How Goes the Fight?

Star (Christchurch), Issue 12068, 25 July 1917, Page 2

How Goes the Fight?

NOTES ON THE WAR. THE POSITION ANALYSED,

CHRISTHCURCH. July 25. There is no apparent improvement in the situation in Galicia, and Russian official reports show that none is to be expected in the immediate future. The disorganisation that permitted, the enemy to break through seemss to be spreading, and unless discipline can be restored speedily there will bo small prospect of stopping the Austro-Ger-man advance. The loss of Tarnopol, which the Russians had been using as an advanced base, is undoubtedly serious, since it is bound to have involved the sacrifice, of great stores of material. But tly.re is really.little to bo added to the earlier comments on the disaster, because, the development is following the anticipated lines. It seems certain that die Russians will have to come back from Brody, and on the other wing a, retreat on both banks of the Dniester can hardly be avoided. Indeed, the Germans claim that they are already advancing on this sector. There has been a stiffening of the Russian resistance in the Carpathians, however, and activity is increasing along the frontier of Moldavia, where the. Russians and Rumanians are obviously fearing an enemy drive towards Bessarabia. Viewing the position generally it is difficult to resist the feeling that Russia is very close to a complete military collapse, more serious in its consequences than were, the disasters of 1910, because then the armies were never completely out of hand and, in spite of reverses and heavy losses, their retreat was oonducted and controlled in a masterly fashion. This year, too, many of the regiments are declining to acknowledge any master.

A desperate effort to retrieve the situation is apparently being made by the northern group of armies. The attack delivered on the Smorgon-Krevo front, astride of the Molodetchno-Vilna railway route, was shrewdly planned, because there is no sector where a Russian success would have larger immediate results, provided, of course, it could, be sustained. There was considerable activity last year on this and the neighbouring sectors, the Russians apparently hoping that they would find a weakness in the Gorman'defence, and would be able to turn the enemy's lines in front of Dvina, but the attacks were never more than strong reconnoitring essays, and were not pushed right home. This year, although a marked initial success has been achieved, it is feared that the instability of some of the regiments employed will prevent the High Command from developing the offensive, and consequently the success is likely to have little influence on the general position. It would need a much larger success than is in sight, however, to save, the situation in the south, and although the northern armies may be able to lend some support the recovery must be the work of the southern group itself. Obviously the demoralisation has progressed too rapidly to be easily checked.

There are signs of radical changes in Petrograd, and they are welcome and necessary, though belated. The council of peasants', workers' and soldiers' delegates has resolved to support the exorcise of arbitrary powers by the Government, and the Government iteelf is moving, indeed has already moved, in the direction of despotism. It is cot only'the army in the field that is affected, for the ieporrs indicate plainly that regiments in the depots havo refused duty, and presumably the trouble is widespread, and the difficulty is intensified by the fact that, the authorities cannot rely positively on the loyalty of the regiments might be used to restore order and discipline. While the disorganisation continues the enemy will, of course, push his offensive vigorously, and it is impossible at this stage to suggest a limit to his advance.

The reader will naturally be anxious to learn the effect of the Russian breakdown on the general position in Europe. The possibility of such a development had, of course, to be taken into consideration by the Allied General Staff, and undoubtedly the plans in the western theatre and on the Italian front'were recast when the revolution threatened to eliminate Russia a 6 a military factor during the summer. Of the ultimate conseejuences it is scarcely possible to speak just now,: but the'immediate effect tvill be to confirm the Allies in. their adoption- of. a defensive policv. Tt iv.at

apparent in the spring that, the absence of active Russian co-operation would compel the western Allies to conserve «their energies, and with the conclusion of tho Arras drive and the French offensive on the Aisne both British and French settled down to the continuation of the old warfare of attrition. Rather however, the absence of effective pressure from the Russian eide permitted the Germans to concenI trate an unusually large proportion of their divisions in the west and to mass their guns there, while the guns on tho Russian front could be kept on short commons while /those in Franco had nn ample supply of shell. Thv. brief Russian offensive disturbed these conditions for a space, but tho enemy's anxieties regarding the Russian front will now disappear for a time. It is: worthy of note that more than one writer before the war questioned the ability of tho Russian Army to stand a prolonged struggle, and as a matter of fact the reorganisation of the army was in progress when war was declared. There was an absence of frank criticism, of course, under war conditions, but there is no doubt that the general excellence of the leadership of tho Russian divisions in the earlier fighting agreeably surprised the closest observers, who had doubted whether the comparatively young Russian officers' corps would endure comparison with the leaders turned out by the oldestablished and efficient German, and Austrian systems. Added to the doubt as to the strength and training of tho officers' corps was the undoubted weakness of the railway system strategically. The military machine could be perfected under wcr conditions, but the building of railways was a huge undertaking, too hugo to be carried out except in the case of urgently essential lines.

The point of this comment, of course, is that the strain on the Russian Army was enormously greater than was commonly appieciated, and the temporary breakdown of 1915 was clearly attribut-

able to causes that had been operating long before the commencement of the war. In this connection one may quote a paragraph from rather a frank article by the military correspondent of the " Daily Telegraph," written quite recently :—" The Russian military system.'' he says, "stood the strain of fighting Austria with one-fourth of the German Army succcssfuly for eight months and a half--that is to say, for two and a half months longer than France held out in 1870. Neither the military resources nor the political circumstances of the Russian Empire were calculated to prolong the struggle successfully beyond that time, having regard to the backward state of her industries, the ; shortcomings of her railways, and the intense fury and energy of contemporary warfare." The truth is that at the end of 1915 Russia had to undertake the reorganisation of her whole war machinery, and the campaign of last year proved the thoroughness with which the work was done. But for the revolution this year would doubtless have produced even greater achievements, but the new armies—for they were largely new—could scarcely be expected to hold firmly and loyally together under the tremendously disturbing influence of the revolution, and the consequences are now apparent. The hope of recovery rests mainly on tjio veterans who fought under Brusilov last year, and tho despondent reader may draw comfort from tho reflection that no nation has ever displayed greater resiliency than have the Russians.