AIR WARFARE

Wairarapa Times-Age, 26 November 1940, Page 5

AIR WARFARE

NEW PHASE OPENED ATTACKS ON BRITISH INDUSTRY SEQUEL TO EARLIER NAZI FAILURES. PROBLEM OF THE NIGHT BOMBER. (British Official Wireless.) RUGBY, November 24. The third stage of the great aerial battle may be said to be still in an indeterminate phase. The earlier stage, consisting of an endeavour by the Nazis to apply against Britain in overwhelming weight the bomber attack which had succeeded so well against numerically inferior fighter opposition when carried out in close co-operation with the ground forces, appears to have been at least recognised as a failure when the army was unable to follow immediately in the path of the bomber. A COSTLY LESSON.

This lesson not only caused Germany the loss of a great number of aeroplanes and an even greater number of most valuable airmen, but also imposed on her the necessity of learning a new conception of the use of her air arm. In this she had the advantage of the practical demonstration given by the R.A.F., who carried out extremely destructive night raids over industrial Germany some months before the Nazi air force had sufficiently trained crews to be able to venture forth in darkness. What may be regarded by future military historians as the intermediate phase shows signs of coming to an end. Attack on civil populations, either by propaganda or violence as the occasion serves, is a common form of Nazi technique, and this, coupled with the vast area of London as a target, may have given the Luftwaffe High Command the idea of endeavouring to combine a serious offensive against civil will, which after all is the foundation of military powei-, with a secondary object of training the crews in the difficult operation of night bombing. The events of the last two weeks may show that the Nazis have realised that their endeavour to break London’s morale has failed, but, having in the process got together at least the nucleus of a trained night bomber force, a long-term policy of attacking the war industry at the source has been adopted. Some observers consider that the attack on Coventry may be the first manifestation of this policy being put into operation and cite the subsequent attacks on selected towns in support of the contention. However this may be, both sides are concerned at finding an adequate defence to the night bomber attack, and for the moment the problem has passed more into the hands of the scientific engineering experts than those of the combatant air commands.

RELIANCE ON FIGHTERS. Many competent observers regard the solution of this problem as being the same as the decisive answer given to the German daylight bombers —by efficient, well-handled fighter aeroplanes. While admitting that antiaircraft fire has forced the raiders to fly at great altitudes and also that the gunnery is becoming more and more accurate, these circles contend that ground defence by itself will not accomplish very much more. They say that the principle of success lies in “seeking out the enemy and destroying him,” and for this purpose he must be tackled in the element in which he is operating; in other words, fighters by night is the answer to bombers bynight. The initial part in finding .an ideal aeroplane for this work lies with the technician, and the problems facing him are those of visibility, range, armament and ability to attain a very high speed in the air and also a sufficiently slow landing speed. The final problem, and probably the most difficult to solve, is that of finding the enemy by night. It is sometimes not realised, especially by towndwellers and those used to well-illunT inated vehicles, how extremely difficult it really is to see in the dark. The blind man, however, relies a great deal on sound, and in this direction it is probable that a solution lies. A long time, however, stretches between theory and practice, and an even longer one between prototype and production. The problems of aerial warfare arise as the fight proceeds. Defence will be a gradual process and no sudden or early solution can be expected.