SKELETON FORCES AT MANOEUVRES.

Star (Christchurch), Issue 9513, 10 April 1909, Page 2

SKELETON FORCES AT MANOEUVRES.

v - ("The Pioneer.") , Those who concern themselves, wit]£ the doings at the various manoeuvres that take place in England and in Ifidia will occasionally read that the operations took place- against a skeleton enemy, and will very "probably find, that " our military correspondent " has many criticisms to make on sach a^pi^ceeding. The objector, Bowfeyer, is apt - to overlook some of thY principles and necessities of military training, and to drop, into confusion between drill and manoeuvre^ Manoeuvre against a skeleton enemy is not manoeuvre at all, it is army or division or brigade drilli The <iomtnander ia drilling his force to operate as a whole, and is training hnn6elf, his staff and his signalling machinery to act as a whole. . He isprac* tiis'ing^ Ms ownloraft) and it has often, been remarked how loath, generals are to do so, and how they and their staff, instead ; of handling their war unit, prefer to split it into two parts. withr impromptu i commanders and impromjitn staffs, while they ride about and crrfcici&e others for noi being able to. d« - what they have not been trained to do, ■ and are' not meant to do. What the army wants in the way of higher train* ing is the higher drill— the army or division, or even the brigade that can •■ handle itself as a whole with all ita machinery complete. The divisional commander cannot handle his division complete unless he has some practice,' and to get this he needs a skeleton enemy. A skeleton enemy is often better than a full one, for the reason that in the drill period the. interference due v to the initiative of, an opponent is disconcerting. A skeleton, that will aot according to a definite programme allows the commander of the army or division operating to give his entire attention up to the matter of drilling hia command to attack or retire. . When his command has been trained as on* organisation, and he and bis Staff nave had the all r neeessary practice in getting their units and fixings working' in harmony, then they are ready for manoeuvres proper. In the larger units, however, of an army it is often impos-v sible to find troops to form an enemy, so that the army commander ; must - train himself •: by staff rides in this portion of his work, viz., the against an unknown quantity. Thedeplorer of skeleton enemies notes how. the interest of the troops flags without a real enemy and how their trains ing is. lost if there iB no real activity against them. But it is for the, training of the divisional commander, his. staff, and of the brigadiers that manoeuvres' against skeletons are, arranged, or should be arranged. Tha troops themselves are, trained in contact work in their brigade training, and it is obvious that at divisional training if the division has to be. divid* ed for work there is no training for the divisional staff. The divisional training has two distinct phases, that \. when the divisional general is training his division as a tactical unit, and that when he is training his brigades aa brigades, or inspecting. their' efficiency* . by pitting one brigade against each other. For the first part, which ia really a drill, he should have a' sketo* ■ ton enemy. Similarly, at brigades : training there are two parts, first whe^nf the units arc pitted Against each other, when the brigade commander is legitimately" a critic and a director .of manoeuvre, and second when he is drill"* ing his brigade to manoeuvre and to iii» ter-support as a homogeneous; whole. He is incidentally drilling himself td^ cany out his legitimate .war role as.ai leader of a brigade with fixings 'iawording order. It is only since the recent remonstrance that we have in this country seen commanders realise • that they must practise . their own tactical role as w©ll v as watch and teach; others to perform their part. The handling}, of a division as such is not a matfcpE that can-be doiie without forethought and practice ; 'aid the same equally atar. plies to brigades both of cavalry and" infantry. Curiously enough, we see; oavalry brigades manoeuvred as such far; oftener by their brigadiers than we seer infantry brigades so' handled. ,'Wfcfen, therefore military correspondents* carpi at the use of the skeleton enemy, -wes may be sure'that they do not q«ite>re^" alise what is .going on. Ii ia legitimate . criticism to object that the whole: of ; a period of training was given up vt« work against skeletons, for there is no doubt that if possible troops should be, trained to work against each other, but, only, iii due regard to the equal essen^ tiafe of the higher group training. It. is essential that the. Staffs shall be' given their legitimate" war-work iat; times to practice, that is to say, the handlipg of the unit to which they are' the accredited Staff offioers. - I • tt must also be- remembered that the . training of soldier against soldier -itf often best carried out in the training* of the lesser units. The value # of thft large combinations to the unit is more „-- in the practice of soldiefrcraft than In< tactical training. By soldiec-craft must- ! be understood wie supply oi food to the ! rank and 1 file in 'long hours 'of waits;' I the art of making oneself comfortable j ithe art of well arranging '; halts and; rests ; most important of all, the realis^; ing that movement with larger forced i means long waits in the sun, ton^ "waits for the baggage, and long fatiguing^ days when the bodily energy is used up ; and the inclination is. to dnr otei duties. It was that zealot, of realism,* General Walter Kitchener, who said that manoeuvres did not teach real lesv sons till officers .and men were weary, and they knew how the weary body - looked at tactical problems. oniposta J to the weary are a very different problem to outposts to the fresh. Tde.dfc*, cipline of the fresh soldier « by *• means the same as the discipline of in*'. weary, and while fresh men may tfc'«»v dered, tired men must often be'<saxexL When such training 16 to be got out ox* eoanty means and small xnaHGeuvrt* grants, it is often impossible toge* enough troops tqgether to give a. divi? sion as a whole a chance to opetttta against another, so that the inuel*; abused skeleton must of. neoeewfc^ Hr employed. Therefore, before jpiMitt . with those who scoff at all sk^leifcbW work, one. may well take into oonsider**, tion whether the commander is not f more anxious tt> practise his command in combined tactioal work than to see - Colonel A chase Colonel B round the country side, which he has already bee*