THE PLUCK OF ENGLISHMEN IN PERIL.

Star (Christchurch), Issue 687, 5 August 1870, Page 4

THE PLUCK OF ENGLISHMEN IN PERIL.

\From the Spectator.") The papers on the subject of the massacre in Greece are of course sad enough reading. As every one reads them under the influence of the shadow east by the tragical close, it is impossible not to note with pain the apparent confusion and want of distinctly marked principles in the course of the negotiations with the brigands, and the recklessness of the Greek commander's action on the last fatal day — after the brigandß had actually accepted terms to which the Greek Government was willing to agree — in alarming them into new suspicion and provoking the collision which led to the massacre of the four prisoners. As far as we understand this chaos of semi-official despatches and unofficial letters, bur Minister, Mr Erskine, while he risked more than most Ministers would risk on their own responsibility to save the prisoners, never clearly grasped the absolute necessity of averting a collision between the troops and the brigands, and temporising till terms had been formally accepted by both parties — for had he persisted in steadily re-enforcing his first formal demand on the Greek Government "to discontinue pursuit until the captives are out of danger," the fatal result could not have occurred. It seems pretty clear, however, that Mr Erskine failed, after the first few days, to realise that collision with the Greek troops continued to be the most imminent peril of the situation, since he even writes to Mr Herbert as late as the very day of the murders: — "I really cannot enter into a discussion with Tako (the brigand chief) as to whether we hare or have not kept faith with him. Surely he cannot suppose that the Government ever meant to allow him to wander about the country with impunity. It would infallibly ruin your health, even if it did not kill you, and it appears to me that as long as he is not molested where he is, he ought not to complain." And again, in the same letter, Mr Erskine says, "In your interest, believe me, we must now be firm. Why should he care to move away, except for an evil purpose ?" It seems thus perfectly clear that Mr Erskine did not apprehend the absolute necessity for removing the suspicions of the brigands that bad faith might be intended after all. It seems from Mr Erskine's despatch, written two days after the massacre, that Colonel Theagenis bad been sent to the brigands "to endeavour to induce them to embark on board a British man-of-war, or leave the country by the Turkish frontjei? unmolested/ 1 No doubt this : permission was only meant to take effect after the ransom of the captives should have been effected. But what impression must have been produced upon the minds of these brigands, — already formally assured by the English Minister that until terms had been agreed upon they should "not be molested," without any condition as to place — on seeing a cordon of troops drawn round them, and learning ; that they were not at liberty to move pending the negotiations? Mr Erskine was zealous enough and ready enough to assume even heavy responsibility in order to save his countrymen. But he certainly did not distinctly grasp the fact that the Greek Government, even if it were ever so anxious to save the prisoners' lives, might be capable* of breaking faitbT with the brigands directly it had done so ; and that the brigands at all events suspected this, and looked with anger and suspicion on any steps which would seem to place them at its mercy, so soon as the hostages should be out of their power. His great object should have been, but was not, to give the brigands every assurance in his power that they should be free to escape as Boon as the terms as to the prisoners had been carried out. Instead of that, he unwittingly supported the Greek (government in a policy that necessarily alarmed jfche brigands for their own personal safety. But whatever regret we may feel for the clearly imperfect comprehension of the most critical point in the situation by our Minister in Athens, — and in justice to Mr Erskine, we inu9t remember that it is only too easy for anybody to criticise the means who

knowß the end, and that for him it was a very different matter indeed,— there is one sort of melancholy satisfaction that the study cf these papers can hardly help bringing to the mind of every Englishman. And that 'is, the evidence they afford not only of the gallantry, coolness, self-restraint, and consideration for the feelings of others, shown by our countrymen in situations of peril, — but, what is even more \ striking, of their impartial, and, as it ! were, almost depreciating, estimate of the importance of their individual lives in comparison at least with any public interest. It has been noted by more than one newspaper how calmly Mr Herbert speaks of the brigands as " amiable," almost in the same breath in which he states his firm belief that they will murder him, or, as he mildly phrases it, with a certain characteristic delicacy for other persons rather than for the captives themselves — " will not release us, but do the other thing." That this " other thing " is constantly present to all the captives' minds is matter of course. But what strikes us is the complete absence of any sort of agitated or egotistic or excited feeling about it. "If things do not look bright," writes Mr Herbert in another letter, with his usual equanimity, " I do not see that they can be altered, so that we have but to make the best of them. If the Government could grant their terms, I believe we should be all right. If not, our only chance is that .when they know the troops are out in force in Boeotia, they may wish to save their lives. For the present, I do not think we run much risk unless we meet the soldiers, and in that case we shall have the satisfaction of believing that they will not go unpunished." A man could hardly discuss with more judicial calmness the chances for and against himself. Again, take the strange moderation — the total absence of eagerness in urging any undue concession on the Government — shown in such a criticism as the following : — " Arvanitaki says he wishes to be near Ohalcis, to make use of Noel as negotiator, and of course he denies the right of anyone to limit his movements. I think he has some grounds for urging his right not to be attacked after the promise made to him, though obviously that promise could not be made to be without limits." Mr Herbert clearly realised that any attack of the troops would be the death-warrant of himself and his friends, but he only " thinks there is some ground " for the brigands' view that the promise that they should not be molested ought to be interpreted in the manner most likely to save his own life and that of bis friends ; and even so, he is careful to add that there were implied limits to the contract which might exempt the Greek Government from any blame for signing their death-warrant. Mr Herbert could not have discussed the matter more impartially if it had been a mere question of compact between one Government and another in the decision of which he personally had no kind of interest. Then look, too, at the calmness of the other captives. Mr Lloyd, indeed, is a little more vindictive in tone than Mr Herbert. "Our great danger/ he writes to Lord Muncaster, "is that they (the brigands) may determine to move into the arms of the troops. .... If it comes to a fight, I believe the force against them will be overpowering, and I hope it will be so. It will be hard to die, but some consolation if they are all exterminated as well." And on the day of his murder he calmly inserts in his journal, " Chief says he will go to a place a quarter of an hour off on Ocyoupos ; know troops are in force ; danger impending. Love to J. and Erskines in worst case. Noel left early. Fine view of moun- ] tains in Euboea. Covered with Bnow from Delphi to N." You can hardly conceive less excitement, or agitation of phrase, less of the self-importance of danger. It is just the same with Mr Yyner.--" Would it be possible," he asks speculatively, "to prevent the soldiers' molesting us in Attica, or, within some line drawn a little further north ? " — not as if it were a matter to be prayed and entreated for as the only chance for dear life, bub just! worth suggesting to maturer judgments than his own. And mentioning, without advocating, the brigands'^ wish that a "court should bo sent! here." Mr Yyner adds, criti-j

cally, " Is ■" this an evasion of law ? " He is quite prepared, we see, to acquiesce in his own murder rather than press it, if it is. In all this there is no sort of display. Everything is obviously written without even a guess that it would bbcome public property. Not one of the prisoners is conscious of acting his paf t in a great tragedy. There is no sign of an effort to display a forgiving spirit. The captives talk of the brigands as a by no means detestable class of rascals who are a public nuisance and a great injury to the State, and, therefore, ought to be got rid of, though they themselves entertain no vehement personal feeling about them. Courage, gallantry, respectable firmness of purpose — ail this, we expect with educated men at all times. But this complete absence from the minds of the prisoners of any notion that they are in any sense in an interesting position — this cold consideration of other public interests as having an obvious right to precedence over their private interests — this entire absence of excitement and self-pity, and the calm reserve even in reference to the feelings of relatives, all this does seem to us to testify once more to the existence of that power of perfectly natural and unforced self-forgetfulness in Englishmen placed under this sort of trial, which we have bo often before tried and tested, in emergencies, for instance, like the wreck of the Birkenhead, in innumerable colliery accidents, or, to refer to events on ft larger scale, in the Indian mutiny and the Abyssinian campaign. An Englishman in a scrape, or in danger, has not yet got to think it is the first object in the universe that he should be got out of that scrape or danger. He can always conceive a great number of other objects far more important, which should take precedence of his rescue. And while he continues so to think, he will always be worth rescuing and always belong to a country which cannot, through the mere blundering of officials, lose any great portion of its power effectually to protect its citizens and enforce their claims. It is the matter-of-fact way of realising that something else is far more important than a man's own life, which makes his life a real resource and treasure to the State.