Wairarapa Times-Age WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 1944. TOO SLOW IN ITALY?

Wairarapa Times-Age, 9 February 1944, Page 2

Wairarapa Times-Age WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 1944. TOO SLOW IN ITALY?

AT the time when it was made, the landing in the Pontine beach-head, south of Pome, was accepted very generally as redeeming the directors of Allied strategy in Italy from the charge that they were fighting the campaign in conditions determined by the. enemy, and were neglecting opportunities, by an effective use of sea and air power and in other ways, of bringing about an advantageous change in these conditions. Now, however, the landing south of Rome has become in itself a target for extended criticism in both Britain and the United States.

One British commentator, Lieutenant-General 11. G. Martin, has said that: “Xettuno remains an enigma. We came, we saw, we settled down in seaside lodgings.” Having added that by now the opposing fronts have evidently set hard, General Martin went on to ask: —

Why did the landing force remain, so far as we may judge, almost entirely passive throughout the first ten days or so of _ its career? My guess, purely a surmise, is that, not for the first time perhaps, British and American arms may have suffered from overfrigidity of planning.

This estimate of the situation in Italy finds support in the statement of the military editor of the “New York Times” (Mr Hanson Baldwin) that: —

The slow pace of the operations seems to be due to an overcautious attitude by the Allied commanders.

At a direct, though possibly superficial view, this criticism may seem to have considerable point. Taking account of the apparently limited use meantime made of opportunities, in spite of the demonstrated fighting powers of the Allied troops engaged, there is admittedly a marked contrast to be drawn between the present conduct of the campaign in Italy and the tremendous onslaughts in •which the Red Army is smashing and hurling back numerous and formidably established and equipped German armies on one vital section of the Eastern front after another.

In the extent, if any, to which it has validity and force, the criticism here quoted evidently must be taken to reflect'; rather on the supreme directors of Allied strategy than on the commanders of the armies fighting their tvay towards Rome. It may be rather early, however, to pronounce confident and dogmatic judgments based solely upon an examination of the position as it appears at the moment in Italy. With or without warrant there have been suggestions that the Italian campaign now takes a subordinate place in the offensive plans of the United Nations. It is known that the Allies are maturing plans for attack from Britain, and possibly from other bases, on a very great scale. There are some suggestive indications, amongst them the call addressed by the 8.8. C. to all French patriots to prepare for active revolt against the Germans, that the hour’for major Allied action is near. It is by no means certain that when that hour strikes the situation meantime reached in Italy—one in which the Germans are massing strong forces on two fronts in an effort to cling as long as possible to Rome—will continue to be, from the enemy standpoint, advantageous or promising.