The Timaru Herald WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 3, 1945. One World Or Two?

Timaru Herald, Volume CLVIII, Issue 23321, 3 October 1945, Page 4

The Timaru Herald WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 3, 1945. One World Or Two?

ALTHOUGH the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in London has not yet disbanded, reports suggest that there is little likelihood of agreement being reached on any of thf major issues, and there is a probability that the meeting will end without any decisions of value being obtained. There can be no doubt that Great Britain, the United States. France and China would be ready to go some distance in meeting the legitimate demands of Russia, but Russia is in no mood for compromises. She is steadily pursuing an individual policy which she does not seem disposed to modify. This creates a situation making future international prospects less bright than might have been hoped. The conception of one world, united for the purpose of assuring reasonable living conditions for all people, and for maintaining peace, has appealed to many nations as the one real reward for the sacrifices of war, but without the easy co-operation of Russia that ideal state of balance cannot be reached. Indeed, if Russia persists in her altitude of driving forward alone, regardless of the honest compromise efforts of her Allies, there is the gravest possibility that the world will be split into two, and with such a division the prospects of continuing peace are seriously prejudiced.

Possible reasons for this uncomprising attitude of the Russians are given by the Economist which says that there is in Russian policy “an element of confident • over-bearing and readiness born of victory and the sudden discovery of overwhelming power after a quarter of a century of enforced isolation, to throw a great deal of weight about in the international arena.” What is happening was accurately foreshadowed by General Smuts in a speech to the United Kingdom Branch of the Empire Parliamentary Association in December, 1943. ‘Russia,” he said, “is the new Colossus that bestrides Europe. With the others down and out and herself mistress of the Continent, her power will not only be great, but still greater because the Japanese Empire will also be gone. You will have Russia in a position no country had ever occupied in the history of Europe.” Russia is the strongest military power in Europe; this strength can be used in two ways. It can be used to compel the consolidation of Eastern Europe under the complete domination of Russia. Once that unification is effected, the . Soviet could wait for developments which would turn the tide further westward. If Russian influence is used in this way Europe will at least be partially unified, and it will be for Russia to achieve what Hitler had hoped to achieve. But the ultimate result of this policy would be to divide the Continent into two camps which would inevitably collide at seme time in the future. Perhaps the peace between the two wars would be longer than it was between 1918 and 1939, but in the end a clash of interests would come.

The other way in which Russia could use her new strength would be to place it at the service of her Allies and direct her unquestioned authority to the tasks of collaboration for the common good of the whole Continent. This would demand the substitution of idealism for realism, but such a change could not be undesirable. The world has learned where realistic policies have led in the past, and it might be a useful experiment to place new reliance upon idealism in international affairs. If there is any hope for the future it lies only in the possibility that Russia will direct her moral and material strength to the task of unifying Europe in co-oper-ation with her Allies, Allies without whom she could not have defeated Germany. The alternative to the unification of Europe by collaboration is the division of the Continent and the world into zones of influence, and the zone of influence system must lead to instability and ultimately to new wars.

There is a chance that the aggressive individualism which is the present characteristic of Russian policy in Europe will later mellow into co-operation when the Soviet Government loses some of the suspicion it still appears to retain concerning the motives and actions of the wartime Allies of the Russian people. It may be that Russia is simply passing through an awkward phase in her development, testing her strength and noting what the response of other is to it. Such a policy may be understood, but it cannot be continued indefinitely without peril to the whole international structure.