ON ROAD TO MARS.

Star (Christchurch), Volume LXIV, Issue 934, 2 December 1933, Page 21 (Supplement)

ON ROAD TO MARS.

Famous Economist Places Blame. WEAKNESS OP THE LEAGUE. By SIR ARTHUR SALTER (Member of the British Economic Advisory Council, and Author of “.Recovery—A Second Attempt.”) LONDON, October 20. 'J'HE programme evolved at the Paris Peace Conference had not two, but three; vital parts: 1. Disarmament of Germany. 2. General disarmament. 3. Security for all of us, including Germany, through the League of Nations. , It was realised that peace cannot be based securely on the dominance of one country or an alliance of countries. Equal status and approximate equality in armaments among countries of comparable size and responsibilities is inevitable. In a world which includes seven great Powers, no country possibly can make itself safe by its own armaments, and attempts to do so greatly increase the danger of all. The only possible basis for lasting security, therefore, in the present world is that each country shall be able to rely on the help of others against aggression. This is the direct opposite of* an alliance system which means “ My friends right or wrong.” This means instead: “ I have no enemies except those who break the peace.” The fundamental reason for the “ dominance ” system lingering on disastrously is that the League, the “ collective system,” has acquired too little strength. And for this none of us is free from responsibility, neither Great Britain nor Germany. The weakness of the League is not due to defects in its machinery or mistakes in its provisions. It is due to the fact that Governments have not supported it sufficiently and have not sought their own security through it. It is not by throwing ourselves violently into one camp or the other, and it is not by impotent isolation which leaves us a slave to events from whose consequences we shall not escape; it is only by a resolute return to the task of rebuilding the collective system of peace that we shall be able ultimately to establish peace and security. The worst, of all possible courses would be to restart the competition in armaments, drop negotiations, and say:

“ Well, if Germany re-arms, we must, by increasing our own armaments at the same time, see that she doesn’t improve her relative position.” That way lies inevitable disaster and on the largest scale. Another conceivable course is collective restraint by economic pressure or actual occupation before Germany has re-armed sufficiently to enable her to make resistance. That would, in certain circumstances, become necessary. But it would obviously create a situation of gravest danger both for the present and the future —at best only less disastrous than an armaments race, resulting in inevitable war on a larger scale. And it would be utterly unjustifiable unless and until countries proposing to exercise the pressure had first met by their own disarmament proposals all that is just in the German case. They are as yet far from having done so. Negotiations must therefore be resumed in whatever form is most practicable. What have we to build on? If we take the German declarations at their face value we have a great deal. I would urge everybody to study carefully the speeches of Chancellor Hitler and Foreign Minister von Neurath. These contain some things we may regret, but they contain much more. Apart from a very strong assertion of desire for peace, there is a renunciation of any claim to Alsace-Lor-raine, a notable gesture of friendship to France. In addition, there is the declaration that Germany adheres to the British draft convention of March, her objections being to subsequent modifications of it. And then the Reich has committed herself to make no claim to any weapons which other countries will give up within a definite time. Rebuilt and strengthened, the collective system—the League and the Kellog Pact working together—is the only foundation for peace in the modern world. (Copyright, 1933, by the “ Star ” and X.A.N.A.)