BRITISH ARMY’S POLICE WORK WHEN NATIONS ARE AT PEACE.

Star (Christchurch), Volume LXVI, Issue 20476, 30 November 1934, Page 6

BRITISH ARMY’S POLICE WORK WHEN NATIONS ARE AT PEACE.

To-day’s Special Article

Expert Soldier Believes Mistake Was Made in Amritsar Rebellion.

The British Army in times of peace has many ticklish jobs to do in the outposts of the Empire and elsewhere. How it does them is revealed in this article by a special correspondent. The exploits of the British Army may be said to be blazoned on its colours in the battle honours that recall campaigns fought in every continent of the world, but a great deal of difficult and arduous work is done by the troops which never stands a chance of being recorded. How many people remember, for example, that since the war British troops have been engaged in a dozen or more outstanding incidents—each of widely differing character—in the maintenance of law and order within the Empire or the mandated countries?

gOME, AT LEAST, of these episodes of “ Imperial Policing ” have been of supreme importance in international affairs, and have, indeed, played their part in preserving the peace of the world. This is clearly emphasised by Major-General Sir Charles Gwynn. formerly Chief of the Staff College, Camberley, who has just written a masterly study of the experiences and duties of the Army when “ handed the baby ” by a civil power confronted by rebellion on the scale of a small war. General Gwynn uses ten episodes to illustrate his history of imperial policing. They make an imposing list and illustrate the restlessness of the world since the war. No pre-war period since the Empire assumed its present form can show so many serious disturbances within so short a space of time. They range from Chanak, where a small British force stood in the path of the conquering Turks partly to safeguard British prestige, to the Moplah, Burmese, Punjab and North-West Frontier Province rebellions, Egyptian disturbances of 1919, the Sudan mutiny, the Arab conflict with the Jews, and the defence of the Shanghai settlements. Of these, the Chanak crisis, with its amazing mixture of military and diplomatic ingredients, is unparalleled in history, and General Gwynn uses it as an example of the value of armed forces as guarantors of peace external and internal—a point often overlooked in these days of pacifist agitation with their marked tendency to regard soldiers as the cause of wars. The Chanak crisis arose over the attempt to force upon Turkey the acceptance of partition under the Treaty of Sevres, in which the Greeks ambitiously took a hand with their march upon Angora. They were defeated, and Kemal Pasha, in his pursuit, and his determination to revive Tyrkey as a nation, advanced against the neutral zones which the Allies had proclaimed round their area of occupation on the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus to secure the freedom of the Straits. France and Italy, for political reasons, deserted Britain when the Turks came within striking distance of Chanak, and upon General Harington and a small force fell the responsibility of protecting the Narrows and preventing the Turkish pursuit of the Greeks extending into Europe, with its possibilities of starting a new blaze in the Balkans. Admiral Mahan has said that the British Navy won many campaigns without firing a shot, and General Harington’s triumph was somewhat similar. Although Kemal’s cavalry appeared in thousands before the British position and his infantry and guns were within reach; although even at one stage a Turkish column appeared to threaten to isolate a British reconnoitring force, no shot was fired on either side. Both Harington and Kemal were bluffing. Harington was playing for time, awaiting reinforcements in the event of the worst happening and hoping that Kemal would in the meantime realise the folly of risking war with Britain. Kemal, although taking chances, was not gambling wildly. He used his cavalry to demonstrate, but so long as his infantry and artillery were in the background he could obviously not attack. Thus, while only threatened by cavalry Harington was able to refrain from delivering an ultimatum difficult for Kemal to

comply with and difficult for the British to enforce.

In the end, although the situation was highly inflammable, nothing happened, a result for which the world has to thank the steadiness of British troops and the wisdom of a British General in a piece of international police work. Unhappily, not all men are Ilaringtons. General Gwynn makes this clear in his dealing with the Punjab Rebellion of 1919 and especially the events at Amritsar. Here he examines the duties and responsibilities of an officer faced with assisting the civil power. One of the most important duties is to “ decide what is the minimum force to employ, rather than how the maximum power can be developed.” The officer must not, as a rule, look beyond the local situation, nor allow tomorrow to loom too large. On these points, in General Gwynn’s opinion, General Dyer failed. In principle he was not justified in firing in the Jallianwala Bagh without giving specific warning to the crowd in addition to his earlier proclamation prohibiting meetings. Firing without warning is only justified when the mob is actively endangering life or property. The continuance of firing violated the principle that only a minimum of force should be used, although the difficulty of dispersion in an enclosed space might have caused Dyer to misunderstand the attitude of the crowd. Finally his attitude, disclosed at the inquiry, that he desired to inflict a lesson that would affect the whole of the situation throughout the Punjab and possibly the whole of India, went beyond his duty. If every subordinate officer adopted a similar attitude the situation would be impossible. as he would be dictating policy to higher authority. General Gwynn, however, recognises that General Dyer possessed “ a personality marked and excitable almost to the degree of eccentricity. He was apt to hold very positive views based on opinions which he formed for himself.” In this case, especially, he acted on his own judgment on the general situation and not on the opinion of civil officials around him, whom he should have consulted. It is true that many acts of sabotage were being committed in the neighbouring districts and that the whole atmosphere suggested that the Punjab was in danger of blazing up. But General Gwynn holds that Dyer had no right to be influenced by events outside the events with which he was personally dealing. Moreover, in the subsequent inquiry, by a committee, which included hostile elements, he adopted an attitude which further embittered the controversy which had arisen. For, having refused legal assistance, he answered hypothetical questions which formal legal procedure would have prevented, in a manner which increased the hostility against him. Another unfortunate effect was that the support given him (in the belief that he had stopped “ another Mutiny”), coupled with the attacks made by extremists on the other side, tended to exalt General Dyer into a heroic position which cannot have been without its effect on the latent element of vanity which exists in everyone. There is reason to think that in consequence his evidence may have exaggerated the ruthlessness of his attitude and the deliberateness of his action.