TRAMWAY INSPECTORS.

Star (Christchurch), Issue 9272, 26 June 1908, Page 3

TRAMWAY INSPECTORS.

INSPECTOR OF AWARDS v. CHRISTCHURCH TRAMWAY BOARD.

JUDGMENT DELIVERED

The following is the text of the judgment of the Arbitration Court, delivered this morning by the President (Mr Justice Sim) in the case in which Inspector Hagger (Mr Cassidy) charged the Christchurch Tramway Board (Mr Russell) with having committed a breach of agreement in connection with the recent appointment of a ticket inspector : — The President, in. delivering judgment said: — It is alleged that the respondent has committed a breach of the industrial agreement made between the Christchurch Tramway Employees' Union of Workers and the respondent on February 20, 1907 (Book of Awards, vol. viii., p. 114).

Clause 1 of that agreement fixes the minimum rate of wages to be paid to the several classes of workers, therein specified, namely, motor men, conductors, car equipment adjusters, car cleaners and greasers, linemen, track cleaners, repairers and general labourers. Clause 8 provides that " when any appointments iare made to the service of the Board, preference shall be given to employees lower in rank fn the department concerned, provided that all other things are equal." The alleged breach consists in having appointed one, lt. Lightbody, to the position of ticket inspector from outside tho service of the Board, when there were employees in the department concerned who were equally qualified for the position and ready to accept the appointment.

At the hearing it was claimed, on behalf of the applicant, that a ticket inspector is an officer in the traffic department, and that, therefore, a worker from that department, namely, either a motorman or a conduotor, ought to have been selected to fill the position. On behalf of the Board it was contended that a ticket inspector belongs not to the Board's traffic department, but to the revenue department, and that Clause 8 does not guve a motorman or conductor any right to bo appointed to that position. " It was also contended tbat the preference given by Clause 8 applies only to appointments to the positions specified in Clause 1 of the agreement, and that, as that of ticket inspector is not one of the specified positions, the preference given by Clause 8 does not apply to tho appointment of a ticket inspector. Evidence was called on behalf of the Board to prove that it has three departments, namely, (1) a traffic, department, under the control of a traffic superintendent. The "workers in this department include t-rkffio inspectors, niotormen, conductors and track-clean-ers. (2) An engineering department, under the oontrol of the company's -chief engineer. This department includes aH the workers mentioned in Clause 1 of the agreement other than those who are included in the traffio department. (3) A revenue and clerical department, under the control of the secretary of the Board. According to the evidence of the Board's officials, ticket inspectors have always been treated as belonging to this department. They receive their instructions from the secretary, and furnish to him a daily report with regard to the work they 'have done. It is true that if in the course of their duties they see anything in connection with the traffic that calls for a report, they address a report on the subject to the traffio superintendent, but .that does not make them officers in the traffic department, and we are satisfied that ticket inspectors have always befcn treated as belonging to the Board s revenue department. The Court has not to say whether they ought or ought not to be included in that department. All that the Court has to detenrhno is whether the Board, in fact, has treated them, in the past, as belonging to the revenue department; and on the evidence beforo us there can be no doubt that they have been so treated. With regard to the other point raised on behalf of the Board, Clause 8 must be construed in one of two ways. It must be treated as applying only to the appointment of persons to fill the positions specified in Clause 1, or as being quite general in its application and extending to the appointment of any person to fill any position in any department of the Board's service. If it applies, to an appointment to any position not specified in Clause 1, then it must apply to all suoh appointments, because there is nothing to indicate where a line is to be drawn once Clause 8 is allowed to apply to any office outside those specified in Clause 1. The result of such a construction would be that a worker in the traffic department might claim tbe right to- be appointed traffic superintendent, a worker in the engineering department might claim the right to be appointed chief engineer, and the Union- might claim that Clause 8 must be applied to appointments in the revenue and clerical department, although the agreement has not fixed tiie wages or hours of any workers in that department. These remarks show that it cannot have been the intention of the parties that Clause 8 should receive a general and unre-sti-icted operation. If it is to be restricted in its operation, then the only way in which this can be done is to adopt the other construction, and to read it along with Clause 1 as being intended to regulate the appointment of workers to fill the positions mentioned in Clause 1. Full effect can be given to it in this way, and tbis, in our opinion, is how it must be construed, j-ne evidence which was tendered at the hearing, to prove Avhat was said by the representatives of the parties during the negotiations that preceded the agreement is clearly not admissible for the purpose of interpreting the language of the agreement, and we have not taken that into consideration in dealing with tbe matter.

The applicant has failed to prove the alleged breach, and the application is therefore dismissed.