MYSTERY ARMY

Wairarapa Times-Age, 30 December 1939, Page 3

MYSTERY ARMY

BIG EFFORT BY CHINA DIPLOMATIC CHANGE IN FAR EAST. SOME JOLTS TO JAPAN. TOKIO. Behind the easing of tension between Tokyo and the British and French Governments, as reflected in the decision of the Western Governments to withdraw most of their troops from China, lies a tremendous change in Japan's political orientation, writes Randall Gould in the “Christian Science Monitor."

This change has come about during the last few weeks. One circumstance that is forcing the hand of the Japanese Government, is the activity of General Chiang Kai-shek, who has spent the last few months in a concentrated effort to raise a formidable army capable of driving the Japanese off Chinese soil. According to reports, this army, about which there has been considerable mystery, has reached vastproportions, and the Japanese Government is making every effort to settle its quarrel with the Western Governments and to get an all-China Government under Wang Ching-wei on its feet before General Chiang can open his new offensive.

Another reason for the change is the German entente with Soviet Russia, which rocked the whole basis of Japan’s international setup and was far more sensational in its direct repercussion on the national life than the outbreak of the European war has proved. Another incident of deep effect on the Japanese national thought was the American abrogation of the 1911 treaty of commerce and navigation. AVERSION TO BOLSHEVISM. To these things might be added a more nebulous but in its way no less important feeling of dissatisfaction with the continued “incident" in China. It is hard to put a name to this feeling. It partakes a little of both boredom and war-weariness. Two main factors stand out.

First, Japan feels suddenly more isolated and isolationist, after a long and cosy period of joint importance ”'ith Germany and Italy as an “Axis Power." Second. Japan would like to set the Far East house in order to end war deprivations, endless quarrels in all directions, and industrial preoccupation with armament needs, all to the end that it may recover friendly trade and prosperity.

For a time, after the abrupt revelation of Soviet-German collaboration, it appears that Japanese leaders and public were alike too stupefied for coherent utterance. Abroad there was some effort to indicate that Japan was “in on the play” at least to a slight extent, and Russia’s subsequent willingness to arrange a border armistice with Japan was made to appear a first step toward a reforming of some sort of axis alignment, including all the original members plus Russia. But no one in Tokio seems to have had any illusions on the matter.

The aversion to Bolshevism, carefully nurtured for many years by a variety of Japanese leaders who united on this one point if no other, was too great to overcome, even if anyone had desired to undertake the task. ONLY A TRUCE. The border agreement brought re- > lief from the fear that a Russia, free from the menace of Germany, would crash head on against Japan’s belligerent Kwantung army, and on to Japan proper. But it was regarded as a truce only—not as a precursor to an era ol Soviet-Japanese sweetness and light. And-Russia’s continued help to Nationalist China was not overlooked. Today everyone here seems entirely frank in view that Germany let Japan down hard and that it is henceforth up to Japan to sink or swim by itself. Last summer, when the writer visited Tokio, there were great anti-British' demonstrations, even against the British Embassy itself, and almost every telephone pole bore posters reading in English: "British withdraw yourselves from the new continent of Asia!” There were big painted banners also, crowded with anti-British slogans. Today the poles still bear tattered remnants of the posters not yet scraped off or washed away by rain, but they are the last reminders of a campaign now ended. No more anti-British banners appear, there are no more anti-British demonstrations, and while feeling toward foreigners is generally cool it is clear that Japan is welcoming the new British gesture as a possible step on the way to restoration of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. As for the United States, which through Anglo-French action, is the only nation left exerting pressure against Japanese expansion, that is regarded as one of the nation’s major problems and the press is full of argument as to what should be done to sweeten American feeling toward 1 Japan. j ■Whether the American view will be j modified since Ambassador Joseph C. ( Grew, returning recently from home ] leave, delivered a frank report on the state of American thinking on Japan i and China remains to be seen. The i speech at the time was candid in its 1 statement that the American public ’ had made its decision on Far Eastern J issues against the Japanese side of the case, and that Japan’s “now order” in ! Asia was construed by the American c people as an effort lo set up an exehi- j sive monopoly for Japanese interests t only. 1

POT BUBBLING. This moderate statement has had the pot bubbling over in all directions. , The Japanese-owned English language “Japan Times" trumpeted Japan’s sincerity and went on: “We may ask Americans if they have truly fathomed the significance of Japan’s enterprise in the Continent. It is not a question of dollars and cents; it is not of concession grabbing or ofi mere material gains. It is a definite step toward Japan’s destiny, backed by! moral suasion and inspired by the noble mission of establishing perma-

nent tranquility in East Asia . . . . Until the other side phychologieally changes its attitude, there will be no use of talking about understanding because it is for them to understand us." The Japanese want to be understood: they have no idea that they should do any understanding. They think it is they alone who understand China, who know what is best for China and for all who deal in the Far East.