N.Z.’S Request To Earl Jellicoe.

Star (Christchurch), Issue 19120, 12 July 1930, Page 8

N.Z.’S Request To Earl Jellicoe.

A Weekly Review

By Bystander. HOOVER is still making rather impassioned appeals to the Senate to ratify the Naval Treaty; but there is a rumour that the Senate, rather than take this course, will refuse to form a quorum, and so the matter will lapse. I am not sure

that this would be a misfortune to Britain, but I cannot see what the Americans are complaining about. As Mr Hoover has pointed out, the Treaty reduces the total naval aggregates for Britain, Japan, and America by nearly 300,000 tons, and this total is 680,000 tons lower than the minimum thought possible when a naval settlement was first dis-

cussed at Geneva only three years ago. Moreover, as Mr Hoover has reminded the Senate, “the only alternative to this treaty is competitive building, with all its flow of hate, suspicion, ill-will and ultimate disaster.” Under the circumstances the Americans, having secured “parity,” ought to be content, and as they are quite prepared to pay for it—to the extent of about £200,000,000—1 fail to see what cause of complaint the Senate has against either the President or the Treaty. After all, perhaps it is only a question of “getting one on to Hoover” again. The British Naval Outlook. But as soon as one comes to consider the Treaty from the British point of view, it assumes quite a different aspect. A few days ago, Earl Beatty and Admiral Jellicoe caused something of a sensation in the blouse of Lords by speaking their minds about the Treaty.

Earl Beatty told the House plainly that the Treaty has rendered Britain—the only nation to which sea-power means anything—“impotent and incapable of maintaining effective control over the connecting links of her farflung Empire.” lie pointed out that while the United States were increasing their cruisers by 233,000 tons, and

Japan was increasing hers by 40,000 tons, Britain had taken the “inexplicable” step of cutting down her cruisers from 70 to 50. He further showed that by 1933 France would simply outclass Britain in submarines, and he maintained that without the Singapore base “Britain would be helpless to protect her Empire and her trade in the Far East and India.” A Word For New Zealand. Earl Beatty’s remarks were endorsed emphatically by Admiral Jellicoe, who declared that “the present position should cause the nation the greatest anxiety.” He reminded the House that, if Britain had not possessed over 100 cruisers at the outbreak of the war, “her losses would have been so great that she would have been starved into submission.” Even now, she may not keep up her cruisers to the fifty limit, without retaining vessels twenty years old, while other Powers may use the sixteen years’ limit. But one of the most interesting points in the Admiral’s speech was his reference to New Zealand. He stated that the New Zealand Government had asked him to represent them at the Naval Conference, and after Lord Passfield had objected to “two sets of expert advisers,” Earl Jellicoe’s views were submitted in writing to the Admiralty. Mr MacDonald was questioned about this in the House of Commons later, but contented himself with stating that “there was never any question of the Government declining to receive a representative nominated by New Zealand.” But he definitely refused to say that Earl Jellicoe’s statement was incorrect. Why all this mystery ? What Does the Treaty Mean? Naturally a great deal of energy and ingenuity has been expended at Home on the criticism and the defence of the Treaty, and I must admit that I cannot quite understand the reasons advanced by the “Times” for maintaining that “the elimination of competitive building between Britain, the United States and Japan” is a benefit great enough to justify the Government in accepting the terms of this pact. The chief grounds for acceptance, so Sir Archibald Hurd tells us, were the need for economy, the assurance of the Foreign Office that there is no danger of war in the near future, and “the plea that the sacrifice of naval principles is essential to retain and cement the goodwill of the United States.” But are these arguments convincing? As Earl Jellicoe said some time ago, “If there is no danger of war why maintain any fleet? If there is a danger of war, why maintain a fleet that is not strong enough to fulfil its mission?” Admiral Oliver, who has had long experience of naval requirements, declares, “The man who could protect our trade routes now would be a genius,” and confesses that he could not do it himself. It is possible. I fear, that Lord Bridgeman told “the whole truth and nothing but the truth” when he said, not long ago, that Britain, by signing the Treaty, had given away a good deal and got nothing in return because “our negotiators seemed to think that it was necessary to get some agreement, however bad.” More Antarctic Claims. A Democratic member for Maryland has urged the Senate to insist that America shall claim the lands in the Antarctic regions “discovered” by Byrd and other American explorers. In the case of Byrd, the process of “discovery” amounted for the most part to little more than “sighting” from an aeroplane. This is certainly not meant to depreciate Byrd’s achievements, but it does seem an inadequate ground for a political claim. According to Russell Owen’s account, which appeared in the “New York Times,” “the entire area surveyed by aerial camera has been conservatively estimated at 150,000 square miles, and the area seen on the flight was probably much larger.” No doubt this is, as Owen puts it, a much greater territory than has ever previously been discovered or surveyed by any one expedition. In the “New York Times” map, the new “Southern America” is superimposed on a sketch of the United States, and it covers more than half the territory between the Atlantic Ocean and a line running from the New England States, south-west to Detroit, and then south to the Gulf of Mexico. Why should the Americans claim all this —an area larger than New Zealand and about the same size as Japan—because an American explorer saw it from an aeroplane? As to other American “discoveries,” it may be pointed out that the name of Wilkes’ Land w’as given to a certain area in the Antarctic by the Australian expedition of 1912 merely as a compliment to Wilkes, and there is no certainty that the American explorer ever located it. Such “claims” as these are flimsy in the extreme, 'and it is to be regretted that Mr Tydings, of Maryland, and other eager exponents of American “rights” in Antarctica have not taken Byrd’s good cdvice and refrained from making fantastic demands on such dubious grounds.