THE NATIONAL DEFENCES—PROSPECT OF INVASION.

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 4, Issue 177, 9 February 1860, Page 4

THE NATIONAL DEFENCES—PROSPECT OF INVASION.

LriUILL UKS JL ?'//<£*• J We think it cannot be denied that, without, so far as we are aware, the slightest provocation on the part of England, there exists in France at this moment a very strong and very wide-spread hostility, to the government and people of this country. We do not lay particular stress on any one conversation, either at a military festival, when the tongue is loosed by wine, or in a railway carriage, when the speakers are unknown to each other; but from information derived from a vast number of independent sources we entertain no doubt that a feeling of hostility more bitter than has existed in France since the peace of 1815 is at this moment entertained towards this country. The French press, so guarded on all other subjects, is on this outspoken. The moderate and reasonable Journal des Debats contains an attack upon England such as never before, in moments of the greatest irritation, have appeared in its decorous columns. The Gazette de France lacks language to express the bitterness of its detestation, and the Uniters is still more virulent than the organ of the Legitimists. The talk of the army and navy is of revenge for victories 45 and 55 years old, and their firm belief, as well as their ardent wish, is, that in a few months the signal will be given for the invasion of this country. The inhabitants of the departments from Brest to Calais experience a revival of the hostility of fifty years since, and, strange to say, burn with ardour for a war of which they must bear the brunt. We believe this to be a fair representation of the present state of feeling in France —nay, more, we believe the Emperor Napoleon would, if the question could be put to him, admit it to be so. We believe he would tell us he is our only friend, and that to his intervention alone we owe it that the two most powerful states in the world are n. t already involved in an exterminating conflict The fact we state—namely, that England i hated, and a war with her earnestly desire (1 by the clergy, the Legitimists, the army, and the inhabitants of the northern provinces of France —we think we may assume as perfectly well proved, and we do not expect any of the journals of France will be bold enough to deny it. The next question is, how does it happen, after a peace of 45 years, that this should be the feeling of France towards us ? To what cause are we to attribute it ? What provoca: tion have we given ? What offensive claims have we put forward ? What have we done in the last ten years to make the France of 1859 more hostile to us than the France of ten years ago ? We have fought and bled together without, as far as we are aware, the slightest imputation upon the good faith or honour of either nation. We are even now

preparing a joint expedition, and ■ there is no part of the globe in which our interests come in direct and hostile contact. We are utterly unconscious of having put forward any claims or entered upon any negotiations which even the most perverse ingenuity can construe as hostile to French interests. The Freneh subjects, whom the fortune of war has placed under our government, are admitted precisely to the same rights and privileges as our own people, and, as far as hospitality goes, it has been our honour and our pleasure to receive the representatives of every dynasty that has occupied the throne of France since the Revolution. There remain, certainly, the injuries given and received during the Wars of the Revolution and of Napoleon; but they in no degree account for the phenomenon which we are examining—the great increase of French animosity against England at the present moment, and a wish and expectation in a time of what ought to be profound peace of an almost immediate descent upon our shores. We fear that the fact, which is unfortunately so notorious, can be accounted for in no other way than by the assumption that these evil passions have received a powerful impulse from , the French Government itself. The time is i come when it is most friendly and most wise tto speak plainly and openly. In England the 1 manifestation of a feeling in different and re- ' * mote parts of the country is very easily acjj counted for. By the agency of railways and -•electric telegraphs all the information that can Jbe procured on any subject of public interest Jis simultaneously laid before the nation in the t!sheets of a free press, and it is not marvellous l- if from the same facts people should arrive' for - themselves at the same conclusions. In France

there are hut two ways in which the whole body of the nation can be acted upon. The one is by the press, and the other by the action of the centralised authority, civil and military, The French press is not exposed to censure, but the power of punishing a newspaper in France is so summary, so complete, and sc

irresistible, that the director of the journal is .forced to perform the office of censor nimself, under penalty of the immediate and total confiscation of the valuable property committed to his charge. If he violate the ■ law —and nothing is easier than to do so without the slightest moral or political guilt —he is liable to punishments of every degree of severity ; and, if he does not violate the law, he may be warned, or his journal suppressed without warning, at the pleasure of the government. Not only must he insert nothing which the government ‘ disapproves; he is bound to insert an article which the Government may transmit to him as if it had emanated from himself —a fact which has been made laughably manifest by the appearances of the same sentiments, expressed in the same words, in the most remote parts of the country at the same time. It is not, therefore, too much to say, that for so much of the present irritation of feeling as arises from the attacks of the press upon England the government .of France is responssble. To check them would require no exercise of power. An intimation that they are displeasiug to the government would have sufficed, and that intimation has never been given. The other way in which the opinion of France may be simultaneously moved is through the official hierarchy. The Minister of the Interior in Paris wields a power more tremendous than was ever vested in any minister of any government. He has but to express a wish, and an enormous bureaucracy, whose ramifications extend to the smallest commune in France is immediately set in motion. Their advancement depends on their diligence; their power penetrates everywhere, and their influence reaches every one. The same is the case in the army. The Minister of War has only to give the word, and thousands of zealous emissaries are ready to propagate it like lightning through the ranks of 600,000 men. Has this influence been used in the present instance to excite the feelings of citizen and soldier against England ? We believe it has, and we believe it for three reasons. First, we believe it because it is quite clear that an instrument less secret, and in the present state of society in France less efficient — the press —has been employed for this purpose. We believe it, secondly, because the results are such as an action of the government upon the people would be likely to produce; and we believe it, thirdly, because we have observed in the open acts of the government of France symptoms that it does not shrink from stimulating ill-will against this country. We will mention two instances —first, the issuing the medal of St. Helena, and, secondly, the erection at the public expense of a monument to commemorate a repulse sustained by the English on the coast of Brittany one hundred years ago. We have, therefore, we think, established that there is considerable irritation in the mind of the French army and nation against England, and that that irritation has mainly been caused by the action of the French government. From this it necessarily follows that the French government wishes that irritation to exist, but it does not necesarily follow that the Frehch government has Resolved to go to war with this country. It may well he that a profound politician like the Emperor of the French is not unwilling to have it believed that his people are burning to avenge the misfortunes of the last war upon England, and that if peace be. preserved it is entirely owing to his good sense and moderation. It may be that the Emperor Napoleon, while exciting the national spirit of his subjects against us, and making such preparations as would be required if a war were really in contemplation, only means to place himself in so commanding a position that England, which desires peace above all things, may. be intimidated into following whatever impulse he may please to give to the affairs of Europe ; or, lastly, it may be that these things really mean what those who are politically opposed to the Emperor declare they mean, and that we have a danger to confront, in the existence of which we cannot yet persuade ourselves to believe. Unhappily, we cannot afford to speculate on the alternative. The hatreds and passions of mankind are more easily stimulated than allayed, and it is not our fault if we are forced to act in a time of profound peace as if the camp of Boulogne were already formed again, and another flotilla awaited the orders of its imperial master.

The following significant paragraph appeared a short time ago in the ‘ Correspondance Bullier 5 :—I can certify the entire accuracy of the following information touching the relative naval strength of France and England. England has at this moment, or will have in a few months, 36 line-of-battle ships, carrying 3400 guns, and 19,750 horse-power. France has 40 line-of-battle ships, with 3706 guns, and representing 27,510 horse-power. The parallel, as you see, is by no meansTo our disadvantage. As to frigates and gunboats in a state for immediate service, the proportion is also in our favour. The writer of the letter from which we derive this information, says that the English Admiralty is making,prodigious efforts to regain the former numerical superiority of England. It carefully watches every movement in our dockyards, and latterly, when it heard we were building two blindes vessels at Toulon, it put two upon the stocks also. Whatever diligence our neighbours may use, we shall be ready before they are. The two vessels alluded to, at which men are working night and day at Toulon, are designed upon the model of the Napoleon, our most magnificent ship of war. They are covered with iron or steel plates, which render them proof against the most powerful projectiles. They will carry only 30 guns, but the calibre of these is so l large that they will easily sink a three-decker. • A distinguished exception to tho Anglo-

phobia which is now the rage in France is furnished iu some letters which the well-known M. Michel Chevalier lias recently contributed to the * Journal des Debats. 5 These letters are on the subject of the present relations between England and France. It shows how deeply the idea of a conflict between the two countries must have struck in France, when a man like Michel Chevalier comes forward with a detailed estimate of the condition, tion, polity, and laws of the English, with praise for their assertion of human right; and with proof that England can always produce a huge defensive naval armament ; while he maintains that her armaments are merely defensive, he castigates those journalists and others who inflame French passion against England ; and he warns them that if England is either threatened, or kept in a state of incessant alarm, the will probably deal a thundering blow against the aggressor. He condemns those who would enter upon a “ hopeless rivalry 55 with England in building war ships.