Soviet Foreign Policy

Timaru Herald, Volume CLVIII, Issue 23375, 5 December 1945, Page 5

Soviet Foreign Policy

Changing From Offensive To Defensive “Monroe Doctrine” In East By Telegraph—N.Z. Press Assn.—Copyright (Received 7.30 p.m.) LONDON, December 4. GENERALISSIMO Stalin’s decision to continue his holiday at Sochi for another month has caused some speculation. It is learned that a number of decisions on Soviet home and foreign policy have been postponed until the New Year. It is also remarked that Soviet policy is in transition and that there is a conflict of views on foreign relations and that isolationism or expansionism is the dominant issue. A special correspondent of the “Observer” suggests that Generalissimo Stalin is studying the international situation very closely and allowing Mr Vyacheslav’ Molotov to play his hand freely. If Mr Molotov fails or if his moves increase the tension, then Generalissimo Stalin may be free to initiate a new political course. The correspondent says that the direction of Soviet diplomacy is gradually being changed from the offensive to the defensive, but the present phase is one of transition and therefore is neither markedly offensive nor markedly defensive. The softening of Soviet policy throughout Eastern Europe is undeniable, including the absence of interference in Hungarian and Austrian politics during the ejection campaign, the release of some Polish leaders sentenced to long terms, and the withdrawal of Russian troops fr«om Czechoslovakia.

The correspondent suggests that even in Persia a rather limited objective was fixed, when Moscow denied qny”~ ■ Separatist aspirations in the Azer- ’’ baijan rising. In the Far East Russian tactics have been even more cautious. There is no doubt that Russian diplomacy is overshadowed by what it sincerely believes to be the threat of the atomic bomb. The writer expresses the opinion that Generalissimo Stalin is brooding over the extent to which the threat is real or unreal and over the question of how deepiy his diplomacy should retreat before Anglo-Saxon pressure. His home policy is no fess complex and difficult. The Soviet Union will elect new Soviets in February and shortly afterwards. Generalissimo Stalin can be expected to sum up the economic and political developments of the last few years and the present outline of the first post-war Five-Year Plan. An important question will be, it is emphasised, on the development of - heavy industry or consumer goods, the I demand for both of which is equally . pressing. Since the present tension between Russia and the western Powers he suggests that Russia did not receive much economic assistance. The new five-year plan will have to be based on this assumption Internal Economic Problems The correspondent remarks that there ' “ is a good deal of evidence of a tug-of-war behind the scenes in Russia over tbis problem of the allocation as between capital and consumer goods. The diplomatic conespandent ot l 'The Glasgow Herald,” commenting on Generalissimo Stalin’s continued holiday, expresses the opinion that there are two policies in Russia at tlie moment, neither of which is perfectly formulated, but both are greatly mfll> . enced by the atomic bomb controversy Both are inspired by fear, but seek its removal by different means—(l) One which largely the military desires is to secure commanding positions and the use of outlying Slavs as Russia’s first line of defence. Hence .he policy of domination by alliance ‘ in the case of Poland. Czechoslovakia. Yugoslavia, the neglect of Austria and Hungary and the maintenance of Russian oceupatiqn on the Oder. In these “Russian” regions no more interference would be tolerated than would be interference in defiance of the Monroe Doctrine. (2) The policy of those who see no; line defence against the atom-rocket combination and the potential air strength with which Russia for iong will be unable to compete. They are hardly less "isolationist” than the former, but they see in the United Nations’ organisation a temporary means of security and a guarantee against war. They are not internationalists, but they see in a present adhesion to internationalism a sort bl insurance. In this play of offensive and defensive conceptions lies the explanation of the inconsistencies of Russian policy. It is nqt treacherous. It is simply undefined and. therefore, confusedly carried on by hand to mouth procedure. in which far too often the manon the spot has to act not on definite orders, but on his personal predilection. But so far there is no agreement on the best method of obtaining it. Attitude of West In these circumstances the Western Powers must be prepared to put up with a good deal of annoyance, caused partly deliberately, partly by sheer in- 1 experience. Above all, they must try to avoid giving a handle to the intransigeants and the isolationists. The policy must remain firmly on the ground of their own democratic principles, but to recognise that Russia still rejects their full implication. Reuter's Moscow correspondent reports sending the first uncensored dispatch from Russia for six years. Jit . says: “I am convinced that for the time being anyway the Soviet Government will allow correspondents to write what they think, provided the rules of fair ness and objectivity are observed.”

A gradual easing of censorship during the last month has reduced censorship to a formality, but correspondents are still confined to Moscow. The Soviet Union is expected by foreign observers to give concrete evidence in the nea l future of its desire for increased international co-operation. There is a feeling that Soviet suspicions will decrease and that the Soviet Union will show increasing willingness to respond to invitations fron other Great Powers for Internationa co-operation in many spheres—political, economic, scientific and cultural Across the conference tables Soviet representatives will continue to bargain hard. The Press and radio of the country will storm against persons and moves which the Soviet Government suspects are being aimed at Russian interests.