How Goes the Fight?

Star (Christchurch), Issue 12176, 27 November 1917, Page 2

How Goes the Fight?

NOTES ON THE WAR, THE POSITION ANALYSED, CHRISTCHURCH, November 27. The account of the mutiny in tho German. Navy now given by a sailor from the raiper-Dreadnought Kronprinz agrees in tho main with the. earlier reports. But there is no reason to doubt that these reports were substantially correct. An American correspondent says that the story was not fabricated by the tiuthorities as a bludgeon for Socialist heads, although that theory was gravely advanced from quarters that should have been bettor informed. The Government spokesmen in the Reichstag did not even tjy to ex aggerate it. On the. contrary, they minimised it. It seems certain that the crews of at least six ships were involved, and that they made an effort either to hand over their ships to the enemy or to intern them in neutral ports. But a still more sinister situation was revealed at the trial of the incriminated sailors. It was found im possible to segregate the guilty ones, since nearly all were guilty. There was reason to believe that the whole navy was saturated with disaffection, and that any attempt at punishment might easily produce a crisis impossible to handle without disaster. Only about half a dozen men were executed, but many others were imprisoned, and the crows were so mixed as to break up the personal combinations that had been formed.

" Tlie causes that led to such a state of affairs arc, of course, conjectural," the correspondent says. " Bad food comes first. A dread of the submarine service is said to hnvo played its part, and at least one story says that the danger of the submarine service is much greater than is usually supposed Finally there is the moral corrosion produced by years of inactivity, and to this may lie added a, statement of a traveller from a German port, to tho effect that 'the battle of Jutland had a considerable adverse effect, on tho sailors of the. Grand Fleet. They know now that tho British fleet is far superior, and that going out to fight it means something like going into a, trap." The trouble began insidiously some eight months ago in Wilhelmshaven, and it culminated in recent events. But we. may observe, that- during the last few days there have been other stories of mutinous spirit at Ostend, and of outbreaks between the German and Austrian sailors on tho warships at Pola. Now all these stories may be exaggerated. Certainly they have not dwindled in transit, but at least they are. circumstantial, and lo a certain extent they are proved by the proceedings in the Reichstag."

That the dread of the submarine service should play a part in the production of a mutinous spirit throughout the navy is significant. It was known for a long time past, and from many sources, that the German naval authorities had found it increasingly difficult to man their submarines. Month* ago it had been found neeessa/y to offer increased pay and long shore leave in order to overcome the unwillingness of the warship men to undertake the terribly arduous work of the U-boat. But that work must be even more arduous or dangerous than has been supposed if it was actually a factor in producing a spirit of mutiny among German sailors. One report from Amsterdam says that to be drafted to a submarine is regarded by the German sailor as almost equal to a sentence of death, and. that the chance of a safe return is very slight, except in the cases of some half-dozen commanders who have displayed a sort of genius for the underwater work. Ono of the most interesting of all the revelations that tho end of the war will bring will he the actual facts of the grim struggle waged between the submarine and its innumerable enemies, and these facts are likely to be of the most surprising kind.

'The mutiny in the German Navv may serve to put us on our guard against a too ready acceptance of opinions based upon a, supposed knowledge, of the German people, and an experience of their attitude under the, strain of the war," the correspondent continues. "The knowledge and the experience may be real enough, but) the tact, none the, less remains that this is a war without precedents, a, war 'n which the. past throws little or no light upon the present and its probabilities. Since the intervention of ' America, we have had two or three important books written by Americans who were, in Germany until th 0 outbreak of hostilities, and who have testified to the state of German public opinion, and to the causes that are likely to lead directly or indirectly to peace. One, of these books was by Mr Gerard, whose intellectual competence is as much beyond question as his sincerity. But all of these writers have denied the possibility of military disaffection. All of them have believed that the discipline of the army and navy was impregnable, and would remain sp until the end. They have believed also that there could be no revolution in Germany, at least until the end of the war had brought with it its maddening disappointments and revelations. Mr Gerard says, ' The German nation is not on* which makes revolutions. . . . The officers of the army are all of one class, and of the class devoted to the ideals of autocracy- A revolution of the army is impossible; and at home there are only the boys and old men, easily kept in subjection by the police.'

"Now it is true that here we have a mutiny and not a revolution, and of the navy and not of the army. But the distinction is not a very substantial one. Moreover, wo may note with some interest that the mutinous spirit in the navy had already reached serious dimensions before Mr Gerard had begun to write his book. But Mr Gerard does not seem to have heard of the ominous occurrences at Willi elm shaven, or of the fact that the captain and officers of the Westfalen had been locked in their cabins by their crews. Three hundred men were involved, and thirty of them were sentenced to death, but only three were actually executed, as the authorities did not dare to add fuel to the slumbering flames. The fact shows the impossibility of successful prediction where there are no guiding precedents, and where hi'story has nothing to offer us by wa,y of direction. No human opinion as to the future, and especially as to the incalculable operations of the collective or national mind, can have much value at such a time as this, where nations have been hurled into the midst of new and inconceivable forces, and so have been snatched from their anchorage of custom and tradition. Revolt in the army or in the nation is not an impossibility. There are no impossibilities. Psychologically speaking, wo have lost all track of. causes and effects. ~We can glimpse nothing but the tilings that have happened."