QUESTION OF INSANITY

Timaru Herald, Volume CLVIII, Issue 23265, 28 July 1945, Page 4

QUESTION OF INSANITY

Murder Of Mother And Brother Decision Of Court Of Appeal (N.Z.P.A.) WELLINGTON. July 27. The Court of Appeal this afternoon delivered judgment on a case stated oy the trial judge in the trial of a boy, aged 13 years, Noel Ingram Brooks, foi the murder of his mother and brother. Clarence Brooks, near Greytown, m March last. The questions for the Court of Appeal concerned the right of the Crown to call medical evidence on the question of insanity when the defence of insanity was not raised_ by the accused’s counsel; also questions as to the validity of the trial judge’s direction to the jury, and as to the meaning of the jury's verdict. The Chief Justice, the Rt. Hon. Sir Michael Myers, said the Crown had to show affirmatively, if it could, that the accused knew that the act charged against him was wrong, and added that it was not part of the duty of the prosecution—indeed, it was contrary to its duty, contrary to practice, and. in his opinion, contrary 1.0 law—to seek to prove insanity which was clearly a defence and no portion of the Crown’s case. It was proper, however, for the Crown to call medical evidence to show that the accused knew the act was wrong.

He continued that in his opinion the direction to the jury by the learned trial judge was erroneous when it stated that the Crown said that the accused should be acquitted on the ground of insanity. The medical evidence brought by the Crown was not for that purpose, but to put the whole of the conflicting medical evidence before the jury in respect of the section of the Crimes Act providing that no person over the age of seven and under 14 years should be convicted unless the Court or jury are of the opinion that he knew what he had done was wrong. The Chief Justice continued that the jury should have been told the ingredients of the offence in the case of a child under 14, and what the Crown had to prove, and they should have been told that unless they were satisfied by the evidence that in committing the offence the accused knew that he was doing wrong, it was their duty to acquit. In his opinion the verdict should be construed as one of acquittal. If the authorities considered either that the accused was insane within the meaning of the criminal law, or that he was a mental defective within the meaning of the Mental Defectives Act, 1911, though his defect may fall short of criminal insanity, appropriate steps could .doubtless be taken for the protection of both the accused and society. Mr Justice Callan and Mr Justice Kennedy agreed that the verdict should be construed as one of acquittal, qjrd that it was not necessary to formulate detailed answers to questions asked in the case stated. Mr Justice Finlay dissented from the majority of the Court.