THE WAIRARAPA STANDARD SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 1878.

Wairarapa Standard, Volume 8, Issue 791, 30 November 1878, Page 2

THE WAIRARAPA STANDARD SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 1878.

W« will endeavor to give a brief narrative of rhe events which have led to the war in Afghanistan. A Russian Embaeay, which it would appear bad been determined on before the Berlin Congress concluded its sittings, arrived at Cabal on the 22nd July, which was well received by the Ameer; who held a grand review in their honor on August 2nd, to which troops and representatives had been summoned from all parte of Afghanistan, f-ord Lytton, tbe present Qovernortieaernl of India, ou hearing of this Russian Embassy, determined on sending a epecial mission to Cabal, under the charge of BirN. Chamberlain, G.C.8., who. according to the Times, was to pro,poaa to the Ameer of Cabal inch an aa would virtually place hie country under the entire control of Gnat If"**-*- |ft was also said that the Envoy

was to insist upon the rupture of all agreements which might have been entered into between the Ameer and the Russian Embassy. The mission started on its journey, when it was met by the decided refusal of the Ameer’s officers to allow it to pass the frontier, and it was consequently recalled. Two days after this news reached England, that is to say on 26th September, upcn which the Times observes :

Our latest news from Calcutta leaves little room for doubt that we must expect war with Afghanistan. Military operations have, in fact, been commenced already. Qnettah must at least be strengthened. Our troops are on their way to the frontier, and it will probably not be long before we shall hear that they are threatening Afghan territory, or have even entered it. The more we learn of the circumstances under which our Mission was turned back, the more necessary it is shown to be that the outrage we have received should be followed by punishment, and the less likely it appears that there will be any such submission and reparation on the part of Shere Ali as the Indian Government could accept. Our envoys were not only refused a passage at the frontier line, but were repelled, we are now told, witn threats of personal violence, which were only just not carried out. It must have been the intention of this conduct to make the breach betweed England and Afghanistan irreparable, and such doubtless will be its effect. The Indian Government itwouldseem is in a position to act at once. The men and the materiel are in readiness. Winter, indeed, approaches, but there may be yet time for some of the work before ub to be done in the remaining open weeks during which military operations will be practicable. If we can succeed in occupying two or three important military stations in the enemy’s country—and this at least ought to be well within our power we shall haye gone a long way towards finishing the war. If more yet remains to be done, if Shere Ali is not content with the first stroke he will receive, and if his attitude is unchanged in spite of it, we can go on with the return of spring. Even the Daily News , of the same date, recommended a prompt march on Oabnl before the Ameer had time to mature his plans and marshal his forces ; and observes that England had been grossly insulted, while the overtures of Russia had been received with ostentations satisfaction “As the thunder follows close on the heels of the lightning, so ought a British army to follow close on British menace.” The Spectator pronounces “ this Afghan business a very bad business,” and blames Lord Lytton for sending, instead of a quiet Embassy, a pompous Mission with a Commander-in-Chief at its head, two Indian Princes in its train, and 1,000 followers to increase its splendor. That journal then observes : The popular idea of our great disaster in Afghanistan is, we are quite aware, a popular error. That disaster the result of mismanagement was easily avenged by General Pollock, with a much smaller force than the one we can easily put in motion ; and we might, had we pleased, and had not European treops been so scarce, have remained in Afghanistan to this hour. But it is quite as futile to draw deductions from the victory of General Pollock; as to draw them from the disaster of General Elphinstone. Shere Ali is far stronger than his father, has more control over his nobles, has organised bis administration far better, and has far more control over the fierce mountain tribes upon whom our communications will depend. The Mutiny, too, has occurred, and has altered all Indian ideas of the necessity of being strong. It will not be safe to enter (Jabul, even if Russia is not behind Shere Ali, without two corps d'armee of 16,000 men each, 10,000 of them Europeans, one 'corps to enter Candahar by the Rolan, and the other Cabal by the Koorum or Khyber. We shall have in Candahar lO ngut men Deittu aimed, hotter disciplined, and less impressed by British power than before; while in Afghanistan we shall have to take the capital, and Ghuznee, andJJellalabad, and the long stretches of hilly and difficult country reaching away to Herat. We can do it all, no doubt, for civilisation is armed at last, and against the new shells, and rocket batteries, and arms of precision, individual valour and fanaticism can make no stand. But we can now less than ever afford to receive a check, or to find ourselves brought to a stand by some improvished Plevna in the Hills. If we lose a battle, India will be in flames behind us from end to end.

Vanity Fair thinks that it is against Russia, and not Afghanistan, that England should declare war That journal observes;—Shere Ali has declined to allow this mission to proceed into his territory, and we are told that for this refusal we must “ chastise” him, “ bring him to his senses”—in other words, make war upon him. But in the name of common sense, if not of justice, for what 1 Because he received a Russian Envoy? Why, there Is a Russian Ambassador in London. Because he declined to receive an English Envoy ? That is monstrous on the face of it, and doubly monstrous after onr declaration that we should henceforth leave him to himself. Spain and the United States have done more than this : Spain expelled an English Ambassabor, and the United States expelled an English Minister, yet nobody ever talked of war with them Is it then to restore our damaged prestige ? That would be equally cowardly and foolish—cowardly because it would bean announcement that we feared to fight Russia, whom we allowed to destroy onr prestige, and yet will tight Afghanistrn in order to regain it; foolish because no amount of success against Afghanistan will remove the fact that we have quailed before Russia. On the other hand the Whitehall Review asserts that England's interference with the internal affairs of Afghanistan will not cause complications with Russia. Even the Economist counselled immediate action.

The Army and Navy Gazette observes : “ If Russia is to have a Resident in the Afghan capital, it ia more necessary that we should have one too, for we have everything to lose, whilst they have everything to gain. We may guard the mouths of the defiles into India, but unless we know something of what is going on beyond them we cannot make arrangements to meet the foe at the mouth of the particular defile he might at any moment select, and if we allow the further ends to be closed to us wo may be suddenly attacked at the most inopportune moment, it is to such another opportunity as the mutiny that the Russians are looking forward. The disasters of Cabnl are very apt to recur to our memories at the present crisis. They stand out as the prominent part of the whole picture, because it has been so rare for ns to suffer disaster , but if the story of the campaign be carefully read it must be seen that these disasters occurred only through fatuous idiocy on our part, and it is only necessary to mention that the ' honor’ of an Afghan chief was considered worthy of reliance to explain in a few words the whole case. The fact should not be lost sight of that when a small amount of military science was brought to bear we were able to walk over Afghanistan without difficulty, and ultimately to lease behind ns an officer commanding tbe British forces at Bamian. We are now far stronger in arms, in troops, in intelligence—in fact, in everything.” It may, however, be well to learn what are | the views of Kussaia on this question. Tho St Peterbnrg correspondent of the > Zrtut Zatunq writes { Tbe London Timet is perfectly mistaken in Speaking of a Ruaao- Afghan alliance, or attri-1

outing to Russian influence the Ameer’s refusal to receive the English Embassy. Ttie English Government have to thank themselves for their high-handed practices, which have made the Ameer suspicious. England’s continued intrigues have at last resulted ia making the potent Shere Ali her open enemy. The Russian officers despatched to Shere Ali from time to time were never commissioned to sot Afghanistan against England. Their only object was to promote friendship and amity, and develope commerce. Among other proposals of the like nature they mentioned the plan of a railway between Central Asia and Afg’aagistau, which was very favourably received by the Ameer. The Ameer never had any injury to sustain nor threat to endure from Russia; and if Russian missions appeared at his Court, their suite was too small to inspire fear. But English conquest and greed of territory, as displayed in Beloochistan and enforced under the most futi.e pretext at the cost of the petty Princes of the region, had long set Sheer Ali thinking as to his own possible fate. Add to this the mitchievious attempts of the English to interfere in the domestic concerns of Afghanistan and the numerous escort that was to accompany their Embassy, and Shere All’s conduct needs no furtherexplanatioa. This escort being fartoo numerous for friendly purposes, it was naturally concluded at Cabal that General Cham berlaiu’s companions were only the van of a force ordered to occupy the Ameerate. Hence Sheer Ali was fully entitled to shut his door against a corps which, contrary to law of nations, was to have invadsd his country on the pretext of a pacific mission, in any circumstances, England, acting in her usual rough and offensive style, would soon have discovered a plea for declaring war against the Ameer' But whatever may befall, Russia will conclude no .alliance with Afghanistan. Only as England, supplied Turkey with arms and ammunition in the last Eastern war, so Russia will throw no obstacles in the way of Russian foreign traders who may wish to sell rifles or cannons to the Afghans. Russia will do nothing against England, unles, indeed, she should be attacked by England, when energetic reprisals may be expected. The RussoAfghan alliance is nothing but an English fable designedly invented to serve ulterior purposes.

Much later intelligence than is given above has been received by the telegraph, but wo think our readers, who have not had the opportunity of reading the English papers, will thank ns for the foregoing extracts relative to a matter which is exciting the attention of the whole civilised world. The remarkable circumstance in connection w:th this war is that all the English newspapers are fayorable to its vigorous prosecution, while most of the Continental journals admit the fact that had England tolerated the affront her authority in Asia would be gone. The whole of the papers to hand unite in the opinion that warlike operations will have to be suspended during the winter months, which of course in the Northern Hemisphere correspond with the summer months in New Zealand.