Science.

Tuapeka Times, Volume XVIII, Issue 1157, 27 June 1885, Page 2 (Supplement)

Science.

The Genesis of the Human Mind* Two lectures, bearing the title " Is the Human Mind of Animal Origin ?" have been lately delivered at the London Institution by Mr. George John Romanes, M.A., LL.D., F.R.S., Secretary of tbe Linnaan Society. Assuming the truth of the general theory of evolution, both as regards bodily struoture and mental organization, so far as the lower animals are concerned, the lecturer explained in his opening lecture last week that even among evolutionists there was still a difference of opinion on the question whether the mind of man admitted of being regarded as the produot of a natural genesis — in other words, whether the human mind was of animal origin. Considering the question first on purely a priori grounds, Mr. Romanes ob?erved that if it were admitted, in accordance with his original assumption, that the process of organic and of mental evolution has been continuous throughout the whole region of life and mind, with the one exception of the mind of man, it becomes antecedently improbable that the process of evolution should have been interrupted at its terminal phase. And, indeed, looking to the very large extent of the analogy on which this consideration is founded, he thought that the presumption raised could only be fairly counterbalanced by some very cogent and unmistakable facts proving the virtual impossibility" ol animal intelligence passing into human. Next he pointed out that in the oase of every human being there is presented to actual observation a process of gradual development, or evolution, extending from a zero level of mental life in infancy and culminating, perhaps, in genius. Moreover, so long as the human mind is passing through the lower phases of its development, it ascends through a scale of mental faculties which are part passu identical with those that are presented permanently by the psychological species of the animal kingdom. Lastly, it is a matter of actual observation that in the history of the human race, as recorded in documents, traditions, antiquarian remains and flint implements, the intelligence of the race has been subject to a steady process of gradual development. Thus, on the whole, a strong pritna facie ease is made out in favor of the view that the human mind, like everything else in organic nature, has been evolved. Leaving the a priori side of the question, Mr. Romanes next turned to the side of direct evidence. Here the problem that stood for investigation waß that of comparing the faculties of brute with those of human intelligence, in order to ascertain the points wherein they agree or differ ; for thus only can the probability be finally determined as to whether the one order of intelligence is continuous or discontinuous with the other. If we had regard to the emotional faculties of brutes, we could not fail to be struck by the broad fact that the area of psychology whioh they cover is nearly coextensive with that which is covered by the emotional faculties of man. After showing that instincts are oommon to the brute and the man (although preponderating in the former), Mr. Romanes passed on to consider the faoulty of reason. He maintained that although this faoulty greatly preponderates in man, it is also true, in the words of Milton, that the lower animals "reason not contemptibly." The only explanation of there being any difference of opinion upon this point is, according to Mr. Romanes, because different writers use the term " reason" in different senses, it being often understood to include self-consciousness and introspective thought. But if the term were restricted to its only proper meaning, there could be no question as to the rationality of brutes. This meaning is that of ratiocination, or the drawing of inferences from the perceived equality of relations, i.e., of inferring results from past experience. The lecture was profusely illustrated with examples of emotional and rational actions on the part of animals. The second lecture, whioh was delivered yesterday evening, was devoted to a consideration of all the points of difference between animal and human intelligence which had ever been alleged. Of these the only valid one was held to be the high power of abstraction whioh was obaraoteristio of the human mind, and which constituted the basis of all the other differences. The question, therefore, for evolutionists was to explain the gjrowth of abstraction; and, as all psychologists were agreed that abstraction depended upon language, the whole question became resolved into, this— Why had man alone of animals been gifted with the Logos ? Now, in its essence the Logos consisted in the power of predioation, or of expressing a judgment ; "if the brute could think 'is,' man and brute would be brothers." Was it, then, conceivable that the power of predioation could have been developed by way of a natural genesis? To answer this question in the affirmative, Mr. Romanes argued that animals undoubtedly possessed in germ the faculty of making signs for the purpose of intentionally communicating feelings and ideas. The signs whioh they made were necessarily restrioted to those of tone and gesture, except in the oase of the talking birds, where alone the anatomical conditions required for the uttering of articulate sounds were present. Evidence was then given to show that talking birds and children when first beginning to speak learned by special association correctly to name objects, qualities, actions, and desires. This first stage of spoken language Mr. Romanes distinguished as the denominative stage, and observed that it would certainly be exhibited by domesticated monkeys, seeing that they were both more intelligent and more imitative than birds, if any of them had happened to have been able to articulate. Now, if once the name of an object and the name of a conspicuous quality belonging to the object were used in apposition, the copula was latent in thought, and only required a further advance of abstraction itself to beoome an object of thought. The only requisite to this further advance was the growth of selfconsciousness (whioh was shown to ariss in children from the naming of self as an object), and thus the denominative stage of language passed into the predicative stage. Mr. Romanes conoluded by arguing that, given a species of anthropoid ape with the power of uttering articulate sounds, and there would be no more reason for wondering that this passage irom the denominative to the predicative stage of language should have taken place in the brute, than there was fox wondering that it took place in the child.

Marble Cake:— White part; — One-half cap of butter, one and one-half caps of sugar, two and one-half pounds of flour, one-quarter of a teaspoonful of soda, whites of four eggs. Dark part— One-half cup eaoh of butter and molasses, two oops of brown sugar, onequarter of a teaspoonful of soda, yolks of four eggs, one-half cap of sour milk, two caps of flour, spices to taste ; after each part is mixed batter the pans well, and pat in first a few teaspoonfuls of the white, then of the dark, until all v used.