GALLIPOLI ATTACK DECLARED TO BE A BITTER DEFEAT.

Star (Christchurch), Volume XLIV, Issue 193, 15 August 1931, Page 13

GALLIPOLI ATTACK DECLARED TO BE A BITTER DEFEAT.

Critic says that Re-embarkation Would have been Best.

A T LEAST half a dozen books have' . written about the Gallipoli cam- j paign, but the latest addition to the list, “A Glance at Gallipoli” (Eyre; and Spottiswoode, London), by Lieut.-| Colonel G. O. Head, D. 5.0., differs from j all the others fn being the work a i man who did not participate in the j campaign or witness any part of the j operations. He did not see the Galli- j • poli Peninsula until May, 1930; and he went there to acquire “ some personal knowledge of the local topography, so as to be able to form an independent judgment of the whole merits of th# campaign.” As regards his competence to pass judgment, he states: “ I have read much of the writing, British and German, bearing on the subject, and with such knowledge as I gained, added to some considerable study of military history and strategy, I have attempted to present a miniature picture of the Dardanelles operations in a true perspective. And also, perhaps, overambitiously or gratuitously, I have been actuated by a desire to draw attention to some faults and weaknesses in our military methods, which were national rather than peculiar to the military system, and which were only developed recently by a false estimate of modern conditions.” Free from Prejudice. The book is an interesting study of the Gallipoli operations by one who brings to bear an independent view, vMch, though by no means favourable to the military minds responsible for

i the plan of campaign and the conduct j of operations, is free from the prejudice i and partisanship which have been pro- | minent characteristics of most of the j previous books about Gallipoli, i “ An analysis of the Gallipoli camj paign,” writes Lieutenant-Colonel Head, j “ discloses it as a particularly bad j example of inept military management. ■ j Its inception, plan and conduct were ; all faulty in the extreme, and put the I troops engaged in it to inordinate loss ! and exertion, and cost the country a j price out of all proportion to the rej suits gained. . . . For active hostilities against Turkey we held some enormous initial advantages. In Egypt we had an almost ideal base of operations, safe, sufficiently salubrious and easily accessible either from home or from India and Australia. “ A great force could safely and conveniently be collected there, and trained, organised and supplied for any enterprise contemplated. Then, in our command of the sea, we had a striking power and a of choice of objective that were entirely free from any restriction, doubt or risk. We could make our plans with absolute certainty of being able to put our force intact, and probably secretly, at any spot on the enemy’s coast that we decided to make the scene of our activity. These were quite extraordinary initial advantages. and such that one belligerent rarelv possesses so absolutely over another. “ But even with the bad start the Gallipoli operations got,” continues Lieut.-Colonel Head, after giving further details of the initial advantages, there seems to be no valid reason whv the object aimed at should not have been gained! As success was not obtained, it is impossible to say whether it was within reach, but it is easy to point out errors and faults in the way the enterprise was planned and conducted, which effectually deprived it of any chance of being successful. And it is hard to resist the belief that success in the minor object aimed at was perfectly and readily attainable. “ The Germans and Turks were quite resigned to it, and were looking backwards for the next defensive position at or beyond Constantinople. But they had no intention whatever of throwing

up the sponge on the loss of the Dardanelles; they only counted on weakening us so much there by their defence that they could more easily withstand us in the next position. All the dazzling pictures and lyrical descriptions of the rich reward awaiting our emergence into the Sea of Marmora are only the figments of ignorant and thoughtless enthusiasm. The Bosphorus was still a more formidable proposition than the Dardanelles, and the Asiatic side of the latter was a problem requiring the most anxious consideration, if the passage of the Straits was to be kept open. In fact; the whole British army, had it been available, might have been employed there without entirely subduing the Turk and his German leaders, and driving him out of the war. But a capture of a commanding position position on the Gallipoli Peninsula with the spare forces available and a naval raid through the Straits would seem to have been a perfectly feasible project, promising strategical results of considerable value, and not prejudicing our struggle against our main enemy, Germany. The Turk’s View. “ All our writers dwell with insistence on the difficulties and obstacles we encountered; they never look at the case from the Turk’s point of view, so their picture is misleading. The Gallipoli Peninsula was an awkward bit of ground to defend, and quite inadequately prepared for defence. The Turk could not maintain large numbers of troops there before he was quite a lured of our plans. He had a thousand miles of coast line to guard, as well as the sixty miles exposed coast of the peninsula, so he could not .concentrate his forces in any one locality in anticipation of a descent on it. And the lack of communications and shelter on the peninsula made the dispositions and supply of troops there peculiarly difficult. “ He suffered from a scarcity of ammunition and a lack of a great variety of military stores and appliances. When the attack did fall on him, he could only concentrate slowly and exiguously to m_et it. If the attack had fallen on the spot where he was least prepared, and could least readily oppose it, he could hardly have resisted it! Falling as it did on his best protected locality, and the waterless impracticable region of Sari Bair, was a gift of the Prophet to his faithful followers. Well might they shout ‘ll Allah Akbar.’

“ The campaign fortunately had one great redeeming feature, which almost entirely relieved it of the bitter taste of defeat. The heroism and determination our men displayed have rarelv if ever, been equalled Great fof organisation vveiw performed, a vast

deal of inconspicuous, meritorious work was accomplished, but the feature of the campaign which will distinguish it for ever was the dauntless courage and patient fortitude of all ranks of our fighting forces. 4 Their name liveth for evermore ’ is an epitaph that only does bare justice to the heroes who died at Gallipoli.” Concerning the landing of Australian and New Zealand troops at Anzac Cove, Lieutenant-Colonel Head writes: 44 The original intention was to land these troops just north of Gaba Tepe, where the ground slopes gently down to the shore. Here the Turks had wire entanglements in readiness and machine guns on Gaba Tepe to beach in enfilade. A landing here would probably have reproduced the shambles of V and W beaches, and it was fortunate that chance diverted it. 44 Gaba Tepe should first have been stormed before any landing in its vicinity was attempted; and, sticking out into the sea as it does, with broken and not inaccessible cliffs of moderate height, it was quite a fair target for a determined attack, supported by the great force of naval gun-power available. With Gaba Tepe in our hands, the beaches on either side of it would have made fair landing places; without it they were only death traps. Fortunately, in the circumstances, the naval officer guiding the landing parties made a mistake in topography and led his force ashore just south of Anzac Cove under the steep spurs of Sari Bair. Here, apart from a few machinegun posts, firing direct, not in enfilade —a much less effective way—the Turk had made little preparation for defence and the troops got ashore with only a few casualties. Unfortunately, they

broke out of hand immediately, and scattered and lost themselves in the ravines and spurs confronting them. “Any strategical object their originally intending landing places at Gaba was designed to aim at was lost sight of at once. No attempt was made to gain this landing place from the land side, or to revert to the presumably carefully considered line of operations of which the discarded landing place was the starting point. The force was engulfed in the tangled and scrubby are?, of the spurs of Sari Bair, and could not get out of it It was overcrowded on too small a space, immobilised and reduced by its position to a state of small military value.” In a survey of the landing operations at the various points on the peninsula, Lieutenant-Colonel Head concludes: “A re-embarkation was the best policy for the moment, but pride and fear of loss of prestige forbade The initiative was gone from us, with all its advantages; the enemy could now besiege the landed parties, and employ his surplus troops elsewhere; or he could concentrate all his strength against whichever of them he pleased. The peninsula was now for us little better than a bottomless pit, swallow ing all the men and munitions we could pour into it. The navy was left helpless off the coast, with no more useful duty than to supply the needs of the army, and protect it as far as the restricted use of its gun-power permitted. It was a sad result for a great effort, but political requirements and some vested interests insisted on its being regarded as a great victory. Better to have cut the loss immediately and tried elsewhere.”