The Timaru Herald FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 12, 1943. Russia’s Arms Output

Timaru Herald, Volume CLIV, Issue 22738, 12 November 1943, Page 4

The Timaru Herald FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 12, 1943. Russia’s Arms Output

| WORM AT lON about the situation in the Soviet war industries lias recently been more scarce than usual. The paucity of facts and figures so familiar in other belligerent countries prevails in Russia, too;’ and, in addition, the discussion of economic and industrial problems which for a time was very common in Russia at war has been abated. Moscow publications give extremely few glimpses into the development of the industrial war effort in the Urals and the Asiatic industrial centres, which at one time was widely discussed; and nothing has been published lately except either very general over-all percentage figures of increases in production or scattered detailed accounts of output records obtained by individual workers. Crucial problems such as the replacement, of raw material and fuel resources lost to the enemy; the problems of industrial organisation in the east; the special labour problems of regions only recently opened to industry; the new geographical distribution of war production; and the regional variations in output, wages and the cost of living—all these and similar aspects of Russia’s war economy are shrouded in increasing secrecy.

It is by the victories of Russian arms on the battlefield that the achievements of Russian factories can be gauged. General Sabennikov, the Russian commander on the Orel sector, stated in August that during the decisive phase of the fighting for Orel his artillery was able to cover every yard of ground on the average with nearly two guns; the density of the barrage at Orel was “at least ten times as large as that at Verdun.” 'Hie credit for this stupendous saturation of fire power belongs, of course, to the Russian war industries, even allowing for the very substantial contribution made by Lendlease deliveries.

The production drive in the Urals ■ and Siberia apparently went on un- : abated during the first half of this year. In a recent report the Deputy 1 Commissar of the Munitions In- j dustry, M. Khrunichev, stated that, i during the first six months of 1943, the Russian munition factories pro- . duced nearly 50 per cent more than : during the first half of 1942. This figure of 50 per cent is an average : covering all types of munitions. The ’ same statement mentioned an eightfold increase in the output of the “most essential types of munitions”; in the manufacture of shells, for instance, special emphasis was laid on armour-piercing power to immobilise the German Tiger tanks; and the ordnance factories have concentrated on new kinds of self-propelled gUnSOn the production of tanks and aeroplanes reports have been still less specific. Not even percentage increases have been published lately. Instead, a very considerable improvement and modernisation in the technique of production has been reported. Automatic electric welding machines have been introduced in many factories in the Urals, which has made it possible to speed up and perfect the manufacture of tanks as well as to save skilled labour. “A girl who only recently left a collective farm for a factory (one report goes) is able on an automatic welding machine to turn out as many tank parts as five skilled welders used to produce by hand.” Much has also been done to ensure an even flow of output from aircraft factories. New multi-spindle lathes have been brought into use, with a very large economy in labour and machines. In some instances only an eighth of the previous number of workers are now required to carry out a particular operation; and one multi-spindle lathe does the work which twelve times as many lathes of the previous type used to do. Many of the new technical devices, which have recently been given publicity, still remain in the experimental stage; but many others have been put into operation and have enabled a number of armament factories to switch over to mass production. The tendency towards “americanisation,” which has been apparent in Russia ever since the first Five Year Plan appears to be a dominant influence in the many new industrial centres in the Urals which have sprung up in the course of the war like mushrooms. The weakest spot in the Ural war industries has always been the supply of fuel and electricity. In this respect the northern and central regions of the Urals are in an even worse position than the southern regions, which are nearer—though by no means near to the coal basins of Kuznetsk and Karaganda. In the course of this year some progress has been made in the exploitation of local resources of coal and other fuels. The Sverdlovsk region—very important for its tank and aircraft factories —has doubled its output of electricity and trebled its output of coal. It seems doubtful, however, whether the fuel bottleneck has really been broken; and the fact that the shortages of coal and electricity in the central and northern parts ol die Urals have not frustrated the plans for industrial expansion there is in itself a remarkable achievement. It can only he explained by the extraordinarily energetic and strict allocation ol fuel, according to priorities, to the factories which have lacked and needed it most. The spirit in which the Urals drive is being continued is issustrated by a new letter from the workers of the Urals to M. Stalin. The letter contains the promise: “To work still more smoothly and enthusiastically in order to help the Red Army drive the Fascist beast into its grave as quickly as possible. The Urals people swear by their lives and their honour Io keep their word and give in 1913 twice as much armaments and ammunition ol the best quality as in the previous year.”