LORD SALISBURY'S RUSSIAN POLICY.
f'Argns.") The Marquis of Salisbury followed up hlsf fetateufeijt to t the, Hackri^, Jtoetinft that no prudent man would havd areatriea of conducting a campaign against Russia in the wilds of Central Asia, by a speech in the House of Lords, (May 12th) fully explaining his Indian' policy and that of his friends. To^ Russian, treaties they would pay.no more attention tnan to the wind. Apart from other reasons, war dissolves all 'treaties. 'But! they 'would put India in a state of defence to meet Russia, reviving, the scientific frontier of Lord Beaconsfield. To the adoption 1 of this scheme the Gladstone Government had come at last, the Earl of Kimberley, the .Secretary of State ior India, having previously informed the House that the best military, authorities Were being consulted as to the fortification of a line of defence, and that £5,000,000 had, already been allotted for military roads and for the Quettah, railway, which, in its anger and its reversal oi the Beaconafield policy, the Miniabry hacl abandoned. ' 3?hs Marquis of Salisbury, .cordially approved of this decision. His only regret was that Mr Gladstone should have disallowed the Quettah-Oandahar frontier in the first instance, and gone far beyond it— on paper— 'afterwards retreating when faced by the foe with the same rapidity that he , had advanced. The defence of "Herat by British troops seems to the noble Lord neither advisable nor feasible. : Quettah, the Khojah Pass j and Candahar should be' the strong places on the frontier works. All that is possible to do to conciliate the Ameer, Lord Salisbury says, should be 1 done, but as for making England responsible ior, any of, the excesses which his; wild Afghan' tribes m»y commit upon his l western., or Russian t frontier, the noble; lord frankly says he would do nothing of the sort. A Russian advance, and conse-, quently a Russian war, he regards as inevitable^ arid he 1 would simply prepare' to 1 meet it in the 1 best possible manner; The greattpoint (says the Marquis) is< to say little bat to, work hard,. And, above all, to throw every energy into $he construction of the, necessary military railways. To attempt to fight an army with only camels' and beasts of burden behind it, as '$fr Gladstone would nave had to do in order to drive' the Russians from' Penj-deh, is, according to the 1 new Premier, to court the disaster in Afghanistan we met with on the Nile; The railway: is the key to the situation. Given the proper, forttresses, with easy- communications with their base, and; Russia': wijl hesitate to place herself within striking distance; and when she does advance, England, can strike with effect, and India 1 will; be defended with the least possible risk. Two points have to be borne! in mind : First, when we fight our first battle with Russia we. ought to: win. < Secondly, the battle* field should not be the plains of India, in the midst of an inflammable population. The two conditions are satisfied by fortifying the passes on the Afghan side, and by perfecting the cbmmunieatiion«. ; This is neither a ieniational nd» • "jingo" policy, bud it is one whichwell but ousiheu, '' Engliinnion everywhere
can understand arid endorse it, musing ' that they tterd nob to be diahurbdd by false alarms, and when the bugle call does sound, it will find all ready. -
Permanent link to this item
https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/TT18850819.2.20
Bibliographic details
Tuapeka Times, Volume XVIII, Issue 1172, 19 August 1885, Page 3
Word Count
566LORD SALISBURY'S RUSSIAN POLICY. Tuapeka Times, Volume XVIII, Issue 1172, 19 August 1885, Page 3
Using This Item
No known copyright (New Zealand)
To the best of the National Library of New Zealand’s knowledge, under New Zealand law, there is no copyright in this item in New Zealand.
You can copy this item, share it, and post it on a blog or website. It can be modified, remixed and built upon. It can be used commercially. If reproducing this item, it is helpful to include the source.
For further information please refer to the Copyright guide.