The French Cabinet: A Political Blunder.

Star (Christchurch), Issue 19014, 8 March 1930, Page 8

The French Cabinet: A Political Blunder.

A Weekly Review.

Written for the “ Star ”

By

BYSTANDER.

History has been made rapidly in France during the past week. The defeat of the Tardieu Government was unexpected, but it seems to have made little difference to the political situation. For Chautemps, after holding office for a few hours, was in turn defeated, largely because the majority of the deputies resented the attack upon Tardieu during his absence at the Naval Conference, and the Socialists and Radicals are not strong enough to stand alone. After Poincare had refused, on the ground of illhealth, to form a Ministry, Tardieu agreed to make another attempt, with Poincare’s assistance, and he seems to have surmount-

ed his difficulties effectively enough. Tardieu, of course, is regarded by the Left as a reactionary, and they will make no terms with him. He was prepared to give the Radicals four seats and the Socialists five seats in the new Cabinet in return for their support, but they declined to be beguiled. Knowing that he would have to depend for his political existence on the Right and Centre (Conservatives and Clericals), Tardieu did his best to secure support from every attainable source, and he is even reported to

have considered Caillaux as a possible Minister. Happily, France has been spared this last misfortune, and Tardieu is now the head of a strong Cabinet which includes M. Briand, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and can expect at least a small working majority to tide over the period for which the Naval Conference lasts-.

Was There a Treaty? Referring to my recent remarks on “war guilt,” a correspondent revives the legend that Sir Edward Grey had virtually bound Britain to aid France before the Great War began. It is a well known fact that the President and the Government of France appealed to Britain several times during the week preceding August 4, 1914—the day on which Britain declared war—asking for definite information about our intentions. If there was a treaty, or even any clear understanding, between Britain and France defining precisely our obligations to her, why were those appeals made? What need would there have been for the doubt and apprehension about Britain’s attitude, expressed so strongly by the statesmen and rulers of France, up to the last moment when Britain decided to throw her sword into the scale?

The answer to these questions disposes entirely of the fable of an Anglo-French treaty or pact arranged secretly by Sir Edward Grey before the war came. Of course, Grey, as he explains in his own autobiographical account of these momentous days, recognised the “ moral ” obligation imposed upon Britain. But this does not mean that he ever admitted that he had encouraged France to expect aid from Britain, much less that he had bound Britain to render it. Britain was “ morally ” bound to help France because France was a friendly State exposed to an unprovoked attack clearly aiming at her destruction; and the responsibility thus cast upon Britain in regard to France needed no treaty and no formal agreement to define or enforce it.

The High Sea Fleet. One of the most significant and remarkable incidents in the history of German sea power occurred last week. What is left of Germany’s High Sea Fleet has been transferred from Wilhelmshaven, on the North Sea, to Kiel at the Baltic end of the great canal. This “ change of venue ” lends itself to a great many interpretations. Possibly. the Germans are anxious to warn Russia that she is not to be allowed to dominate the Baltic. Possibly the German Government in view of the anxiety displayed by France over the German “ pocket battleships,” wants to conciliate her critics and to promote the international movement for the limitation of naval forces. But to grasp the full bearings of this new move on Germany’s position we must turn back the pages of history for nearly 70 years.

Forgotten Pages. When Bismarck, after long and anxious intrigues, brought the Schleswig-Holstein question to a head in 1864, and, with the help of Austria, wrested these two provinces from Denmark, there is no doubt that the possession of Kiel by Germany, the establishment of a great naval base and the possible construction of a Baltic-North Sea Canal which would duplicate Germany’s naval strength all played their part in shaping his policy. The Kiel Canal came to be the sign and symbol of Germany’s naval expansion. The building up of a great naval base at Wilhelmshaven was regarded by Britain as a direct menace to her safety; and many German authorities explain the long hesitation of the naval and military “judges” of Germany to precipitate the war by the fact that the canal was not widened to accommodate the largest warships till June, 1914. The withdrawal of the German fleet into the Baltic is thus an event of the utmost international importance, and it will be generally recognised as marking a definite turning point in Germany’s relations with foreign Powers. Just as the Schleswig-Holstein War laid the foundations of the German Empire, so the final retirement of the fleet into the Baltic has fixed the close of Germany’s struggle for supremacy. “ Worldpower ” or “ Downfall ” were the two alternatives set before her in Bernhardi’s famous book; and there could be no more complete and convincing proof of her defeat and abasement than this. A Political Blunder. There is a report in circulation that a French agent in London is negotiating with the Australian Government for the sale of a controlling interest in French holdings in the New Hebrides. This would be good news if true. In 1906 the Anglo-French Convention established the Condominium in the New Hebrides, and nobody pretends that the system of dual control has been satisfactory. A conference to consider the question was called in 1914, but proved futile. There are about 1000 Europeans in the islands, of whom about one-third are English, and the British traders and residents complain that they are debarred from doing many things permitted to the French. Whatever be the merits of these conflicting claims, it is not expected that joint management of these uncivilised regions by two distinct races could work without friction or without producing genuine grievances on both sides; and the surrender of control by one or the other Power seems to be the only way out of the difficulty. Of course, France will not easily be induced to abdicate the position that she has held so long in this part of the Pacific. But if French property-holders are open to a “deal,” it is to be hoped that Australia will keep a careful eye upon the situation. For already it is rumoured that Japan is on the alert, and has made very offers to the French agents now operating in London. Later news is to the effect that Sir Granville Ryrie has asked for more time to investigate the facts, and the “ negotiator,” though protesting that too much time has been wasted already, is prepared to allow Australia a little longer. He has now gone to Paris and may possibly continue his conversations on the subject with Japan.