The Timaru Herald WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 4, 1944. China’s Peril

Timaru Herald, Volume CLVI, Issue 23014, 4 October 1944, Page 4

The Timaru Herald WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 4, 1944. China’s Peril

JT is reported from Chungking that recent Chinese defeats and the possibility that the Americans may lose further air bases in China have ‘■produced an atmosphere of gloom unmatched since the dark days when China was fighting alone.” The Chinese have had seven years of war against Japan and they must be looking hopefully to the time when the Balance will be weighed in their favour by the assistance of their Allies. No doubt large-scale assistance to China is part of the general strategic intention of the British and United States Governments, but China suffers in the meantime through her inaccessibility. As long as there is no direct supply line from India and Burma the Chinese cannot hope for much more than the aid that can be furnished by Allied air transport and air support. This can be only of limited help to the sorely-pressed forces of the Chungking Government which has internal problems in addition to those created directly by the Japanese war. The gravest internal problem for the Chungking Government is that caused by its division from the Communist north. Already it is suggested that Chungking has lost face in the north, but something more important than that will be caused if the Japanese succeed in their attempt to divide the country physically by developing attacks which for the present appear to be going satisfactorily from the enemy standpoint. Difficult though the situation is for the Chinese, it must be assumed that in the grand planning of the Allied war against Japan the greatest possible efforts will be made to bring succour to China. In the meantime the best way in which the Chinese can help themselves is by continuing their struggle on the same heroic plane as it has been carried on for the past seven years. The ability to do this may be waning, but relaxation of strength at this crucial stage could have desperate consequences. There have been reverses in China, but they must be measured against the substantial progress which the Allies have made in Burma. Successes in Burma mark the first stage in the rescue of China. Allied victories there are a lantern in the gloom for China; they, in addition to Pacific successes, are evidence that the Allies have the power to hit the Japanese hard and eventually ' win the war. No matter how far the Japanese advance, it is incon ceivable that China could be knocked out of the war. It has one weapon which so far has proved unbeatable: the will to resist. Even though China’s position may be progressively weakened, this weapon can eventually be put to decisive use. Nevertheless, one of the harrowing problems that must be caused I by the Japanese advance into Hunan Province is increasing development of famine conditions. Hunan is the rice bowl of China. If the Japanese completely occupy and despoil it, millions of Chinese who depend upon Hunan’s rice will go hungry; hungry soldiers cannot fight well, and it will be impossible for the United States planes to bring >n enough food to meet the needs of the people. No matter what happens, experts on China believe that Marshal Chiang Kai-shek and his followers will hold on even though it will further disturb their shaky economy to do so. It has also to be revealed what the Japanese actually hope to gain by their recent offensives. Certainly they can win new air bases and deprive the Americans of bases, but in the long-term view these temporary gains cannot have major value. While it is natural that the Chinese should be deeply immersed in their own tragic affairs just now', they can look with confidence to the future. Mr Churchill’s latest war survey revealed that the British Fleet was being concentrated in the Indian Ocean for war collaboration with the United States naval forces. Britain and the United States are clearly determined to bring the war closer to Japan with all the speed that circumstances allow.' As the direct threat to Japan grows, there must be some relaxation of pressure in China. Japan will struggle to Bolster her morale by holding her position in Asia as long as she can and it may be that her activity in China, since it cannot affect the outcome of the war, is a spurt without design, made for psychological reasons. It may prolong the war, but it cannot deflect the day of doom.