NEW GROUND FOR DIVORCE.

Wairarapa Age, Volume XXXI, Issue 9163, 11 August 1908, Page 7

NEW GROUND FOR DIVORCE.

IMPORTANT JUDGMENT. A new ground for divorce, according to an amending Act of last session, is provided if it is proved that a .respondent is a person of unsound ■mind, and has been confined in a mental hospital for periods not less in the aggregate than ten years, and that a respondent is unlikely to re--cover. Recently in the cases Stevens v. Stevens, and Livingstone v. Livingstone, an application was made to Mr Justice Chapman for directions as to service. According to his Honour, says the "Post," there is a provision in the principal Act (section 26), imposing on the Registrar of the Supreme Court the duty of forwarding a copy of the petition to the Solicitor-Gen-eral. This, said his Honour, was followed by a power (section 27), given to the Attorney-General or the .Solicitor-General to oppose the divorce. To that power there was now added by the amending Act (section 4) the duty statt=d in the following terms: "(2) When the ground of .any petition for dissolution o r marriage is the lunacy or unsoundness of mind of the respondent, it shall be the duty of the Solichor-Genera! to take, on behalf of the respondent, such steps in the matter of the petition as ha may consider necessary in the interests of the respondent." The question that his Honour was asked .1 to decide was whether this provision was intended to supersede the necessity for the appointment of a guardian ad litem. It was suggested that 'su'-stitutcd service would be sufficient, as the office of guardian ad litem was rendered superfluous, and was th.r:fnra superseded by the new duty cast upon the Solicitor-General. For sevtral reasons his Honour did r.ot think that this assumption could be safely made. If it were a matter of discretion it might be sufficient to order substituted service and cyst upon the petitioner the duty of igiving the Solicitor-General express notice of the nature of the case. His Honour thought, however, that the question of sarvice here raised was a question of law, and that the .jurisdiction of the court to entertain the suit depended upon the sufficiency of the service and representation. It was obvious that if the court proceeded without jurisdictiqn, the gravest consequences might ensue as tne legitimacy of persons born of the subsequent marriage of one of the parties might be questioned. A serious doubt as to the power of the ■ cjurt to dispense with the appoint ment of a guardian ad litem ought, therefore, to be a sufficient ground for insisting on such an appointment. The least his Honour could say here was that he had such a doubt. His Honour held that it wa3 necessary in the first place to serve the respondent in order to give the court authority to appoint a guardian, as was done in the Mordaunt case. There was no difficulty about this, as section 42 applies. After this the matter had to proceed under rule 70. Sinre writing the above, his Honour said he had conferred with the Solicitor-General on the subject of this judgment. His view of his duties coincides with that which his Honour had expressed. He also informs his Honour that he was willing, upon a proper application being made, to accept the office of guardian ad Islem, i*, upon enquiries, he was ■ satisfied that there was no other person reasonably available and willing to accept the appointment. A somewhat similar practice appeared 11 prevail in England.