MR ASQUITH'S SPEECH.

Wairarapa Age, Volume XXXV, Issue 10713, 4 November 1915, Page 5

MR ASQUITH'S SPEECH.

THE GOVERNMENT'S DETERMINATION. PROSECUTION OF THE WAR TO A SUCCESSFUL TSSUE. (Received Last. :siL;ht ft.so clock.) LONDON, Nov. 2. In the House of Commons, the {l»rimo Minister, Mr Asqailth, made his promised statement regarding the war. Ho sakl ho was afraid he had doomed to disappointment many expectations of those ho thought it was his duty to appear in the guise of a criminal making tho best defence he could, or as a wihtc-sliceted penitent asking for absolution. He proposed to idopt neither attitude, lxut to speak as the head of the Government. "We are," life *aid, "as determined as ever to prosecute the war to a. > uccessful <issuc, and us;> eveiv means and exhaust, if necessary, every tesoui'co in the attainment <il: that common supreme purpose. ' A WAR OF SURPRISES. It was true that to-day some parts of tho horizon were overcast. L'his war, like all great wars, had oeen full of surprises and disappointments ■to all the combatants. It seeined at this moment that the situation in Britain called in an exceptional degree fior three things—a projyr sense •of perspective —(applause), a limitless stock of patience, and an ilowitig reservoir of both active ana passive courage. WORK OF THE NAVY.

Tiyning to tho work of - the Navy. Mr Asquith said it had been transporting troops since the beginning. The Transport Department of "oho Admiralty for the Army alone had carried 2,500,000 officers and men, 320,000 sick, wounded, and nurses, 2,500,000 tons of stores and munitions, find 800,000 horses, mules, and camels. These operations had involved tliousand of voyages through seas which at ono time were subject to tlio raids of German cruisers, and which even ribw, though tlicy are believed to be rapidly diminishing in strength, are infested with submarines. A most remarkable tact is that hitherto the loss of life in tho whole of tlio gigantio oversea operations lias been considerably less than one-tenth per cent. He dicLjiot believe that m the history ot the world any nation could produce a comparable record. In these figures he had not included the minions of tons ot stores carried by tlio iNavies for Allied countries. Mr Asquith asked, was there any tiling in history comparable with tho. actual service of tho Navy itself?

WHERE IS THE -GERMAN FLEET? The 1110x1 of the Grand Fleet wore Jiving in tlie twilight' so far as public observation was concerned. They were not noticed or advertised, but) they were performing with an efficiency and vigilance that it was impossible to describe in appropriate terms, a servico to tho whole Empire. "Where woo tlio Gornj.au oriaud Fleot, on which so much talk, science, and money had been expended, and which was to be a perpetual menaco to the United Kingdom? It was locked up in tho Baltic, and dare not show its face on any sea whero it could bo encountered. The who*? effective maritime and military resources of Germany upon tlio seas, after fifteen months of war, had been reduced to the sponulK-. and o/onstantly-diminishsiie: efforts of a few furtive submarines, which sc*>t to the bottom fax more innocent and unoffending civilians than any military harm they had done. .MEDICINE FOR DOWNHEARTED These figures were more eloquent than columns of rhetoric. Ho could conceivo no bettor medicine for any who affected to >1)0 downhearted, or doubtful that the Empiro was playing its part in tlio greatest .stniggM in history. NO AL'OLOGIES. Mr Asquith .said he was not going to apologise either for tho people oi tho Empire who had borno their part so magnificently, or for the Government, which, to tho best of its ability, no doubt with many shortcomings and mistakes, but to the best of its ability, and ho believed with tho confidence of the- great mass or their' fellow-coiimtrvmen, had controlled, organised, and directed tH.« great campaign. THE WESTERN FRONT. Mr Asquith touched briefly on th«

campaign on the Western front, where the total casualties to a .vceK ngo were 377,000, or considerably more than tho total of the origina expeditionary force. He said that happily thoro were" a very large per cent of recoveries . from wounds, which made the net permanent wastage much smaller. THE RUSSIAN SOLDIER. The Prime Minister affirmed that he could not pass without paying a tribute to the supreme light ng qualities of tne Russian soldier, which were never more splendidly or more conspicuously manifested tlian during tho recent retreat, i'he people of Britain had the greatest confidence that Russet would ultimately, and before long, roll back the tide of invasion and reverse tho past. IN MESOPOTAMIA. He would like to say two or three words concerning aur own imporant and highly successful campaign in Mesopotamia. The object of sending a forco t-hero was to secure tho nntrality of Arajbia to safeguard our interests in the Persian Gulf, to protect the oilfields, and generally to maintain tho authority of our flag in the East. Mr Asquith related the brilliant series of ahso-

lutely unchequered land and river operations, until now General Nixon's force was within measureable distance of Bagdad. He (.'id not think in the wholkj course of tho war thero had been operations more earcMly contrived, more brilliantly conducted or with better ]Vospects of final success. THE DARDANELLES. Ho now came to tho not so michequered, chapter in the story of our operations in the East, namely, tho Dardanelles. From tho moment that .Turkey entered tho War it was no longer possiblo, either from a strategic or political viewpoint, to concentrate our entire energies in tho Western theatre. Tho Turks had threatened Russian Caucasus, and had indirectly threatened Egypt. Tho Turks wcro able to closo the Black Sea, and stop our supplies of Russian wheat from the Black Sea ports . Their entry had also produced a great and lasting effect cn tho attitude of tho Balkan States. Consequently, tho Government had to face the question in tho Near East, not merely strategically, but tliey had to consider, in consultation with their naval and military advisors, the best and most politic -course to take, either aggrossivo or otherwise. During January thoro was an insufficient military force available for service in tho East to do more than provide a local defence of Egypt against tho Turkish attack, which we ultimately defeated in February. THE NAVAL ATTACK. Tlie Government had' then brrnige:. to their notice the possibility of a naval attack on: the Dardanelles. A''tttv a full im4.?st. : .gataon and eeiisnltatio.il with ■•naval experts, including tlie Admiral commanding that part of

the Mediterranean, and notwith-

standing some doubts and hesitation in tho minds of Lord Fisher, tho Government felt in sanctioning: a naval attack. Those 'people who aro thinking ,aind say'iig that the attack wiais initiated without a full review of mill tho latent possibalit'es, were entirely mistaken. It was most Gainfully conceived and developed by n consultation .between tho Admiral o« the spot, and tho War Staff of tho Admiralty. Before any final deeisi'ow was taken, tlfo proposal was communicated to tho French Admiralty, which entirely approved, and agiw l to participate therein. It was also enthusiast'cally rcceived and aeclaimod by tlie illustrious Grand Duke, then commanding the Russian a.rmy. who rightly thought it would assist huu dn tho Caucasus. The matter was most carefully rev'ewed over a.pci over again by the War Council. The operation then conceived was purelv naval. They could not afford at that time—i Earl Kitchener had sard so, and all agreed—to give any substantial military support. WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE? It was therefore decided to make tho attempt, with the Navy alone. "I take my full share, luf the responsibility for initiating that operation." said Mr Asquith, "and I dvprecato more than Lean say any attempt to allocate tho -Maine on one Minister or to another, or tho suggestfon that soiuy undefined (personality oi great, authority and overmastering will con.'p'eilled and 'directed tho strategy. That was not tho case." Ho said thai was more responsible than Ik* Ho thought then, as 'everybody mils'have thought who knew tlie whole circumstances, that wo could run the risks, especially as there were verv givat oibjcct-s '.u view, namely, to influence th 0 whole Balkan situation, in a sense, favorable to tho Allies, to open communication with the Blac.lS&a, and to istrike a. 'blow at the very heart of tho Turkish Empire. Th»> operations had culminated in ail attack on tho Narrows, which had resulted in a set-back.

MILITAIRIY AID

Tlj,s Government had then to consider w'Jkhlkv further operation o should be continued. It was the opinion of tho advisors of the Government, and it seemed a very tenable ophu'em, that by tho aid of an adequate military force tho attack might still driven homo successfully General Sir lan Hamilton, who wa* selected to conduct the expedition, had witnessed the naval attack, rnd ho and tho Vices-Admfcail *xn-tho spot •were in agreement that a joint naval and military 'attack was necessary. The active plan of 'operations. Ivan left to tho jmlgnient of the Commanders on the .spot, and thejve was never any disagreement between them, flnd tho opionion of the- General 'Staff in Britain. Tho actual o:parat.lons ,wea'o familiar to everybody. Ho übuld oJily say" that, in the whosj course of the <war, ho had never sustained a keener disappointment than in the failure of. tho'operation. In tho beginning of, August the chances of success seenixl aot only great, but preponderating. Hie consequences of success would have been almost iimneasiirn i b i X\ It would havo solved th 0 whole situation in tho Balkans, prevented 'Bulgaria front.entering tho Avar, left Constantinople open to capture, and hten ttcHtoinuxl thiwuglliout the whole Eastern World iis tha most brilliant demonstration of the superiority of tho Allies. But it had not succeeded, notwithstanding tlio magnificent 'exhibition, that hu<' never be-on surpassed, of tho gallantry and resources iotf the ißritish troops, and norfa were more conspicuous than the Australians and .New ZeaJanders. HELP OF THE NAVY.

Nor ought the House to forget the i extraordinary and magnificent services of the JMavy. Mr Asquith pa*' l au cl'of|uent ti'ibuS.3 to the services of t!io submarines and emphasised the fact that up till October 26, in their operations in the ISea of Marmora, they in sinking or damaging two battleships, five gunboatsono torpedo boat, eight transports, and 197 supply ships. (He then described tli'.?. arrival of the Cvnna.n submarines, but he said tli e Navy was equal to this. They selected sai'-a harbours, smaH craft assembled in greatnumbers to maintain the communications of tlie army. finally, a number of specially-constructed vessels, larjsn.ly duo to the inventive genius of Lord Fisher himself, went to the Mediterranean, and bod 'done mos< magnilidnit wlcrk Tlie Nary through, out had «risan superior to all difficulties, and had maiintainet] tlie communications of the army intact. JUDGMENT STILL MBIATUR.F He considered it still premature to. form a judgment on tho Da,rd;mel'>:.s operations, but tliey must ooasider what would havo happened if they had not been under taken. It Wxt.s prababfc that the Russians might have sustained a swimis set-back in the CJa-ucasus. The Turl..* might have organised a, great attack against Egypt, while tlio expedition to Mesopotamia. might have Ucon swept out of existence. Tliey also must, not for•gjufc that tlie IJrifch on CnlftpoJi were holding up 200,000 Turks, an r\ preventing them from doing incalculable mischief in other parts. Tlid present situation in the Dardanelles had received most careful ;uid anxknis consideration, as part of a large strategic question rnisMl by -recent deve!- ; opments. ! THE BALKAN STATICS. Air Asquith explained how tiie Allies had laboured ceaselessly far tß'".,

uu't.y t>i' the Balkan Slates. f:».» admitted that tltv result had been tlisappointment and failure. lie p'-intc out to critics who wore talk'.tg .1

greater firmness and adroit

uess, that tlio unity n|' d >crc.;ijn u-as an important ass ; 't. (<'< i in:>:iy lind the advantage of such xi 11 ■ ty, while the Allies must consult each ot-hei - which resulted ihi i-net"ita.b!u differences n tin' point of vi ; .MV of any operation. Germany had a further advant<igo in that she w.as 111 «ikinee lavish promises to Bulgaria, whereas th„ Allies could not barter away the property of tlio Allies' U'iciuls behind thor backs without au assu.'"icv -of adogtia to compensation. AID TO SERVIA.

Further, when the. Allies wore reproached tor being too late in providing active help for Seribca, it must bo remembered that to the "very last'moment there was the strongest reason to believe that Greece would acknowledge and act upon tlio Treaty obligations to Serbia. YV hen tlio Bulgarian mobilisation began, jVL. Veiiizelos asked Franco and ourselves for 150,000 men. Thero was an express understanding that Greece would mobilise also. I\l. Vcnizelos later announced that Greece must 'abide l>.v her treaty with Serbia. but tlio King repudiated this declaration, and M. \ enizclos resigned. These were the facts, and they would b e recognised by people who wero complaining of alleged inertia 011 the part of the Allied Governments. He wished to say, on behalf of the Government and people of Great Britain, and t-Uis opinion was also shared by France and Russia, ti tat Sorvia cannot bo allowed to become the prey of this sinister and nefarious combination. Thv British and French General Stall's had com e to a complete agreement thoreaneut. Serbia may bo assured that her independence is regarded' by us as one of the essentia objects of the alliance.

HOME QUESTIONS. Mr Asquitli next dealt with homo questions. Ho said that an adequate supply of men for , the Army and Navy, and the provisions of munitions, was a burden comnwii to, the Allied finance, 'rile nation, had to consider how it could co-ordinate and adjust tho different .ways, of serving these purposes bo that the United Kingdom . and the Empire should contribute most fruitfully and effectively to the common cause. THE FINANCIAL POSITION. U "Tho financial position," he said, "is very serio,us. We arc buying goods abroad in excess of our exports to an extent of £30,000,000 per month, against an average of £11,000,000 before the war. At the same time, we are ma-king advancesto tho Allies and others which trc estimated for the current financial year to amount to £423,000,000. We alono amongst the belligerent nations have a main free market for gold. Indoed, we have exported a large amount. We are further undertaking committements which canonly be paid by further export of gold or the sale of securities. Hence, rich and resourceful though we £vc, we must cut our coat according to our cloth." Mr Asquith said 'hat' nevertheless tho position compared favourably with that in Germany, where the consumption was far in excess of what they could produce, and the stocks were rapidly diminishing. Further, the standard of living; of the (ircalcr of tho population of Germany left little >r no margin of reserve. Britain was in a much better position in this respect. But wo could not sustain, the burden of thi3 great war unless individuals and Government alike. were prepared to make greater sacrifices in tho way of retrenchment and economy. COST OF /THE WAR..

The averago cost of the Army was ' usually reckoned at £IOO per head annually, but undor tlie present conditions it had vastly increased, and was costing between £2-50 and £3OO. COMPULSION. Tho Prime Minister then dwelt on tlie question of compulsion. He admitted that voluntary reenmting, as hitherto practised, had been haphazard and capricious, and to some extent unjust. But his objection to compulsion was based on the ground that aindcr existing conditions, compulsion woiuld forfeit what was regarded as of supreme capital importance, namely, tlie maintenance of national unity. He would prowas being caried out with the an impossible expedient, but that compulsion ought only to be resorted to with something approaching a general consent. He did not fear that there would bo any necessity to resort to anything ibeyond .Lord Derby's great national effort, which was being carried out with the hearty goodwill of all parties. Ho emphasised the fact that married men who enlisted would not be called upon to sorvo while young and", unmarried men were holding back. He hoped the unjrtarried would be j obtained by military effort. But, j if need be, they would be securer j by other moans. j A WAR COMMITTEE.

In conclusion, he referred to the question of a War Committee of the Cabinet, which would have the power to summon experts with special knowledge on all important questons. Cabinet should be kopt constantly informed of the decisions of tho Committee,. also of all questions involving a departure iri policy. Cabinet should bo consulted 'icfore decisive action was .taken. Ho wasconfident taht only on these lilies was tho successful conduct of the war possible. STAFF CO-ORDIN ATI()N T .

Mr Asqutli said 'Tie attucjux? the greatest. iutpv'tanee to the more coin, iplot-cd and moi\< intwimte eo-ordinrr-tioii between tho Staffs ol ? the Al-he'i powers. A very happy illustration was General .1 office's visit.. A .MOVINC TRAGEDY.

lIV iiflii-mul .that a sroat »•<?.?!rwms ? - hility iva.« u|H>n luiu h.h lir-'.ul of tli;-> (.'mvmnent, as measured tjv \vliat had I!pjxvn'od n.n-J what was still' to fiapiHii. Our fa-st blood had Im'l'H ; t.TuiuKancls of j-mng lives liiii! Injun -cut .slrort; \he ? v ry wont up in t>wr-m<T-easing rejnrno from :H\'irbs ami imtt'latod

liome.s. .Ami wo inioht have .stood n.lm:4*. This mis Ilijj most .novi'ng tragedy in tho history of mankind. Vet, lie did not. bel.cve those sufiorers would have said that Britain could haW actn) otherwise, Cheers!. .Ho I tad laboured unceasingly tin ucholding the common cau.se. If ther* had boon es''or.s, , shortcomings, - ):ici l;u;k of foresight, ho was tho first person to acknowledge it. Hut ho challenged anyone to j)rove that there had been anything of sloth or indifference or a self-complacency to faiv* unpalatable facts, or to conceal tintnith.

THE PtUiEYIIER CONFIDENT. "I am confident," h P said, "that we arc going to cany our l'gnteons cause to a triumphant issue. 1 am not going to sh:<ft tho burd"n until I am .satisfied that I cannot bear -t. or that it can be tperfonmU better by othors. So long as I onioy tin co.niidenco oj" the 'Sovereign, of the Commons, and ic*f tho country, I.shall not .surrender the heavy task. JI there be moments when wo a.. - ,« tempted to be faiint-hoaJ'ted, let us ask ourselves what year in -our history we have dou.i more to justify rjur faith in th ( . manhood and woinauri nxl of our people. It has brought us 'he impruvshable story of the last hours of Edith (.'aveil facing a. worse ordeal than death in watch? Mg the momonts creeing on to Jfar <l<v:*ni slowly, 'icmorselessly, in death already (.wallowed up. It taught, our bravest men tho .supreme lesson of courage, and in the United .Kingdom and iliv Emp : ro there are thousands .of such women. A year ago ive did not know it. We have, great traditions. But. tho nation does not exist 011 its traditions alone. Thank /God ive are living examples of all those qu.ili ;i<~ that built up and sustained our Empire. Let us be 'Worthy of tii --m. and endure, to the (T.oaid clree/s.)