The Timaru Herald MONDAY, DECEMBER 18, 1944. Mr Churchill On Poland

Timaru Herald, Volume CLVI, Issue 23078, 18 December 1944, Page 4

The Timaru Herald MONDAY, DECEMBER 18, 1944. Mr Churchill On Poland

|T would be in technical accord with the declared objectives and aspirations of the United Nations, or at least of Great Britain and the United States, to have the boundaries which existed before the German attack and the Russian advance of late 1939 restored to Poland. However desirable this might seem from the Polish standpoint, it is now clear that reconstructed Poland will be a nation of different frontiers when the boundaries of Europe are settled finally after this war. Mr Churchill would not make such a realistic approach to the Polish question in the House of Commons were he not convinced that Russia had certain western frontier demands which she intends to have met, and Russia has the strength to enforce the demands she considers necessary for her own security in the future.

Mr Churchill, with the example of Greece before him, is obviously anxious that the Poles, at whatever cost, should harmonise their internal differences and present a united front as their time of liberation draws nearer. Russia is supporting the authority of the Lublin Committee. That committee was formed under the wing of Moscow and it may be just as fairly representative of Poles now in Poland as the London Government. In any case, the Polish territory liberated by the Red Army will come under the authority of the Lublin Committee; it is on the spot and Russia, plainly, will pay no attention to the claims of the London Government. Mr Churchill is no doubt basing his attitude to the Polish question on the recognition ot facts and inevitabilities which can no longer be disguised.

It would seem that Mr Churchill is adopting towards the London Government the role of impatient, if not exasperated, adviser. His tone was almost chiding, but the Poles in London should be able to understand that it is the chiding of a friend. He does not wish them to continue the unprofitable endeavour of swimming against the torrent. The part Mr Churchill played in attempting to solve the Polish problem was shown in the account of his dealing with M. Mikolajczyk, the Polish Prime Minister in London. “I had several times drawn M. Mikolajczyk’s attention to the dangers of delay,” said Mr Churchill. “Had he been able to return after the most friendly conversations between him and Marshal Stalin, and also the conversations he had with the members of the Lublin National Liberation Committee with the assent of his colleagues, I believe the difficulties inherent in the formation of a Polish Government in harmony with the Lublin Committee might well have been overcome. In that case he would at present be at the head of a Polish Government on Polish soil, recognised by all the United Nations, and awaiting the advance of the Russian Army moving further into Poland.” No doubt M. Mikolajczyk ascertained what Russia’s minimum territorial terms were, and he would have been made as well aware of the realities of the situation as Mr Churchill is. However, his colleague in London are not ready to compromise; they want Poland to stand where she did in 1939. Perhaps it is too early to say that all chances of an agreement between the London Government and the Lublin Committee have vanished, but the chances cannot be good when Mr Churchill declares: “Already I imagine that the prospect of reconciliation between the Polish Government and the Lublin Committee has definitely receded. ’ The one persuasive factor still remaining is the revelation of the British Government’s attitude. The London Government, by persisting in its present stand, will almost certainly forfeit the support of Great Britain. So far the British Government is taking this positive stand alone, and the Prime Minister explained to the House of Commons that he was in “great difficulty” because the attitude of the United States had not been defined “with the precision which the British Government had reached.” It may be that this questioh does not present itself with such urgency to the Government of the United States, but it is obviously desirable that an interim solution of the Polish problem should be found to save disastrous confusion in which the Poles themselves would be the chief sufferers. In an address at Chatham House earlier this year, Professor David Mitrany, speaking on the question of the U.S.S.R. in South-Eastern Europe said: “South-Eastern Europe can do little for itself if it remains a border region between contending forces East and West. Nor can the West do much for the peace and prosperity of the region if it tries to leave Russia out of account. One might indeed say, and quite truly, that the way in which the West can help South-Eastern Europe best is indirectly, by working together with Russia. That is the only road even for those who might deem it necessary to ‘protect’ South-Eastern Europe against Russia.” That statement can be applied with equal appropriateness to the Polish question.