THE FALLACY OF THE "PERSONALIIY" AND "MOTIVE" CRY.

Star (Christchurch), Issue 427, 27 September 1869, Page 3

THE FALLACY OF THE "PERSONALIIY" AND "MOTIVE" CRY.

(From the Nelson Colonist, Sept. 14, 1869.) What is personality ? "To attack the opinions or arguments of our clique or party," is the simple and ready reply which is practically given by a certain cla?s of pseudo-leaders of opinion, and those who follow and admire their dictum. Discuss the policy of certain men, assail their political conduct and the arguments by which they seek to justify and support it— assail these either by the weapons of fair logic, or the shafts of moderate sarcism, and straightway, no matter how sound the reason, or how just the satire, they raise the cry of " personality." The true definition of personality which merits grave censure is that course which interferes with private character, which meddles with private relations, or intrudes within the circle of domesticity. But to point out, and, where necessary, to condemn the public conduct of public men, is to do that without which useful criticism, whether in the press or on the platform, would cease to exist. Singular to say, among the speakers and writers who most affect a prudery on this subject, and who profess a horror at what is called personality, are to be found far more instances of unwarrantable language, of direct and unjust attack, than in those writers who, striving honestly for the public interest, irrespective of friend or opponent, adopt a plain nomenclature, and without any sprinkling of rose-wa'er. show what they believe to be hollow, and condemn what they believe to be unjust. Conclusive evidence of this would not be far to seek were we disposed to give patent instances of the fact. Another absurdity that has gained spurious currency is the phrase " Oh, you must not attribute motives." This is one of the lamest assertions that could be made. If the public act of a public man is to be canvassed at all, the motive of that act is an element absolutely necessary. If Mr Stafford, let us say, sticks for months to the Ministerial residence, when he had no right to it, he has a motive, selfish or otherwise, as the case may be. If he meanly and wilfully makes incorrect statements regarding a lease which is essentially Government property, and threatens to turn out the Government in order to retain the said residence in spite of law and moral right, Burely the meanness of both the motive and

the action is not only apparent, but it i* alfcoa matter which calls for the loudest censure from the public. If, toot an ex-Minister has peculiar intromissions with certain ornamental articles of vice-regal household furniture, iv which he has not the shadow of a personal right, and if utter loss of all public character should be the inevitable consequence of such contemptible dealings, must the public critic hold his peace, and move neither tongue nor pen because the mere publicity of such facts would bring deserved obloquy on one who should have been far above the very suspicion of such paltry pickings ? Or must no enquiry be made as to the motive for such conduct ? We should think no one will be disposed to stop such enquiry. Sometimes the motive is palpable; if so, must it not be spoken of ? Sometimes a false motive is given. In such event, must we be debarred from searching for the true one, through fear of the argument that we must not attribute motives ? Were that shallow assertion to prevail, all discussion of political action, and especially of the actions of public men, would cease. It is a notable fact that, in the administration of justice, " moiive " is one of the first things that is looked for. Yet we are told by superficial philosophers — who are themselves frequently the first to show the fallacy of their own argument— that we must not attribute motives ! In thinking of a certain action, one can no more avoid thinking of the motive in which that action originated, and by which it was worked out, than one can avoid referring personally to a public man in referring to his actions. If these l>rinciples are not admitted, then criticism of till kind is silenced.