join the 65th regt., I have no doubt he caii; do so by applying to , the proper authorities ; he will then get pay, lodgings, and rations * from the government, and by the existing military regulations in /Fanganui it will in no wise interfere with his daily occupations. But for my own part I hope the volunteers will remain an independent corps, and in the expected campaign if we are to earn laurels, let jus wear them.

Yours very Volunteer.

July 7,1860.

Sir, —-New Zealand is- astonished at the tardy movements of the British* troops in New Plymouth—whites and natives alike; and not only this island, but the South Seas share in the same wonder. It is a matter? of amaze-ment-to every one, both at the scene of inaction, and at every place to which the intelligence is carried. Never before do we remember to have witnessed such imbecility. The rashness of Colonel Despard is a thousand times more preferable than such conduct. Had the pas in his time been constructed after the.fashiou they now are, his dariug would] have had its due reward. 'What reward shall we mete out to the one of whom we now write ? We dare not answer. We should not like to follow the multitude—whether right or wrong —in their, perhaps, truthful designations. That is hi.s reward here in New Zealand ;. it [ will be the same in al parts where the name | of Col. Gold is whispered. Colonel Fespard was rightly enough accused of temerity; Colonel Gold will with justice be blamed with its converse, and the world will not say he i& maligned. The press is now, we think without proof, casting the odium of these transactions on the Governor. . We do not credit the statement. We consider the retreat of the British forces from the southern expedition a standing answer to the opinions hinted in the - newspapers, and as furnishing us with' anindex of all past proceedings; Should we not rather denominate them non-proceedings? Phis term we consider most ajplieable. Are we not daily furnished with proof? What will they think. in England—what iij Europe generally—what in America, of the prowess of British troops ? When, especially, they learn that 2100 man are in daily and nightly dread of being attacked by 600 or 700 savages;, when they learn that, for fear of being cut off, or taken prisoners, 300 soldiers were transported in a steamer £0 at a time, instead of; marching twelve miles along a good road. Truly we know what we think ; and we believe they..will set us down as llomaDS turned Italians 1 /That reason, we ; are anxious toknow, is there for all this dilatory work—for all this fear, we ought rather to say ? William ; King, insulting British authority, and in the face of troops numerous enough to swamp him at once hurling defiance—his men quite at liberty to roam where they please* mui dering and plundering wherever- they can—-which meaus in the face* of the troops, before their very eyes! Our latest intelligence states that. 60 natives advanced in skirmishing order, proteciing some fifteen fellows; who plundered - nine or ten houses close to a stockade* with 100 men !! We think this would form not aninapt illustration of our Saviour’s remarkable words,— 4 He that smiteth thee on 'the oho cheek, turn unto him the other also;” and we should suggest to any one publishing the Sermon on the Mount to insert this scene asfrontispiece ! I do not wish to be irreverent —God forbid ! They say it is bard to followour Lord in this precept ; is it not also hard , to be dealt with as the natives with the whites at Taranaki, and not resist ? The simple idea makes our indignation almost irrestrainable.' We are reverting, now, to ourselves ; we are quite aware of the logical consequences, of this prudential conduct. Whatever the British commander may think on the matter, the natives look on it in no other light than.

t'latvof cowardice—-cowardice, unfoitunately, 1 not on the part of the" leader, but of the wholej white.community. Witness their speeches at —Te Heuheu’s especially ; witness their behaviour everywhere - that of -insolent contempt, mingled with dislike.' All '..'.we can reply to this deportment of theirs is, if r they are wrong in their conclusions—and we ' are confident they are—they are .at least logical. He nee, it is plain, if matters continue much longer as at present, the now shimmering volcano of Maori dissatisfaction ‘ will hurst out in a general and disastrous rising of the p.ineipal tribes. It is only intimidation that ke p i them quiet. I also, with most of the missionaries, have had twenty years’ experience of their’ character; and once they believe that we are the weaker par ty—in other words, that we are afraid—every barrier to their desires 'is' broken; and what more likely to confirm them .in. this'idea than the ■ "cautious conduct of theßifftish leader ?.

All that officer’s inactivity ' can only excite ; feelings of mingled scorn and reprehension-on our part against the party guilty of such inanition! 'Words, indeed, would fail to express a tithe of the indignation by U 3 experienced, when we cast a retrospective glance at past events. Is Colonel Gold so utterly void of military strategy, that, after refusing, because so daring, the' ‘ practicable’ offer of that experienced Crimean, officer, Capt. Lucas, he cannot of himself devise some means pi routingout these barbarians even in their stronghold? We have asked the question, and leave the answer for others, if the' procedure of that Officer be not answer already furnished ! There must be, it is apparent, many forms of attacking a place, and’ from amongst these let us suggest the two following. Before, however, proceeding to these plans, let ‘ us premise one thing of importance. It must, then, be granted, that what is shelter for one will be shelter under similar circumstances for another. That, when once in the bush, or scrub, or toi, or whatsoever it may be, a white man has as ifiuck Chance as a Maori; and we think, from the superiority of weapons, a'much hett'er. Trusting in this belief ! it was that ‘ Sir George followed Bahgihaeata into the middle of the Horokiwi valley, then ;one of the * wildest places that could be imagined. The military there found that a tree was as good a protection to them as to their darker, enemy. The truth of this doctrine cannot be better exemplified than by referring to Waireka, wliere'tlife natives, in very superior numbers, and on ground of their own choosing, were beaten back with great' loss by comparatively . few, who had only two of their number killed. ? The Maori thought, that as in the forest they were all powerful against the Europeans, so, with the cover afforded by scrub, toi, flax, fern, and sandhills —-cover, in point of fact, superior to that secured in the forest—they thought their enemies would become an easy prey. They found, however, as many upon trial do, that they had miscalculated. They : found, to use a vulgarism; that “ what was sauce for the goose was sauce for the gander !” That when once bohind a toi or flax bush, the white man was hidden from view of an enemy as well as a brown man ; and so will they always find, if the white man will only act as they did at Horokiwi and Waireka. We shall require this, which we consider indubitable, to be granted, as, in our mode of attack the bush must be occupied, because the natives, fully alive to our indecent terror of fighting them on equal terms amongst timber, will always contrive; to have their fortified pas either, wholly or in part surrounded by bush; in' which- case, unless the pa can be hemmed in that none escape, the place had better be’left alone. r If the pa is to be thus hemmed in, the bush must be taken possession ■ of; which, when once entered, they are then as; safe as any !Maori can be. 7 The trunk of a tree, wenmagine, is quite as' impervious to a , Maori bullet as:to a soldier’s. ‘ A bullet Won’t penetrate a .round " pole four inches through ! Let us now begin, without further comment; to describe our first: . 'Plan of Attack. '

• -Let us premise; for-we;-know at present, of the coilfiguratidii off William King’s pa at Mataitawa, the one he now] occupies—let us premise, we say, s that the shape of the , pa is similar! to the famous L one, in the capture of whiclv:so 'much want of tact was shown. We suppose it to.have : the forest in the rear, and open on the side3i We shall also suppose it to have -an outer defensive work, in' the shape offpalings-fifteen inches from the ground lashed to; two' strong rails, which ' rails are . seemed to posts sunk in the ground. This outwork is,-.perhaps, three feetfrommainpallisades, 1 and clear•undbr that no hindrance to . tire outwards'may-he offered. ' Outer fences after this, .description constitute a principal : feature in the defensive warfare of the natives ; at, Ahuriri, and we presume such an admirable preventative to approach will not be disrej garded. at Taranaki. We shall next ‘take it : for granted that the natives Lave built them* - selves bomb-proof chambers both for, fighting and sleeping—that, in fact, they' have no ■houses above ground. If so, they have made : them thick enough to resist cannon, and canj’lnot, consequently, ob'ain a fire from their . loop-holes other, than’.almost at right angles with the face of the pa. So was it found to ■ he. in the U stockade, and it cannot fail to be the case , in every instance where they are forced; to ..build walls: to resist cannon. In proceeding to attack, the storming party must make for. one of the angles 1 thatas-not ! flanked ; by-another face, andi'* marching 1 in 5 column,' , proceed as if a diagonal line were projected . from angle to'opposite angle of a square. lii . this manner, the column.of ; either face of pa to .right and left of ' them-' an angle 0f.135> making a "'Supplemental angle to either face : of 45. degrees. The fire from the

besieged cannot come within A 5 degrees of the storming column, if the construction be as above described; but, in any case, if they make an unflanked angle the point of entrance, no bullet could touch within twenty degrees; and if properly the enterprise could not possibly fail. We shall now enter into a detail of the ' - Disposition of Attack.

' We have been profuse of suppositions; let us be allowed still further licence in this particular, and to suppose the pa to be defended by five, six, or eight hundred—it matters not how: many ; that the besiegers number 800, a force about equal to that which Colonel Gold led southward. The troops would require to be thus divided—more or less in one party, of course; according, to the discretion of the commander—2oo men (100 civilians and 100 soldiers) to take up a position in the bush close in rear of the pa ; 100 watching the right, and another hundred the left2oo in ! frontand 200, composed of half blue jackets, to form the storming column. In this manner should we order our attack. Those to be stationed in the rear would to proceed to the edge of the bush about an hour before dawn, and when they had sufficient light move into position. The advanced work, to which we alluded, , would require ; to be shot away with' chain or bar shot, or whatever would remove it, that no hindrance might be offered in scab ing the main walls. After this was effected they would then bombard the pa oil two or three sides, to draw off attention, and, when everything was arranged, the attacking column to' advance on the open angle under the protection of the bombardment, which would clear the pa of all defenders above ground. When once .entered, 200 more, either those inffronl or predetermined drafts from these and other parties, would require to follow the storming column. : These troops once inside the pa, we presume that even Colonel Gold .would know how to manage matters, and we therefore consider further detail unnecessary. We may, however, remark that, if the place were divided, as was the L stockade, into two distinct compartments, having Underground communication, some sappers ought to be prepared, immediately the place was entered, to sink a pit like a post hole, two feet deep, and blow the passage in. If everything were previously arranged, as we doubt not it would be, the plan we- have here devised must prove successful. It may be objected that, by subdividing the beliegers, as we have done, we render them too weak. We are perfectly aware that this objection would be quite valid if we were contending with disciplined European troops; but Maories—and, mark, we are far from undervaluing either their prowess or courage—though thousands tried their utmost, could not prevent these troops from forming a junction. Any objector must remember, that the proportions of a native fighting pa are not of such magnitude. That so far from being like a Sebastopol, their size' does not even equal an Exchange !—consequently, it requires little effort on the part of disciplined troops to form a junction when it is rendered necessary. We believe, too, that the possession of the bush in rear of any besieged pa is absolutely indispensable, as there is not the slightest doubt in our minds-that the natives have subterranean communication with the forest, in order that, if hard pressed, they may escape. We do not wish to lose men taking empty fortifications ; vve want to take and punish those rebellious people who erect them. So much for.the foregoing. Let us now, as briefly as‘possible, illustrate our Second Plan of Attack.

In it we propose to attack by night—midnight the best time. In 'one of this sort the chances are always against the defending party. ' He knows nothing of the number who are opposed to him—is entirely ignorant of their plans or resources—is, in fact, afraid to stir. A night attack creates consternation enough in the mind of the cool European ; how much more terrible, then, must it be to the mind of the savage ? In encounters in the dark between whites and barbarians, the result has always been the signal discomfiture of ! the ! latter;' Even amongst polished nations, some generals have been eminently successful in this mode of'warfare. Such was Roguet, in the time of the great Napoleon, whose nocturnal exploits carried consternation wherever he made his appearance. We might, indeed, safely predict a speedy termination to this native rebellion, if night attacks would obtain in our forces. 'ln the mode we are about to describe, the bush must be possessed as in the first place. '■ They would require to enter the confines of the bush the night previous to attack, and take up a position on the following evening ; must be well provided with rockets —signal rockets—to be used as lights if needed ; as must also all the divisions. We should proceed as before, in : destroying . the' outer fence at the unflanked angle. -The storming party might consist of 200 men, as in the first instance, and when an entrance was effected'3oo more men to support. The rockets to be fired, being held in the hand as torches, thereby rendering it light as day, -carrying terror into the ranks of the enemy. We daresay 'the soldiers and blue jackets would not only understand their Work, but perform it. If pa after pa were served in this manner, ere many months elapsed New Zealand would see every- man, ?o to speak, sitting in'peace uuder bis own vine and under liis own fig tree. We cannot bind a commander of troops to any one mode of action; nor do we desire it.' > His brain ought to be fertile enough M in invention to forward and carry out any plans liis profession necessitates.' If liis own is defective he has that of ‘others to fall back on, upon whose suggestions he might act. ‘ Certain we are, that the inactivity of the British com-

-- . V... - x- V i inander at New Plymouth. is. not m accord ance with the views of experienced .officers under him. He might, for aught we know, be justified in not accepting the brave offer of Captain Lucas. Yetwedoubt .it. Two other officers approved the plan, one of whom knew something of both Maories and a Maori pa. The whole line of policy hitherto pursued by Colonel Gold is fraught with misfortune to our colony ; for, much as we abhor bloodshed, and much as we deplore its necessity, our conviction is that, until the natives, in some dreadful encounter,'‘Jose some eight .or. nine hundred of their number, we shall have little hope - of amicable relationship between the races.

I am, &c. Philopcemen.