EUROPEAN ALLIANCES AND DESIGNS.

Star (Christchurch), Issue 5582, 4 June 1896, Page 4

EUROPEAN ALLIANCES AND DESIGNS.

■ — o— (From tlie Lyttettcn Times.) When the German Emperor was in January last, indulging in threats against England, Lord Salisbury threw out a hint that it was in tbe power of England to form alliances which might prove very disquieting to tlie Imperial professor of bombast. This was generally interpreted to pointto a probable alliance between England and France, and certainly such a rapprochement is at any time much more likely to be realised than the general European league against England which the Paris Gaulois recently alleged to have been suggested by Prince Lobanoff on behalf of Eussia, and accepted by Prince Hohenlo'he acting for Germany. It would be barely possible to conceive of France and Germany acting together in the promotion of a plot to " drive England out of Africa," even if one of the conditions were the surrender of Alsace and Lorraine to France; but as this was not mentioned in the reported scheme for the re-partition of the world, we may rest assured that no such plan has beeu proposed. As a matter of fact, the European outlook is not now so threatening as it was a little time ago. Mutual fear of the devastating consequences of a war in Europe seems to be increasing, and the nations are concentrating their intrigues and energies upon the race for the possession of the vast unoccupied territories of Africa and Asia, or for the power to influence the rulers of the settled countries of these continents. In this way the Great Powers may find an outlet for their population, their manufactures and their warlike ambition, and so war in Europe itself may be .averted for many years to come. The Turkish question is just now the chief disturbing element in the international position. A revolution might at any moment break out in the Sultan's dominions that would involve a fierce conflict among nearly all the European Powers. Iv view of that possibility it is interesting to notice the position of the Powers as to alliances, and the sides on which they would probably be arrayed. To all appearance, we should find Russia and France closely allied, as they now are, and insisting upon a dominant voice in the disposition of Turkish affairs. Against them would be combined the Triple Alliance — Germany, Austria and Italy — with England in a sympathetic mood and resolved to insist upon the extension of Greek influence in the Levant, to the exclusion of the Slavonic or Russian element. In the event of such a conflict of interests not being adjustable by diplomacy, it is clear that the Mediterranean Sea would become the scene of a sanguinary naval struggle. The Russian and French fleets, if able to concentrate and unite, might obtain the mastery of the Mediterranean. This possibility has recently been causing some alarm in military circles at Rome, where it was pointed out that whereas the French fleet was nearly all available for offensive operations, the stronger British fleet would have to be divided — part of it defending the English coasts and part of it guarding the route to India through the Suez Canal. When France had in the Mediterranean only the military port of Toulon, England could have felt secure, keeping her Mediterranean squadron only at Malta or Gibraltar, while, now tbat France possesses the great fortified harbour of Biserta, in Tunis, the task of Great Britain is much more difficult. If she centred at Gibraltar, the Italian generals say, the French equadron from Biserta could seize Port Said without danger that the English men-of-war would arrive in time to interfere. If she centred at Malta, the fleet of the enemy could pass through the Straits of Gibraltar, out of cannon range, and operate on the coast of the United Kingdom. Finally, if England divided her Mediterranean fleet between Malta and Gibraltar, it might, perhaps, be possible for France, with preponderant forces, to beat successively the two divisions before they could help each other. To obviate such a danger, it is claimed that England should be in a position to close the Straits of Gibraltar by occupying, the coast of Morocco. v Another course was indicated as probable by the London correspondent of the New York World a few weeks ago. He asserted that England was about to enter iuto an alliance with Spain, which would confer upon England the right to harbour and refit her fleet in the Mediterranean ports of that kingdom. The harbour of Cartagena is one of the finest on the Mediterranean, and could, if necessary, shelter the entire British Navy. The importance of possessing the right to enter such a harbour in war time is said to be very great, for the harbours at Gibraltar and Malta are not spacious enough and have not the necessary appliances for refitting and repairing war-ships, Doubtless, English statesmen have a good understanding with Spain and are ready for any eventualities that may arise in the Mediterranean ; but we cannot believe that Lord Salisbury will, in time of peace, break away from the wholesome English tradition and practice of keeping free from alliances with other Powers. Should war, unfortunately, ensue over any question, England "would have no lack of allies and she would not, of course, hesitate about seizing the Moorish coast, if that were necessary for her purpose. Even in the Aery unlikely event of Russia, France and Germany combining on the lines of the wild project described by the Gaulois,t\\Q British Navy, with the help of the Italian, would prove more than a match for its opponents in the Mediterranean. ' Any diversion in the shape of a threat to land troops in England need not greatly disconcert anyone. There are, as Moltke sagaciously observed, "a hundred ways of getting an army into Eagland, but there is not one" way of getting it out." The outlook meanwhile is pacific, but it is unpleasant to reflect that this is only secured by maintaining a continual scate of armed watchfulness, and by Great' Britan neglecting her obvious duty to the suffering Armenians.